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2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2682, 2683, 2684, 2685, 2686, 2687, 2688, 2689, 2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, 2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2718, 2719, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725, 2726, 2727, 2728, 2729, 2730, 2731, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2735, 2736, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2740, 2741, 2742, 2743, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2747, 2748, 2749, 2750, 2751, 2752, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2766, 2767, 2768, 2769, 2770, 2771, 2772, 2773, 2774, 2775, 2776, 2777, 2778, 2779, 2780, 2781, 2782, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 2788, 2789, 2790, 2791, 2792, 2793, 2794, 2795, 2796, 2797, 2798, 2799, 2800, 2801, 2802, 2803, 2804, 2805, 2806, 2807, 2808, 2809, 2810, 2811, 2812, 2813, 2814, 2815, 2816, 2817, 2818, 2819, 2820, 2821, 2822, 2823, 2824, 2825, 2826, 2827, 2828, 2829, 2830, 2831, 2832, 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836, 2837, 2838, 2839, 2840, 2841, 2842, 2843, 2844, 2845, 2846, 2847, 2848, 2849, 2850, 2851, 2852, 2853, 2854, 2855, 2856, 2857, 2858, 2859, 2860, 2861, 2862, 2863, 2864, 2865, 2866, 2867, 2868, 2869, 2870, 2871, 2872, 2873, 2874, 2875, 2876, 2877, 2878, 2879, 2880, 2881, 2882, 2883, 2884, 2885, 2886, 2887, 2888, 2889, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 2896, 2897, 2898, 2899, 2900, 2901, 2902, 2903, 2904, 2905, 2906, 2907, 2908, 2909, 2910, 2911, 2912, 2913, 2914, 2915, 2916, 2917, 2918, 2919, 2920, 2921, 2922, 2923, 2924, 2925, 2926, 2927, 2928, 2929, 2930, 2931, 2932, 2933, 2934, 2935, 2936, 2937, 2938, 2939, 2940, 2941, 2942, 2943, 2944, 2945, 2946, 2947, 2948, 2949, 2950, 2951, 2952, 2953, 2954, 2955, 2956, 2957, 2958, 2959, 2960, 2961, 2962, 2963, 2964, 2965, 2966, 2967, 2968, 2969, 2970, 2971, 2972, 2973, 2974, 2975, 2976, 2977, 2978, 2979, 2980, 2981, 2982, 2983, 2984, 2985, 2986, 2987, 2988, 2989, 2990, 2991, 2992, 2993, 2994, 2995, 2996, 2997, 2998, 2999, 3000, 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3005, 3006, 3007, 3008, 3009, 3010, 3011, 3012, 3013, 3014, 3015, 3016, 3017, 3018, 3019, 3020, 3021, 3022, 3023, 3024, 3025, 3026, 3027, 3028, 3029, 3030, 3031, 3032, 3033, 3034, 3035, 3036, 3037, 3038, 3039, 3040, 3041, 3042, 3043, 3044, 3045, 3046, 3047, 3048, 3049, 3050, 3051, 3052, 3053, 3054, 3055, 3056, 3057, 3058, 3059, 3060, 3061, 3062, 3063, 3064, 3065, 3066, 3067, 3068, 3069, 3070, 3071, 3072, 3073, 3074, 3075, 3076, 3077, 3078, 3079, 3080, 3081, 3082, 3083, 3084, 3085, 3086, 3087, 3088, 3089, 3090, 3091, 3092, 3093, 3094, 3095, 3096, 3097, 3098, 3099, 3100, 3101, 3102, 3103, 3104, 3105, 3106, 3107, 3108, 3109, 3110, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3114, 3115, 3116, 3117, 3118, 3119, 3120, 3121, 3122, 3123, 3124, 3125, 3126, 3127, 3128, 3129, 3130, 3131, 3132, 3133, 3134, 3135, 3136, 3137, 3138, 3139, 3140, 3141, 3142, 3143, 3144, 3145, 3146, 3147, 3148, 3149, 3150, 3151, 3152, 3153, 3154, 3155, 3156, 3157, 3158, 3159, 3160, 3161, 3162, 3163, 3164, 3165, 3166, 3167, 3168, 3169, 3170, 3171, 3172, 3173, 3174, 3175, 3176, 3177, 3178, 3179, 3180, 3181, 3182, 3183, 3184, 3185, 3186, 3187, 3188, 3189, 3190, 3191, 3192, 3193, 3194, 3195, 3196, 3197, 3198, 3199, 3200, 3201, 3202, 3203, 3204, 3205, 3206, 3207, 3208, 3209, 3210, 3211, 3212, 3213, 3214, 3215, 3216, 3217, 3218, 3219, 3220, 3221, 3222, 3223, 3224, 3225, 3226, 3227, 3228, 3229, 3230, 3231, 3232, 3233, 3234, 3235, 3236, 3237, 3238, 3239, 3240, 3241, 3242, 3243, 3244, 3245, 3246, 3247, 3248, 3249, 3250, 3251, 3252, 3253, 3254, 3255, 3256, 3257, 3258, 3259, 3260, 3261, 3262, 3263, 3264, 3265, 3266, 3267, 3268, 3269, 3270, 3271, 3272, 3273, 3274, 3275, 3276, 3277, 3278, 3279, 3280, 3281, 3282, 3283, 3284, 3285, 3286, 3287, 3288, 3289, 3290, 3291, 3292, 3293, 3294, 3295, 3296, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3300, 3301, 3302, 3303, 3304, 3305, 3306, 3307, 3308, 3309, 3310, 3311, 3312, 3313, 3314, 3315, 3316, 3317, 3318, 3319, 3320, 3321, 3322, 3323, 3324, 3325, 3326, 3327, 3328, 3329, 3330, 3331, 3332, 3333, 3334, 3335, 3336, 3337, 3338, 3339, 3340, 3341, 3342, 3343, 3344, 3345, 3346, 3347, 3348, 3349, 3350, 3351, 3352, 3353, 3354, 3355, 3356, 3357, 3358, 3359, 3360, 3361, 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365, 3366, 3367, 3368, 3369, 3370, 3371, 3372, 3373, 3374, 3375, 3376, 3377, 3378, 3379, 3380, 3381, 3382, 3383, 3384, 3385, 3386, 3387, 3388, 3389, 3390, 3391, 3392, 3393, 3394, 3395, 3396, 3397, 3398, 3399, 3400, 3401, 3402, 3403, 3404, 3405, 3406, 3407, 3408, 3409, 3410, 3411, 3412, 3413, 3414, 3415, 3416, 3417, 3418, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3423, 3424, 3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3429, 3430, 3431, 3432, 3433, 3434, 3435, 3436, 3437, 3438, 3439, 3440, 3441, 3442, 3443, 3444, 3445, 3446, 3447, 3448, 3449, 3450, 3451, 3452, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3458, 3459, 3460, 3461, 3462, 3463, 3464, 3465, 3466, 3467, 3468, 3469, 3470, 3471, 3472, 3473, 3474, 3475, 3476, 3477, 3478, 3479, 3480, 3481, 3482, 3483, 3484, 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489, 3490, 3491, 3492, 3493, 3494, 3495, 3496, 3497, 3498, 3499, 3500, 3501, 3502, 3503, 3504, 3505, 3506, 3507, 3508, 3509, 3510, 3511, 3512, 3513, 3514, 3515, 3516, 3517, 3518, 3519, 3520, 3521, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3527, 3528, 3529, 3530, 3531, 3532, 3533, 3534, 3535, 3536, 3537, 3538, 3539, 3540, 3541, 3542, 3543, 3544, 3545, 3546, 3547, 3548, 3549, 3550, 3551, 3552, 3553, 3554, 3555, 3556, 3557, 3558, 3559, 3560, 3561, 3562, 3563, 3564, 3565, 3566, 3567, 3568, 3569, 3570, 3571, 3572, 3573, 3574, 3575, 3576, 3577, 3578, 3579, 3580, 3581, 3582, 3583, 3584, 3585, 3586, 3587, 3588, 3589, 3590, 3591, 3592, 3593, 3594, 3595, 3596, 3597, 3598, 3599, 3600, 3601, 3602, 3603, 3604, 3605, 3606, 3607, 3608, 3609, 3610, 3611, 3612, 3613, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619, 3620, 3621, 3622, 3623, 3624, 3625, 3626, 3627, 3628, 3629, 3630, 3631, 3632, 3633, 3634, 3635, 3636, 3637, 3638, 3639, 3640, 3641, 3642, 3643, 3644, 3645, 3646, 3647, 3648, 3649, 3650, 3651, 3652, 3653, 3654, 3655, 3656, 3657, 3658, 3659, 3660, 3661, 3662, 3663, 3664, 3665, 3666, 3667, 3668, 3669, 3670, 3671, 3672, 3673, 3674, 3675, 3676, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3680, 3681, 3682, 3683, 3684, 3685, 3686, 3687, 3688, 3689, 3690, 3691, 3692, 3693, 3694, 3695, 3696, 3697, 3698, 3699, 3700, 3701, 3702, 3703, 3704, 3705, 3706, 3707, 3708, 3709, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3713, 3714, 3715, 3716, 3717, 3718, 3719, 3720, 3721, 3722, 3723, 3724, 3725, 3726, 3727, 3728, 3729, 3730, 3731, 3732, 3733, 3734, 3735, 3736, 3737, 3738, 3739, 3740, 3741, 3742, 3743, 3744, 3745, 3746, 3747, 3748, 3749, 3750, 3751, 3752, 3753, 3754, 3755, 3756, 3757, 3758, 3759, 3760, 3761, 3762, 3763, 3764, 3765, 3766, 3767, 3768, 3769, 3770, 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 3780, 3781, 3782, 3783, 3784, 3785, 3786, 3787, 3788, 3789, 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 3794, 3795, 3796, 3797, 3798, 3799, 3800, 3801, 3802, 3803, 3804, 3805, 3806, 3807, 3808, 3809, 3810, 3811, 3812, 3813, 3814, 3815, 3816, 3817, 3818, 3819, 3820, 3821, 3822, 3823, 3824, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3828, 3829, 3830, 3831, 3832, 3833, 3834, 3835, 3836, 3837, 3838, 3839, 3840, 3841, 3842, 3843, 3844, 3845, 3846, 3847, 3848, 3849, 3850, 3851, 3852, 3853, 3854, 3855, 3856, 3857, 3858, 3859, 3860, 3861, 3862, 3863, 3864, 3865, 3866,

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CONTENTS

Editorial	328
A Living Sacrifice: In Memoriam, John Baillie (1886-1960) T. F. TORRANCE	329
The Newer Science and Its Challenge to the Churches	
1. Stars, Ethics and Survival.....HARLOW SHAPLEY	334
2. Teilhard de Chardin and the Phenomenon of Man...D. WADE SAFFORD	345
3. Science and Religion at the Crossroads.....G. D. YARNOLD	357
4. Ethical Problems in a Space Age.....EDWARD L. LONG	366
The New Situation in the Atomic Age.....HELMUT THIELICKE	374
<i>(Translated by Karl H. Hertz)</i>	
Mao Tse-tung and the Decree of Heaven.....JEREMY INGALLS	401
Walter Rauschenbusch and the New Evangelism....WINTHROP S. HUDSON	412
The Ministries and the Ministry of the Whole Church..FRANKLIN H. LITTELL	431
Common Sense Looks at Man-Made Men.....J. DAVID TOWNSEND	443
Religion and the Arts	
Painting as the Communication of Spirit.....ROBERT PAUL ROTH	448
Commentary.....J. H. OLDHAM	458
Book Reviews and Notices.....	461

Editorial

THE TREMBLING balance of terror is finally forcing religion, philosophy and science into a new confrontation. They find themselves meeting in the field of moral values, and under circumstances so ominous as to make it clear that they must covenant to help each other fashion, at least, an ethic of survival and, at most, an ethic of world community. Gone are the days when taunts and condescending judgments would pass muster. With the deepening shadows of annihilation rapidly encircling the globe, waiting only for some accident, some incident, some desperate move to blot out the sun of human hope on earth, representatives of these three great disciplines are asking, not whether they can help each other, but how and where to do it most immediately and usefully.

I suggest that the long-neglected field of value theory must be re-explored by them, for this is where they meet now—as our series of articles on the Newer Science (pp. 334ff) plainly shows. It is one of the tragedies of our time that all three disciplines have been devoting so little vital energy to this field. But now they face common questions: What is value? What are the criteria of value judgments. Why do we value what we do? How can we develop the moral imperative necessary to enable us to value what we should value? These and other apparently abstruse questions provide common ground for all who are honestly concerned about human survival.

It will help not at all to have pacifists and militarists in all fields start swinging ancient clubs at one another. While each must bear his witness as he can in this area, all simply must meet or try to meet on new and, let us hope, higher ground now. For they know—must know—that events have overwhelmed their pet positions, and they are called of God (or whatever they hold to be ultimate) to prepare for the final phase of man's present struggle to stay on this planet. The earth may not amount to much, as Dr. Shapley infers, but we earthlings say of it what Falstaff said of his daughter: "A poor thing, but mine own."

H.A.B.

A Living Sacrifice

In Memoriam, John Baillie, 1886-1960

T. F. TORRANCE

I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.

(Romans 12:1)

TO PRESENT YOUR BODIES a living sacrifice to God is your reasonable service. The words which St. Paul used were λογικὴ λατρεία, which we may translate as *spiritual* or *rational worship*. We are reminded of the words in the Anglican service for holy matrimony, "thee with my body I worship." Rational worship is in no sense an abstraction, but rather the honoring of God in our bodies. Rational worship is the directing of the whole of our being upward toward God, but it is a worship of him in the midst of the concrete physical realities of earth—that is the sacrifice with which God is well pleased.

This worship of God has its own true form—not a form derived from orientation to the world, but a form proper to its movement toward God, a form which we can only gain through the renewing of our mind in God. Only when the mind is informed by such worship toward God can it truly discern and prove what is the *good*, the *pleasing* to God, and the *perfect*. It is through the worship of God that human beings become truly rational and ethical. It is the God-centered reason that discerns things in their proper proportion. The man-centered reason is proud; but the man whose reason is centered in God does not think more highly of himself than he ought, but in honor prefers the other. He sees all others in the order that derives from the Grace of God, and therefore sees them as members of one body and members one of another in Christ. Thus the worship of God with

THOMAS F. TORRANCE, D.D., D.Theol. (Basel), D.Théol. (Paris, Geneva), is Professor of Christian Dogmatics at New College, Edinburgh University, Scotland. He delivered this sermon at the University Memorial Service for Dr. Baillie in St. Giles Cathedral, October 27, 1960. Dr. Torrance, himself a distinguished theologian, has carried major responsibility in preparing Dr. Baillie's Gifford Lectures for posthumous publication.

our minds and with our bodies directs us into the way of brotherly love and harmony, and informs the whole body with unity.

Throughout his long life John Baillie was an outstanding witness of these things; he was an embodiment in our midst of this rational worship of God and all that it entailed in the Christian way of life in which we are members of one another. As we give thanks to God for him, let us recall some of these things for which he stood. John Baillie stood for the worship of God with the *mind*—and he was himself a shining example of that worship. When I spoke a few moments ago of “the God-centered reason,” I was using John Baillie’s own words. He held that man is never so truly human as when he is utterly dependent upon God. “It is in the detachment of reason and humanity from this ultimate dependence upon the divine,” he said, “that the Christian is bound to seek the causes of their present eclipse. Man, when cut off from God, has relapsed into unreason.” John Baillie himself worshiped God not only with the bottom of his heart, but the very top of his mind—that consecration of all his great mental gifts to God was the secret of his great humanity and the source of his humility.

Listen to a prayer which he wrote long ago which reveals the man he was:

O God above me, God who dwellest in light unapproachable, teach me, I beseech Thee, that even my highest thoughts of Thee are but dim and distant shadowings of Thy transcendent glory. Teach me that if Thou art in nature, still more art Thou greater than nature. Teach me that if Thou art in my heart, still more art Thou greater than my heart. Let my soul rejoice in Thy mysterious greatness. Let me take refuge in the thought that Thou art utterly beyond me, beyond the sweep of my imagination, beyond the comprehension of my mind, Thy judgments being unsearchable and Thy ways past finding out. O Lord, hallowed be Thy name. Amen.

Such openness toward God meant for John Baillie also an openness toward his fellow men. And so we find he used to pray:

Give me an open mind, O God, a mind ready to receive and to welcome such new light of knowledge as it is Thy will to reveal to me. Let not the past ever be so dear to me as to set a limit to the future. Give me courage to change my mind, when that is needed. Let me be tolerant to the thoughts of others and hospitable to such light as may come to me through them.

That is the John Baillie we have known and loved so dearly, whether as his students or as his colleagues. God, who used him to put such prayers into our mouth, grant that we follow him in seeking to let the mind of God be in our mind.

For John Baillie the worship of God had its own essential and

appropriate form—the beauty of holiness. It was not only that in the worship of God the crooked things were made straight or the rough places smooth, but that the *itinerarium mentis in Deum*—the journey of the mind in God—carried it to places where a vision of divine and uncreated beauty broke upon the mind and so imprinted itself upon it that when the mind turned back to contemplate the world of created realities, it dwelt lovingly upon the good, the pleasing and the perfect.

Give me open eyes, O God, eyes quick to discover Thine indwelling in the world which Thou hast made. Let all lovely things fill me with gladness and let them uplift my mind to Thine everlasting loveliness. Forgive all my past blindness to the grandeur and glory of nature, to the charm of little children, to the sublimities of human story, and to all the illuminations of Thy presence which these things contain.

So John Baillie prayed, and he lived as he prayed; he thought and wrote as he prayed. In no theologian of our generation has the contemplation of God been so wedded to a beauty of form deriving from rational worship. It flowed over into his deep appreciation of all lovely creatures and of the works of God's children, whether in music or drawing or porcelain or verse; but is most manifest in the form of his thoughts and the corresponding form of his writing. We have rarely known such theological prose as flowed from the pen of John Baillie—even his writing was a worshiping and honoring of God in the beauty of holiness. And through it all one can hear his characteristic petition: "Grant unto me such a vision of Thine uncreated beauty as will make me dissatisfied with all lesser beauties." He was, to use one of his own expressions, *a pilgrim of eternity*.

But who has been more conscious amongst us of the startling conjunction in these words of St. Paul—*rational* worship, holy, acceptable to God, is to present to him your *bodies*—your physical bodies? The rational worship of God, the vision of the eternal beauty, takes place where God in his Grace has set us, where we are bound to one another by physical ties, and depend on one another for the fulfillment of our earthly needs, and where no man can appear before God without his brother. Growth upward into God takes root downward into the depth and spreads outward into the length and breadth of human life. The rational worship of God is necessarily a *way of life, an ethic*. Therefore the purer theology is, the greater its fruit in the *way of love*. Unbelief, John Baillie held, always involves some element of wrong desire, but faith works by love, and truth constrains to kindness and unselfishness. Thus in all his theological work John Baillie sought to lay bare the mutual dependence and the interlocking of the mind's

understanding of God and the Christian way of life, that is, of theology and ethics.

"God desires truth in the inward parts," he used to cite from the Psalmist. It was along this line that he came to speak so directly to multitudes of bewildered and morally confused people in our generation, and to point them through their entanglements to the truth of God. Typical was his word to the undergraduates of Cambridge in 1941. "The one great difficulty that confronts God in His desire to reveal Himself to you and me, that thereby He may save us, is the difficulty of cutting through the dreadful tangle of dishonesty and lying and self-deception and pathetic make-believe with which we all the time surround ourselves." Then he went on to show that because the truth of God cannot be pursued in artificial abstraction from the other claims life makes upon us, we can only break through to the truth through sheer moral honesty with one another and submission to the total claim of God upon our daily life. It was because John Baillie's own thinking was marked with such integrity in these ways that he was able both to invite and to lead others into *itinerarium mentis in Deum*—pilgrimage into the new life of God.

In the same course of lectures in Cambridge, John Baillie pointed out that our familiar expression, *membership* of this or that society, derives from and still has its fullest meaning in the Church of Christ. The Church was the first society of which men spoke of themselves as being *members*, and when it was first used by Paul it must have seemed a very startling and even extravagant manner of speech. "For as we have many members in one body and all members have not the same office; so we, being many, are one Body in Christ, and every one members one of another." St. Paul has had no more faithful disciple in our day than John Baillie in pursuing to its fullness this relation between the worship of God in mind and body and the brotherhood of Christ in the unity of the Church. The worship of God is not rational if it entails dissension or division in those who worship; worship of God lacks its true form if it does not carry with it unity in the body and a proper proportion among the members of the body. It is sheer devotion to God, sheer integrity in honoring and worshipping him, that constrains us to unity in the Church—for disunity there means dishonesty with God, the contradiction of his love, and the rejection of integrity. The way of God is the way of reconciliation through truth in the inward parts, that is, not just in spiritual but in concrete bodily relations.

That was the way John Baillie himself ever walked—he embodied the honoring of God; he lived out *in the body* the reconciliation with God given

to him in Christ—and therefore no cause was dearer to him on earth than the peace and unity of the children of God. His years of devotion to the ecumenical movement were crowned most fittingly by his presidency in the World Council of Churches. No one was listened to in its counsels so carefully; no one's words had greater weight in its decisions—for behind his counsel was one who devoted his *mind*, with all its superb gifts, to the glory of God.

Hear, then, the Word of God to which John Baillie bore such faithful witness in word and life: "*I beseech you, brethren, by the mercies of God that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your rational worship.*"

The Newer Science and Its Challenge to the Churches

I. Stars, Ethics, and Survival

HARLOW SHAPLEY

A HUNDRED YEARS AGO Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published and, as a consequence, our concept of man forthwith underwent a major mutation. This sudden change in attitude was comparable in effect to those slow physical changes that had in preceding millennia differentiated the body of man from the bodies of his anthropoid ancestors. We have appropriately celebrated Darwin and his brave collaborators; and in doing so we have extended that basic Growth Principle (evolution) far beyond the point of emphasis of a century ago, when only the origins of plant species and of animal species were explored. We now go much farther back than Darwin and the paleontologists went. Also we timidly look forward. Along with Robert Burns we may say to the panicked mouse that she is fortunate compared with the human plowman, for

The present only toucheth thee:
But, Och! I backward cast my e'e
On prospects drear!
An' forward, tho' I canna see,
I guess an' fear!

Let us cast our e'e backward as far as we can before we look and guess timidly forward. We shall start with the birth and growth of atoms, and steadily progress through a myriad of atomic and cellular stages to ethical man—indeed, toward either a kind of superman or toward the dreaded extinction of this planet's human race.

Hence the title, the ambitious title of this presentation: "Stars, Ethics, and Survival"—*Stars*, in which are born most of the kinds of atoms that

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HARLOW SHAPLEY, Ph.D., LL.D., Sc.D., was Director of the Observatory at Harvard University, 1921-52, and Paine Professor of Astronomy at Harvard, 1952-56, now Emeritus. He is widely known as a lecturer, holds two degrees from Mexican universities, has received numerous international scientific awards.

compose solid and human matter; *Ethics*, on which human and other civilizations are nurtured; *Survival*, based on the hope of avoiding the extinction with which the distortion of civilization now threatens us.

For the race of men and for the individual we seem to hear ominously of birth, struggle, and the finalizing curtain. Or might it be birth, social wisdom, and a glorious survival in an atomic world?

Stars burn their abundant hydrogen fuel into helium ash. They thus provide the energy of radiation that generates life and warms and feeds us all, feeds all protoplasmic creatures. Man himself, who is one of the late products of that hydrogen mutation deep in the sun, now also knows how to change hydrogen into helium and thereby provide energy which, misused, can extinguish himself and others. As a hoped-for alternative, man can peacefully use that nuclear energy for the enrichment of human culture. He can at least slightly modify the earth, explore the solar system. Beyond that, however, little progress, little effect.

We need not be concerned about what man, at his most explosive worst, may do to the universe. We need not worry about a cosmos that has human ingenuity running wild. For man's power, cosmically speaking, is negligible. He can do himself in, of course; possibly blow up his planet and put an end to terrestrial biology. But it would be only a local disturbance. Such an episode would leave the stars untouched and unconcerned.

THE STUFF OF STARS AND MAN: ATOMS AND RADIATION

In the beginning was the Word, it has been piously recorded, and I might venture that the word was hydrogen gas. In the very beginning were hydrogen atoms, so far as we now see, but actually there must have been something antecedent. Whence came these atoms of hydrogen, these atoms 20,000,000,000,000 (plus 66 additional zeros) in number—atoms that we now surmise have become the material make-up of the universe? What preceded their appearance, if anything? That is perhaps a question for metaphysics. The origin of origins is beyond astronomy. It is perhaps beyond philosophy, in the realm of the to us unknowable.

Ordinary physics and astronomy suggest that if several billions of our years ago we had all that hydrogen and the natural physical laws, what we now see would have followed without the intervention of miracles and without supernatural intercession. Gravitation, radiation, and eventually photosynthesis and genetics—with operators such as these and the widely dispersed hydrogen atoms, the universe of galaxies, stars, planets, life, and man would have emerged.

A most amazing and simplifying evolution of the chemical elements, of which all matter is made, has recently come to our knowledge, thanks to the present-day erudite studies in nuclear physics and astrophysics. The evolution of the whole series of elements is concerned, from hydrogen and helium (the lightest atoms) through carbon, oxygen, iron, and threescore other middleweight atoms, to lead, radium, and the devil atom uranium. The interiors of the stars provide the locale of the syntheses. High temperatures are required. Here on earth, or in the earth, there are no atomic mutations—except the natural radioactive breakdown of radium and some others into lead, helium, calcium, argon—not even the simplest mutation, $4\text{H} = 1\text{He} + \text{radiation}$, occurs here on earth where there is no natural temperature high enough for that operation. The same holds for the other planets. Nor is it hot enough on the surface of the sun for the hydrogen burning, or on the surfaces of other stars, or in the diffuse nebulosities from which stars apparently are born.

To start this transmutation, first involving helium and then the heavier elements, we need temperatures in excess of ten million degrees absolute. In the middle of the sun, such temperatures prevail—hot enough for the hydrogen-into-helium reaction, but not hot enough for the “cooking” of the heavier elements—not hot enough for the further steps in the evolution of complex inanimate matter. How were these heavier elements born? They appear to be built out of hydrogen “blocks”; the common carbon atom is 12 times the weight of the hydrogen atom; iron, 56 times; uranium, 238 times.

Our question to the cosmographer is: How are these complicated heavier atomic structures evolved from simple hydrogen and helium? The sun, we have said, is not hot enough. It can produce helium, and in collapsing after the hydrogen supply approaches exhaustion it may produce some carbon and oxygen, but apparently not iron, nickel, gold, and the other middleweight or heavy atoms.

But suppose the sun should blow up, and become a nova. Every year there are scores of such disasters in our own star-populated galaxy. Something goes wrong with the control of the energy output. A star in such trouble suddenly increases in size and brightness. It blows off its outer atmospheric shells. If the erupting star were the sun, the brightness would increase in a single day to five or ten thousand times its normal brightness. The internal temperature would rise toward 100 million degrees, and some of the helium atoms, which had been born more calmly out of hydrogen, would be violently turned into heavier elements. At the same time the

explosion would have scattered into space some of this new material as well as the helium and unburned hydrogen.

It is from this scattered gas mixture that eventually new stars are formed as a result of a second gravitational contraction. They would radiate with a higher central temperature, because the heavier elements are now involved. They start again their risky life where thermostatic controls may fail to function and novation may again ensue.

SUPERNOVATION

Ordinary novae, however, are not competent to do the syntheses of the heaviest elements. Their central temperatures are not hot enough. And it is here that another violent operation enters—the supernova.

In the year A.D. 1054 a dazzling new light appeared in the sky—a starlike radiator that apparently outshone all others. The oriental astrologers made a record of it. It was visible in the daytime for some weeks and visible at night for a couple of years; but then it faded away from the sky and from the memory of man. Centuries later, however, in the same position among the constellations, a faint nebulosity was found. It was named the Crab Nebula, because of its fancied shape. It was not much unlike other nebulosities, such as the famed one in the sword of Orion. But examination with the photographic and spectroscopic tools of the astronomer showed that it is expanding, and at such a steady rate that, counting back, the time of its origin can be accurately dated. The nebula is indeed the product of the explosion recorded in 1054, which actually occurred some four thousand years ago. It took about forty centuries for the light from the explosion to get to the earth. This explosion was not a simple blowing off of the upper atmosphere, but the essentially complete annihilation of a star. The temperatures involved in this supernova explosion were what astrophysicists had been looking for, a temperature source high enough to produce the heavier elements.

Many details of this evolutionary process are yet to be worked out, but the general sketch is clear—contraction of the primeval hydrogen gas into stars, explosive return of some of the gases to space again to assemble in stars, which again may novate. In the course of these catastrophes the chemical elements evolve. Our sun, it is surmised, may be a “third generation” star, for it is composed of all kinds of elements. Of most of the atomic species, however, there is as yet only a trace; hydrogen and helium still dominate the sun. The following percentages for the solar system are based on estimates of atomic abundances by Dr. Lawrence Aller:

<i>Element</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Hydrogen	86.84
Helium	13.00
Oxygen	0.06
Neon	0.04
Carbon	0.03
Nitrogen	0.01
All others	0.02

We have, therefore, in the centennial of the Darwinian *biological* evolutionary theory, found that *physical* evolution prevails on a much greater scale. It is exhibited not only by the birth and growth of stars, galaxies, and planets, but also by the mutation of the chemical elements. An evolutionary thread seems to run through all nature, inanimate and animate. Again I point out that modern science has removed the need of appeal to miracles or the supernatural for the origin of molecules, or the origin of life, or the origin of trees, or the origin of man and his curiosity. All these evolve naturally.

Much can be said about stars—volumes and volumes about star myths, and star-generated poetry; about telescopic appearances and mathematical analyses; about the youth of stars, their evolution and senility. For the examination of our principal theme—biological survival—we shall refer to but a few stellar problems. For example, are there planets other than those of the solar system? Are there minor bodies like the earth circulating endlessly around hot gaseous giant bodies like our sun-star?

Many stars are double, or triple, perhaps more than half of them. Clusters of stars are common, the open variety, like the Pleiades, and the rich globular clusters that have tens of thousands of members. Still larger aggregates are the galaxies, one of which is our own Milky Way organization; and there are clusters of galaxies, and the sum of all, the Metagalaxy.

In general, the double stars are hostile to planets like the earth. They permit no travel in circular or nearly circular paths around them. In fact, they would probably not permit the forming of planets from preplanet material. The same holds for other close groups, like the multiple stars, and probably for the centers of globular star clusters; perhaps also for the nuclear regions of spiral galaxies like our own Milky Way organization. From sampling the contents of space with the largest telescopes to distances in excess of a billion light years, we estimate that there are more than a hundred billion galaxies and a total population of stars in excess of 10^{20} , or a hundred thousand million billion. If only one star in ten were single like our sun, there would still be more than 10^{19} single stars.

THE FREQUENCY OF LIFE-BEARING PLANETS

In a speculative frame of mind let's say that only one in a hundred is a single star, and of them only one in a hundred has a system of planets and of them only one in a hundred has an earthlike planet, and of them only one in a hundred has its earth in that interval of distance from the star that we call the liquid-water-belt (neither too cold nor too hot), and of them only one in a hundred has the chemistry of air, water, and land something like ours—suppose all those chances were approximately true, then we would find a planet suitable for biological experiment for only one star in ten billion. But there are so many stars! We would still have ten billion planets suitable for organic life something like that on the earth.

In the opinion of most scientists who have pondered this situation in recent years, I have here greatly underestimated the frequency of good planetary sites for biology; we should increase the number by a million times at least, increase it to ten million billion.

PLANETS, THEN LIFE

Our next problem concerns the probability that life really does exist on some of these accommodating planets. We have life here on earth, but are we unique? Are all the millions of other suitable planets barren of the products of natural biochemical evolution?

We on earth have no advantages that are denied others. In fact, we are very humbly placed in the stellar world. Our planet is small. It circles a very average, yellowish, middle-age star. That star (the sun) is located in the thinly populated outer structure of a large galaxy that contains some hundred billion other stars, of which many billion must be essentially identical with the sun. That this planet is the one and only place where life has emerged would be a ridiculous assumption. Those who know about the number of stars, about the natural ways planets can be born, and the apparently automatic way life emerges when conditions are right—they no longer hesitate to believe that life is a cosmos-wide phenomenon; and that belief is giving many of us a reason for rethinking our philosophies of man and his function. Rethinking our religious position. Contemplating a stellar theology.

We have long suspected that the animate evolves somehow from the lifeless. But how? The scientific literature has in recent years frequently mentioned the Russian biochemist A. I. Oparin and his speculations about the conditions on the earth's surface before the earliest life appeared. Also

well known is the Urey-Miller experiment of putting an electric discharge through an atmosphere of methane, ammonia, water vapor, and hydrogen, and producing amino acids, the building blocks of proteins. We believe that the earth's primeval atmosphere was much like that of the experiment; the electric discharge simulated the primitive lightning. In other words, the Miller experiment was what could have happened, and evidently did happen, on the earth's surface two to three thousand million years ago, for here we are!—the offspring of rather nauseating gases and of the turbulent primeval lightning.

The Miller experiment has now been successfully repeated in many other laboratories. Other attacks on the problems of life's terrestrial beginning involve deep studies of photosynthesis, viruses, and the nucleic acids. They now convince us that when the physics, chemistry, and climatology on a planet's surface are not unfavorable, life will emerge and persist. Astronomers through their spectroscopic studies are able to say that the same chemical atoms as those found in our sun are present in other stars; and apparently the physics is the same the universe over. But even if only one in a hundred of the suitable planets has actually got life well under way, there would be more than a hundred million such planets. No, we are not alone!

The evidence is strong, though not yet conclusive, that there is life on Mars. If space researches should develop to the point of *proving* the existence of life on Mars, our argument of life's inevitability anywhere when conditions are right would be greatly strengthened.

The high probability of cosmos-wide life of the kind we know is certainly a thought and dream producer. That any form exists just exactly like the higher primates on the earth is very unlikely, for there are millions of variations on the animal theme. However, protoplasmic developments that are far more complex than ours are probable.

Will we forever be out of physical and mental contact with sentient beings elsewhere? Some scientists think not. They even discuss possible techniques for communicating, by light and radio signals, across the emptiness of space. The suggestions are amusing, instructive, if not yet very practical. It is properly assumed, I think, that organisms more advanced than we are probably exist on some planet not too far away. But effective signaling would be difficult. Perhaps we should first attempt a two-way conversation with a horse-radish or a scarab beetle, or with a termite queen-mother, who represents the highest natural societal organization known on this planet.

Probably no suitable planetary station is nearer than ten light years (sixty thousand billion miles). Question and answer would take more than twenty years. So far no one is seriously contemplating velocities of travel or of signal greater than the velocity of light. The physical laws seem to be universal. We are indeed isolated from other life-bearing planets by the physics of the situation.

THE ETHICAL CRISIS

Our concern, however, need not be with the rather bizarre project of space communication; we have a more serious problem on our hands. To appreciate its seriousness we must look back to our account of the early history of the chemical elements. The stars, we noted, are kept hot mainly by the natural evolution of hydrogen into helium and by other transmutations. We humans have learned to turn the trick artificially. As a by-product, enormous energies can be got out of the hydrogen-to-helium mutation. We do not need the resulting helium, and the loss of hydrogen is of no immediate consequence to us. But the explosive heat produced by the mutation is so enormous that all mankind is deeply concerned with its discovery and development.

Here is where ethics enters our discussion. The hydrogen atom is capable of doing great things for mankind. It is an inexhaustible source of energy; and that cannot be said of wood or coal or oil. *If* we can learn to control it properly, the hydrogen atom can easily give us essentially free energy anywhere on the planet. The imagination boggles at the grandeur of man's future, *if* hydrogen is his ally. But that happy collaboration is for man to create—not by some single act but by a series of deliberate acts aimed to serve fellow man, to serve all men.

From the scientific progress on many fronts emerges the need for ever new attitudes toward religion and philosophy. We need an ethical system suitable for now—for this atomic age—rather than for the human society of two thousand years ago. Cautiously we must modernize—but certainly.

We need a new set of principles for the guidance of today's deciders and today's actors on the international stage. The scientist's atom has made good will, good fellowship, social justice more than ever necessary, if degradation or even extinction is to be avoided. To our problems, especially to our multiracial, multinational problems, peaceful approaches are demanded. Angry men cannot resolve our social and political dilemmas. Big national angers can no longer be tolerated if man is to survive. For anger leads to action and reaction and counteraction. If atomic war tools

are available to angry and vain and stupid men, and are used—then a grim final curtain will close the human play on this planet. It will be truly a judgment day—a day of our own *bad* judgment. The galaxies will continue to rotate, without concern for little Planet No. 3 and its highest life (which is not quite high enough). The sun will bountifully pour its energy into space, but not for *Homo*. He will be through because he has not learned to live with himself.

But let us turn the page and be optimistic; let us consider some elementary short-term alternatives to the extinction of *Homo sapiens*. Short-term protections they will be, but long enough, I hope, to give us the opportunity to establish the long-term working schemes such as enforceable world law that may restrain indefinitely the genocidal, suicidal madness of man's worst enemy—man himself.

ALTERNATIVES TO EXTINCTION

It may require less than fifty years or it may require more than two hundred, but optimistically I foresee a civilization on this planet sufficiently unified and intelligent to forestall the annihilation of the human race. Before that hoped-for stability arrives, we shall probably suffer some difficult times—even small wars. But the desire to live in an increasingly attractive world is so strong and so widespread that I believe political concessions and life-saving adjustments will be made. Thoughtful planning will be required, however—not thoughtless drifting.

But first some remarks on *coexistence* as national policy. It must be, and probably will be established. It is already widely operating, and agreeably so, except in the USA-USSR socio-economic fields. For instance, a dozen or more different nationalities coexist in Russia (how pleasantly I do not know). Differing and inherently antagonistic religious sects coexist in the majority of the large nations of the world. Political parties of comparable strength exist peacefully, though sometimes noisily, in the United States, Canada, England, Germany, and elsewhere.

The socio-economic differences between the USA and the USSR seem deep, but they need not permanently menace our modern civilization; both programs appear to work fairly well in their own states. Probably there is as much sincere and passionate grouching about "Party" men in the USSR as about labor dictators in the USA. Ours is open grouching and apparently ineffective; theirs not so open and possibly more dangerous to the Party. Both political systems of course have faults that are more apparent to others than to themselves. We can continue to boast of our free or nearly free

press, keeping quiet about the Negro problems and political corruption; the Russians can boast of Sputnik and their intense educational policy, and maintain silence about war and political prisoners and no free press. It is not entirely unrealistic to suggest that we and they may gradually draw nearer together than now—that we both will soften the sharpest antagonisms and learn to appreciate in each other some virtues as well as real and imaginary vices.

How can we attain mutual and peaceful understanding? It is a difficult task; man is naturally combative, and most politicians are naturally greedy for power or property. Politics thrives on confusion. Here are, however, a few suggestions bearing specifically on the solving of the USA-USSR problems. Some of the suggested projects could be widely international. When and if needed, similar programs, involving other pairs of nations, could be undertaken. For example, India and Pakistan, Poland and Germany. But the USA and USSR first, for without amelioration, without softening of the strain between them, the future could be dark and sudden.

1. Increase the student interchange until ten thousand visiting students from each nation are continuously involved. This will be expensive; but all-out preparation for or against war is much more so. A war could destroy civilization. A massive interchange might save it. Hopefully, the students from neither country would be deliberately brainwashed, either before the exchange or during the residence. Spread the visiting students over the two countries, I suggest, and let natural friendliness do its work of adjustment and understanding.

2. Continue indefinitely in several scientific fields the beautifully working projects of the International Geophysical Year, which brought not only the USA and USSR, but more than sixty nations into intensive scientific co-operation. The first trip under arctic ice, the first man-made satellite, the first moon-approach rocket, the first complete exploration of Antarctica, the discovery of a mysterious radiation belt—these are but five of the accomplishments of the 1957-1958 international attack on the earth's problems as a planet.

3. Inaugurate international "years" in other than geophysical areas. For example: (a) in the elimination of the major human, animal, and plant diseases; (b) in the study of prehistoric man; (c) in the building and exploitation of deep Plutonic (subterranean) laboratories; (d) in the creation and geographical distribution of new food plants; and (e) in the rescue of arid lands. To illustrate this last: More than a billion acres of unwatered land are distributed over all continents. Depending on the future

development of cheap atomic energy, we can eventually bring water to all arid areas. To activate such a world-wide project we need heroic international research programs on the inexpensive purifying of salt water, on the developing of edible salt-water vegetation, and on the amelioration of widespread food taboos. We might bring back from the deserts some of the paradises of old, and create new ones.

4. Award decorations (or prizes) to artists of each other's country, the recipients to be selected by juries mainly from other nations. For example, a Tchaikovsky prize given by Russia for the best new American symphony; or a Frank Lloyd Wright award to the best architectural design or construction by a Russian in Russia.

5. Establish in each other's capitals, and possibly in each other's largest cities, theater-concert halls devoted in America wholly to Russian productions (classical and modern), and in Russia to American productions. Again an expensive dream—yes—but hate and suspicion are more so; and this educational program could be started modestly.

6. Encourage with cash and applause the present two-way traffic in farmers, artisans, students, artists, and scientists.

The extensive interchange of goods is, of course, important, but not so effective in saving man from his follies as would be the interchange of nonpolitical and noncommercial ideas.

Americans and Russians should both keep in mind that their political and economic inheritances have greatly differed for a long time. All the Russians of age forty-five or less, and there are probably more than a hundred million of them, have lived under no other system than that of the present day; why expect them to understand fully our methods and goals? And the 170,000,000 Americans, mostly contented Americans, have lived under no other system than that which now prevails in America. Little wonder that we worry about other governmental policies than ours. Are we able to understand sympathetically other systems?

The Russians have now and then quietly adopted some "capitalistic" methods. The Americans have permanently adopted a number of socialistic practices that would have shocked into hysterics the "capitalists" of half a century ago. Wide differences between the two still exist. "And our system is the right one for the future," says Sam, the American; and says Ivan, the Russian, "Our system is the one for the future."

2. Teilhard de Chardin and the Phenomenon of Man

D. WADE SAFFORD

I

AN ISRAELITE WITHOUT GUILF: such was Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and in the Church Triumphant now is. This should not be lost sight of in the course of this brief study of one of the most remarkable voices to make itself heard within Christendom for a long, long time, for it is doubly apt. Like all original thinkers he is a center of controversy, which is as it should be, for truth's sake. Scientists and theologians, some for, some against—but no member of either species (we shall pitch the phylogenetic tone at once!) can afford to remain uninformed of man and opus.

Inevitably the little books have begun to come out, short commentaries and introductions; one of the best to appear at the time of this writing is that of Nicolas Corte.¹ This is a sympathetic but not uncritical appraisal of Teilhard, and it is recommended that the neophyte read it before plunging into *The Phenomenon of Man* itself.

Marie-Joseph-Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the fourth in a family of eleven children, was born on May 1, 1881, at the château of Sarcenat, near Clermont-en-Auvergne. His family was of the *petite noblesse*, and his father, Emmanuel Teilhard de Chardin, was a man of wide learning and a local archivist. His mother was a woman of piety; one sister became a nun, and Pierre's entrance into the Society of Jesus in 1899 stems naturally from his background. He remained a loyal (if something of a maverick) member of his order until his death, which took place on Easter Day, 1955, in New York. He is buried in the Jesuit cemetery at St. Andrew-on-Hudson. For the interesting—and often painful—account of his life the reader is

¹ *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: His Life and Spirit*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. "Nicolas Corte" is the *nom de plume* of a French churchman, formerly Dean of the Catholic University of Lyons, Dr. Léon Christiani.

DECIUS WADE SAFFORD, A.B., S.T.B., is on the staff of the Department of Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Washington, D. C., and priest-in-charge of William and Mary and Durham Parishes in Charles County, Maryland.

referred to Dr. Corte's book, or to Sir Julian Huxley's introduction to *The Phenomenon of Man*.²

Teilhard from early childhood was interested in rocks, and after his novitiate on the Island of Jersey and at Hastings in England he was allowed to follow his own bent, first in geology and then in paleontology. The origin and prehistory of man early became his ruling obsession, and during the course of his life he traveled all over the world in this quest, becoming a recognized authority. He took part in the discovery of *Sinanthropus*, "Peking Man," and most of his book was written in China during the Second World War. The Society of Jesus forbade its publication, and further refused him permission to teach philosophy or to stand as candidate for a professorship at the Collège de France.

By way of compensation he received high honors in the scientific world, and his Church and order are now according him posthumous recognition. His portrait was hung in the Vatican's building at the Brussels World's Fair, and his work has become the study of Roman Catholic scholars throughout the world. Teilhard prayed that he would not die bitter, and apparently he did not. During his lifetime many of his essays were circulated in multigraphed form among learned circles; under Jesuit rules the inhibition no longer held after his death, and publication and translation began at once and still continues.

II

At the very outset of the study of *The Phenomenon* the reader, unless he be unusually well informed on matters of geology and prehistory, is warned that he must be prepared to go back to school. If he really wishes to suck the marrow out of these hominid and prehomid bones he must engage in honest homework. Let him obtain a chart of geological periods showing the relative duration of the succeeding ages and epochs and hang it on the wall before him, and standard texts on historical geology will be helpful. Then let him visit a museum of natural history and inform himself especially of what took place on the earth during Tertiary and Quaternary time.

For Teilhard is a seer, and unless we can, in some measure, *see* along with him, acquire a supporting vision, we shall miss all the fine overtones and grace notes of his monumental work. Without adequate preparation we shall wind up like Mohammed's coffin, suspended somewhere between

² *The Phenomenon of Man*, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, translated by Bernard Wall. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.

heaven and earth, but solidly in neither. This is the very weakness of many of Teilhard's theological commentators: they leap over the ground in which he has dug and delved with such painstaking care. We who proclaim God's Incarnation dare not neglect his footstool. (Parenthetically, the only real error I found in Corte—and whether made by author or translator I cannot tell, for I do not have the French text before me—is the ascription of thousands instead of millions of years to the duration of the Tertiary. This is characteristically a churchman's blunder, but it need not be so. One asks oneself the question: after Teilhard can there be a theology without a geology, a paleontology and an historical anthropology?)

What will constitute a well-informed man tomorrow? Our fathers were content to extend their backward vision to Greece and Rome, with biblical history and some archeology thrown in. After Spengler and Toynbee a whole gamut of cultures and civilizations have had to be added, or at least some passing acquaintance with them. With Teilhard the vision is now extended back all the way to the condensation of matter itself from energy, followed by the molecularization of the atom, the emergence of the organic (proteinous) molecule from the inorganic; the evolution of the self-propagating cell from the megamolecule by way of the filterable viruses, and so on up to the primates and man himself. Facts which have been known, some for a long time, others for a shorter, but now synthesized *sub specie aeternitatis*, or as we prefer to put it, in the name of the Living God of Israel.

For the Israelite is transparently present: "To be able to say literally to God that one loves him, not only with all one's body, all one's heart, and all one's soul, but with every fibre of the unifying universe—that is a prayer that can only be made in space-time."³

This is the measure of our protagonist—what a hybrid man of science hath God wrought! No, not hybrid: rather, a complete man, as complete as Leonardo and Michelangelo if not more so; far more rounded than Goethe, for he knows and loves the God of Israel, sees and records the adumbrations of his Incarnation in all that took place before it.

Yet an Israelite without guile. The chief criticism of Teilhard from the theological angle is his side-stepping of the question of evil and sin. This becomes cogent when he projects his vision into the future, and we shall have more to say about it later on. But let us see Teilhard first in the perspective of his own being, his heart and his soul, and in the scope of his

³ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

work. Biblically speaking—and Teilhard's Hebraism is apparent for all who have eyes to see—the subject matter of *The Phenomenon of Man* is the first chapter of Genesis. Creation: Teilhard's whole book is really a hymn to the earth, and shows a beautiful kinship with St. Francis' Hymn to the Sun. He has been taken to task by Dr. Corte for his poetizing, but we ask, is truth complete without poetry? *Dichtung und Wahrheit*—are they not inseparable twins? The origin and evolution of sin and evil: that Teilhard will leave to some future organically-minded Milton. He himself will hymn the flawless handiwork of an Omnipotent Creator, who looked and saw that it was very good. We should no more look for a systematic hamartiology in Teilhard than in St. Francis. (But the want will be felt in his prophecies of the future, as we have said.)⁴

III

Teilhard wants us to *see*. I dare say that there has never been a learned work in which that verb is in greater evidence. He is not concerned with the method or the mechanics of evolution. He knows his genetics, but that is not the primary concern of his book. Neither Darwinian nor Lamarckian nor *neo*- either one, he makes us *see* what has taken place, gives us the magnificent panoply of the earth's growth, and shows us that it is an irreversible and total process.

Is it not time for churchmen to return to the doctrine of Creation? It has been scandalously neglected by theologian and preacher alike. The emphasis on the work of the Redemption overshadows it in most of our seminaries, as Dr. W. Norman Pittenger has said. What happens when we ignore God the Creator? All sorts of heresies and errors, patiently lying in waiting from the days of the Fathers, flock to fill the vacuum. Karl Marx, taking a hasty glance at origins—for he was preoccupied with the here-and-now—opts for "spontaneous generation"; modern novelists find the universe neither good nor bad but absurd. We know all the possibilities of error, but, lacking authority, do not preach against them with conviction.

A word must be said on the subject of pantheism, for Teilhard has been accused of this. He does use the phrase, "Christian Pantheism," but as Dr. Corte points out, what he means by this is really no other than St. Paul's prophecy, "that God may be all in all." Teilhard never confuses Creation and Creator; his God is both transcendent and immanent, *but*

⁴ For a consideration of Teilhard's Hebraism see *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: his Thought*, by Claude Tresmontant. Baltimore: The Helicon Press, 1959.

always transcendent in his immanence. Teilhard's vision is one of *Omni-presence*, God at the heart of, but not conjoint with, every creature.

M. François-Albert Viallet, writing from the scientific point of view, has Teilhard say that God and the world are not possible without each other. But Dr. Corte replies:

Did Teilhard really say this? We find it hard to believe that he could . . . What we think is quite certain is that if he really did say it he would be an indubitable heretic: whereas all his work is a protest against heresy, and he knew enough theology not to fall formally into such a serious error on the absolute transcendence of God with respect to the created.⁵

Teilhard's imprecise and often rhapsodic use of words and phrases, his poetizing, and his frequent recourse to a quite prosaic coining of neologisms, are annoying to theologians and scientists alike. But let us be patient with our lovable pioneer. Balzac called Cuvier the real poet of the nineteenth century; Père Teilhard, likewise a Frenchman and a naturalist, may well turn out to be the most catholic one of our own. A great yea-sayer, an absolute optimist—because he has faith in God and in his method—Teilhard's thought is as refreshing as it is novel. He believed that he had a wonderful message, a new version of the Good News, for all mankind. We do not take umbrage at that Baptist-like self-assertion: we need him.

IV

Teilhard has added a whole dimension to the Socratic injunction, "Know thyself." For we can understand nothing, he says, unless we see it in its *becoming*. We now speak of the evolution of the stars, of matter, of thought, of civilizations, of the idea of evolution itself. "*¡Pero éste he sido yo!*" exclaimed Miguel de Unamuno.⁶

We may now extend this impulse, this revelation, back to the very rocks themselves, back to the beginnings of all things. For even so-called inanimate objects possess a *within* as well as a *without*, and to ignore the former is to miss half of reality. Life did not have to come here from sidereal space, for the earth at its inception contained, *in posse*, all that has since appeared upon its surface, *man included*. It follows that we must look for the origin of thought in matter itself! Dr. Corte does not follow Teilhard in this, but J. B. S. Haldane has averred the possibility, and Sir Julian Huxley seconds him. There is much in Teilhard that would have

⁵ Corte, *op. cit.*, p. 103. He quotes from M. Viallet's *L'Univers personnel de Teilhard de Chardin*, Paris, 1955.

⁶ "But I have been this!" *La Agonía del Cristianismo*. Madrid: Renacimiento, 1931.

commended itself to Vaughan and Traherne—indeed to all true mystics. This line of reasoning or intuiting may smack of “materialism” (a word I dislike as much as does Dr. Pittenger;⁷ did not Archbishop Temple term Christianity the most materialistic of all religions?). It also suggests the worship of Demeter or “Mother Earth,” but let it not be forgotten that evolution, in Teilhard’s thought, is controlled *from above*. I hope that Martin Buber knows Teilhard, for I believe that he would joyfully concur in the thought than an I-Thou relationship is possible with every created being. Whatever truth there is in animism, whatever perceptions of the “noumenal” primitive men may have had (and are they not always immediate, here-and-now?), are present in Teilhard to the fullest extent, mystically but not irrationally.

When Dr. Corte takes exception to a lyrical outburst in which Teilhard proclaims that the Holy Spirit “animates” the very rocks, he might do better by dropping his strictly theological approach for a moment to look at the atomic structure of matter. Atoms are in ceaseless motion. Much may lie behind the phrase, “the living rock.”

There is not space in this short survey to follow Teilhard in all his labyrinthine linkings of facts and hypotheses; enough has been stated to show, I hope, the originality and power of an intellect of the first magnitude which had for its high purpose the glorification of God. A synthesizer who wished to be a modern Aquinas, Teilhard hoped that he might baptize the findings of science even as his angelic predecessor had Christianized the philosophy of Aristotle. Dr. Corte feels that in this he failed, that his thought, like that of Origen, is tangential to Western and Christian philosophy; but I disagree vehemently with this finding. Teilhard is a Christian seer in the main line of intellectual evolution. His work is no final word but a beacon light for others to flock to. Much may have to be corrected, especially in his prognostications, but it will have to be done by those possessing vision equal to his. *No future thinker, Christian or otherwise, can afford to ignore him.*

V

Our globe is made up of roughly concentric layers—barysphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere and stratosphere, terms with which we are already familiar. With the advent of cellular life a new layer (film, envelope) rapidly covered the watery surface of the earth—the *biosphere*. This emergence of life Teilhard holds to be a once-for-all phenomenon in the total process of evolution, thus categorically (in his own mind, at least)

⁷ See his article in RELIGION IN LIFE, “The Christ of Our Christian Faith,” Autumn, 1958.

settling the question of whether life is still emerging from proteinous megamolecules. This is another example of his "Hebraism"—a *unique event* which exhausted its source, a thought which would be repugnant to Greek and Hindu alike, as well as to most present-day thinkers. The coming into being of self-propagating cells represents the first major disjunction in evolution since the original condensation of matter.

Hundreds of millions of years later, probably at the beginning of the Pleistocene era, a new and also major discontinuity—the third in the evolution of our earth—took place: the emergence of a new "layer" or "film" of *reflective thought*, which, like the biosphere, rapidly spread out over the planet. This took place wholly within one *phylum* (a term which Teilhard uses to designate any well-defined evolutionary stem of animals or plants), namely, the Primates. The simian line, as opposed to the ungulates, the carnivores, the rodents, etc., had remained relatively unspecialized, and so had preserved the potential of evolutionary variation and adaptability. In the course of evolution he who specializes is lost—as soon as the environment, the milieu, to which he has wholly adapted himself, undergoes a change.

Thus the simians had remained omnivorous, and had also retained the five digits of the first terrestrial animals, the amphibians (frogs, salamanders, etc.). Within the order of Primates evolutionary growth had taken place principally within the brain, which was necessary as a corrective to their relative defenselessness. Thus it was out of this *privileged axis* that Man emerged, and with him, entirely confined to his species, the new "layer," which Teilhard calls the Noosphere. Animals *know*—indeed he admits the possibility of some form of thought in plants—but Man alone *knows that he knows*.

To side-step the presence and centrality of thought, as the physicist and the zoologist are inclined to do; to see it as something anomalous or tangential because of its relative scarcity in the universe, is the equivalent of looking on radium and radioactivity as sports of the chemical series of elements. All progress in evolution has come about through greater cerebralization, an ever-increasing specialization of the nerve tissues. This observation, not original by any means with Teilhard, becomes the source of cosmic deductions which are distinctly his own.

With the acquisition of this tool of tools, reflective thought, man quickly (in geological terms of duration) imposes his rule upon the earth. From this truth, which has become a banality almost, Teilhard deduces the future of our race.

VI

Churchmen will ask: Watchman, what of the night? Teilhard from his high eminence glimpses a rosy dawn. *The very confusion of our times is an evolutionarily creative one.* For the process has not stopped, but will continue to follow its own laws which were laid down at the beginning and will continue to the end.

From the consideration of another banality, the roundness of the earth, Teilhard draws weighty and original conclusions. The curve of human expansion, like the curve of thought at the inception of the Noosphere, is now doubling back upon itself, for the earth's surface is not an unlimited expanse. We are everywhere meeting each other face to face—cultures, nations, races all jostling one another, with nowhere an avenue of escape. (Parenthetically, and as an example of Teilhard's solidity and Christian loyalty, he sees no possibility, *qua* biologist, of man's gaining a *pied à terre* in outer space. The human body is exquisitely attuned to life on this planet. That which has taken so many hundreds of millions of years to reach its perfection could not possibly survive on another sidereal body, which would necessarily be at a different stage in its own evolution. As a Christian he suggests that the proponents of "space travel" are in reality seeking an escape from death. Spiritually and biologically, man's goal and end will be realized on this planet. But see below.)

Phylogenetically, just where are we? Teilhard answers by offering us an illustration. If a pulsation were initiated at the South Pole, it would diverge along the several radii of the earth until it reached the equator, after which it would converge toward the North Pole. *Human history is now at such an equator in duration.* The last century and first part of this witnessed the ultimate in the individuation of man. From now on we must perforce follow the radii of convergence, that is, toward greater and greater socialization (a term he intends to be taken spiritually). The solitary or would-be solitary is fooling himself if he thinks he can escape the mounting pressure, but for the biologist as well as for the Christian the fact of this pressure carries its own promise. It is one with previous evolutionary pressures and times of tension: the moment in the seas of crowded protein molecules just before the emergence of cellular life; the tension during the late Pliocene when the mammals had reached their apogee, so that some must either disappear or change—and the Primates "discovered" the means of a "change of state." And now we, by relying on the constancy of evolutionary laws, may look and hope for a similar spiritual change within

our own species. (Teilhard would look with scorn on any proposals for mechanically limiting the world's population. These would fly in the face of evolution, which honors no status quo.)

What will be the nature of our approaching "change of state"? If his thesis has any meaning whatever, Teilhard says that the arrow *must* point toward greater cerebralization. We can expect no further evolutionary development of the human body, and so we must look for a deeper and more intense union between men. The world is on its way to becoming one—politically, technologically and spiritually. Will the individual, the product of endless ages of development, be lost in such a convergence? No, for a true union differentiates: the individual will find his true being, heightened and enriched, in a real and organic union with his fellow men.

VII

The lines of convergence, from now on coming ever closer together (and from which there is no escape), are moving toward a pole. Teilhard names it the Omega Point, and because it is a point, it is, by definition, not in those converging lines, *but out of the world altogether*. Not flight from this planet; not reduction of the human race to some spiritually static, "sensible" dimensions (nor extinction either, for evolution is true, and the universe can be trusted). Not any of these, but growth in spiritual depth, in new and fantastic dimensions (for the true is always fantastic, the improbable); growth to a point "out of this world." *The unified multiple always succeeds and ultimately supplants the unorganized multitude*. And finally the "end of the world" will be, after all, beyond the world; man's destiny lies outside of this planet. Omega Point is God, is Christ: only now does Teilhard leave his biological platform for one purely spiritual, but which will not cease being biological. Scientifically and theologically our future points in this direction, and can point in no other.

With this we have said nearly all that we can at present on the thesis of our beloved seer. But not quite all: David among the Philistines has taken on some of the ways of the *goyim*. Uncircumcision is contagious. Sir Julian Huxley, who has sponsored Teilhard, has been proclaiming of late that man is now in a position to control his future evolution, with the techniques he has forged and the knowledge he has accumulated. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing; some of Huxley's point of view has rubbed off on our dear Père Teilhard, for he uses language dangerously close to this. But from the Tower of Babel and the Greek dramatization of *hubris*, wise men, prophets who have proclaimed the majesty of God, have warned

mankind not to become too sure of themselves, not to be puffed up in their accumulated knowledge. One could indeed advance a thesis that the Omega Point, the Kingdom, comes *despite* human progress, thanks to God's lovingkindness. No Babylon, no Christ. Cerebralization has helped, and continued research will unfold many new and useful things, but holiness alone will save man; this is a gift, not a mental achievement, and is not centered in the brain, but is diffused throughout the body. Let the brain remain the handmaiden of the heart; let Huxley and all his school read and ponder the last chapters of Job, which are to the point—Omega Point.

In case we have not made ourselves clear, let us take up just one of Teilhard's enthusiasms. As a biologist he sees that there can be a science of applied eugenics, but as an Israelite without guile he seems to be blind to the extreme dangers such an application entails. Wonderful! Now that we know something of the laws of genetics we are in a position to breed a healthier human race! But Hitler was greatly interested in such a program—according to his own canons of fitness. Teilhard, in the purity of his heart, *has reckoned without the Man of Sin: Antichrist*. Yet other prophets have issued storm warnings, and astraddle our historical equator as we are, we may look for equinoctial storms. Spengler foresaw a new race of slaves, bred to do the "work of the world" (and on sound eugenic lines, no doubt). Solovyev, at the turn of the century, prophesied the coming of an Antichrist who would be a vegetarian, and would be kind to children, and whom the world would worship, for he would restore order and impose Draconian laws. Teilhard to be sure saw the possibility of a polarity of worship, but he was apparently unacquainted with the Russian seer.⁸

We are forced to conclude that the evolutionary lines of convergence will follow the pattern outlined in the Apocalypse, and that history will be bloodier than ever because of sin and the Man of Sin during the home stretch of the human race. Only the very brave or the very trusting dare look down that alley.

Do these gloomy forebodings, these jeremiads, cast a shadow on our enthusiasm for Père Teilhard or dilute our love for him? No, not one whit, for we need his explicit vision, and where, toward the end it falters we can supply our own—as Christian realists and by the grace of God. But we shall conclude that our world will reach its appointed goal not through auto-evolution but despite it; not through the post-simian cleverness of

⁸ For a discussion of Solovyev read Josef Pieper's provocative little book, *The End of Time*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1954. Solovyev had the curious idea that the resurrection of the dead has already begun. Might there be a tie-in here with Teilhard's "equator"?

man, but because the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth, and hath decreed Omega Point from the very Alpha.

A brief notice of the latest (at this writing) of Teilhard's works to be translated, *The Divine Milieu*,⁹ may appropriately be added here. This has been advertised as a sequel to *The Phenomenon of Man*, and in a sense it is, although not in point of time. Here Teilhard leaves the discursive and dialectical method behind and hymns a hymn to God the Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer. In it mysticism and the ascetical approach are blended, and the result presents affinities with modern Eastern Orthodox thought, as Karl Stern has pointed out. To analyze this beautiful testimonial theologically will be no mean task; the language is often ecstatic, but that does not rule out a solid theological *Grund*.

One wholesome insistence is that of an orthodox Christian materialism: the earth itself—indeed all matter—is capable of being transfigured, containing as it does an incomplete spirit of its own. The New Jerusalem will come to this planet; the Incarnation guarantees the redemption of all creation.

Original sin, the existence of hell, the fact of grace are all here, but unfortunately they are not tied in organically with the unfolding of life as Teilhard has presented it in *The Phenomenon*. Teilhard's universalism is again a little too universal, his optimism is never clouded by the shadow of that other organically unfolding reality—the coming of the Man of Sin. It is a distasteful task to have to play devil's advocate to this wonderful prose poem, but someone must undertake it, in fairness to revealed truth.

One misses in Teilhard an awareness of the witness of such lovers of God as Luther, Fox, Wesley and Kierkegaard. Their shades must, I believe, be invoked in order to correct Teilhard's at times too-catholic Catholicism.

VIII

I ask permission to attach my personal coda to this score. Speaking for and in behalf of all harassed parish clergy, who must willy-nilly know and get by heart the several anatomies of all within their bailiwicks—every thrombosis, slipped disc, sacroiliac, wen and tumor, quinsy and bone felon, to say nothing of psychoses and neuroses—for all of us who have to listen and listen (for there is no way out), there is in Teilhard bone for bone, flesh for flesh, for him who has eyes to see and ears to hear. When I hear of the airy, and often immodest, proposals and plans for humanity being made by our intellectuals (and too often seconded, if not initiated, by our

⁹ *The Divine Milieu*, by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, translated by Bernard Wall. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960.

theologians), blueprints for the "brown mass," as John Woolman called it; when I hear these ideas and then come face to face (as one must do daily, and die daily to it) with the power and urgency of this neo- and para-simian reality, crying out for that which we promise them and believing it in good faith—for the resurrection of the very flesh itself, which alone can give comfort, and which because it seems vitally necessary is therefore necessarily true—then I go back to Père Teilhard, my spiritual father and preceptor. For he gives no stones for bread, for fishes no scorpions, but Incarnation—infleshing—for these splendid, beautiful, absurd, will-driven, life-worshipping creatures, who are *hic et nunc* the mirrors of their Creator: themselves and ourselves. Perfect and complete chaos has a harmony of its own. Teilhard has not flinched from it, but has fed himself on locusts and wild honey, and has emerged triumphant from his desert. In his love of God and man, monkeys, prehominids and parahominids (who had the toothache too), O shepherds of fleshly flocks, Teilhard is *our seer*.

3. Science and Religion at the Crossroads

G. D. YARNOLD

THE OLD STUFF about conflict is as dead as the dodo. But this does not mean that everything is now tidy. Indeed, there are lots of loose ends. What then has really happened?

In the past few hundred years, science has pushed ahead rapidly. It has concentrated on its own particular job; it has branched out in a hundred new directions; it has filled whole libraries with new knowledge. Every scientist has become a specialist—knowing more and more about less and less, as the old gibe goes. The new knowledge has been applied to industry, to means of communication, to medicine, to social organization, and to warfare. Science has come to dominate Western thought. It has transformed the Western world. And the scientific movement has advanced so rapidly that none of us can quite keep up with it. Like a forest fire it sweeps on through every department of man's life—at once brilliant, enthralling, and dangerous.

The Christian religion has guided the life of the West almost from the dawn of its history. It had taught us the ultimate meaning of human life; it had given us a faith to live by, and a God to worship. It was Christianity that inspired the first hospitals, schools, and universities; and it gave us our first social services. The Church had been the nursing mother of the Western world. But the nineteenth century found the Christian Church still clinging to a view of the origin of the world which was no longer tenable; a view of man which was at variance with the discoveries of biology; a belief in the miraculous which seemed to deny the regularity and order of nature.

Christian theology has taken time to adjust itself. The adjustments have not been easy to make. For the Christian theologian has had to be true to two different sets of facts, neither of which he dare deny: the facts of faith, and the facts of science. Sometimes the trend of theological study seems to have shown little interest in the problem of relating scientific advance to religious thought. Theologians, like scientists, sometimes wear

The Rev. Dr. G. D. YARNOLD, sometime Lecturer in Physics at the University of Nottingham, is now Warden of St. Deiniol's Library, a study and research center at Hawarden, Chester, England. His books include *The Spiritual Crisis of the Scientific Age*, *Risen Indeed*, and *The Bread Which We Break*.

blinkers. But fortunately there has been a succession of leading thinkers from Charles Gore through Lionel Thornton and William Temple down to our own time, who have sought to present the essential Christian insights in terms of the growing knowledge of the universe. Such men have steered a middle way between those who would capitulate to a narrowly scientific view of existence and those who would shut their eyes to scientific advance and retreat into an ivory tower of their own building. The debate still proceeds; and today men of the caliber of Coulson, Mascall, and Pollard still wrestle with the whole range of facts, refusing to be less than honest to the claims of either side.

But all this time, where has the ordinary man stood? The practical man of affairs, the man in the street, the schoolmaster, the practising scientist, the parson, the technologist, the statesman—what have *they* made of it?

The ultimate things of the mind and spirit *do* matter to the ordinary plain man doing his job in the world of today. For man is both an inquiring mind *and* a believing person *and* a moral agent. How is he to understand the world in which he is placed? What is he to believe about his own ultimate destiny? How is he to act, how is he to use the new powers which modern science constantly places at his disposal? Where is guidance to come from?

The plain fact is that he has had very little guidance. The intellectual world has been in such turmoil during the past hundred years, sorting out the problems, making its own adjustments, that hardly any fixed stars have been visible. The tumultuous advance of science and its application, unrestrained by a Christian tradition which has sometimes looked like a protecting grandmother, has left modern man bewildered and lost. Science has all the glamor—but grandma knows a thing or two. If only the two could put their heads together and pool their wisdom and give us a chart to steer by!

So we live through a *crisis*—which involves our understanding of the world and of ourselves, our ultimate belief in the things of the spirit, our practical decisions as we handle our new-found powers.

IN SEARCH OF UNDERSTANDING

The starting point of the Christian religion is our belief in God. The Church believes that God is the Creator of all that exists, and that he is in ultimate control of the universe and of our life within it; that at the heart of reality is One who cares, and in whose image we are made. What does this mean in an age which thinks most naturally along scientific lines?

It means first of all that there is a problem of existence, which we shall not solve either by shelving it or by thinking along Sunday-school lines. The world does not explain itself; and a childlike picture of God does not explain it either. If your belief in God does not satisfy the thinking part of you, your God is too small. You must dig more deeply into reality. You must probe to the heart of things. We know that the universe displays a regularity, a pattern, which becomes more amazing the further our science progresses. The concept of God must be big enough, and wide enough, to include all this. But the world is more than astrophysics. The universe is manifestly organized on different levels: matter, life, mind, and spirit. The higher is built upon the lower. The laws of the lower levels are taken up intact into the higher levels. And personality, human personality, is at the peak. At the heart of reality there must be a Principle of Existence rich enough to account for the emergence of personality within the organic whole, a Being who contains the principle of personal life. "In him was life, and the life was the light of men."

It means also that the familiar words, "Creator," "creation," have to be filled out to express the wealth of our modern experience, as it is in an age of science. To say simply that "God made the world out of nothing" is too easy, too naïve, to express the whole range of facts. Created beings, such as ourselves, obviously have an origin in time. Maybe the whole universe had an origin in time—we do not know. But this is not the real point of belief in a Creator. Think rather of the relationship of a work of art to its creator: a drama, for instance. The drama is something created in the sense that it exists only as the expression of the activity of its creator. The dramatist is the creator because he has brought the drama into existence and impressed something of himself upon it. In very simple terms we have here the metaphysical distinction between essential being and contingent being: between that which exists in its own right and that which exists in dependence upon something else, someone else. The world exists and mankind within it, not in its own right but in dependence upon God. This is the primary tenet of Christian theism. And God has impressed something of himself upon his creation. He has expressed himself in the drama of organic life.

The laws of nature are what they are, because God is what he is. They reflect his divine ordering of his creation. We must find room therefore in our thinking for the regularity and dependability of nature on the large scale; and for the role apparently played by (what we call) "chance" on the small scale. The so-called "law of large numbers" is apparently the

clue. The regularity which we observe with the senses is of a statistical character, but we can believe that it expresses the purpose of an Ultimate Reality whose control is exercised in the behavior of the very smallest structural detail of which we can have knowledge.

There is no need, therefore, for us to set law and providence in antithesis. If we are right in our surmise about the structure of reality, the very uniformity which science investigates is the expression of the Divine Mind. And the structure of things is left sufficiently open for the Divine Mind to express itself also in ways which are both unexpected and providential. True, we shall still be perplexed by the calamities which sometimes seem to hide the "smiling face"; but we shall not make the mistake of supposing that we are engaged in a relentless uniformity which is unmoved by the yearning of the human heart.

To believe in God in an age of science is to believe that the universe, and our life within it, have a meaning. It is to believe that evolution, both cosmic and organic, is in some sense a guided process—since it is the more or less inevitable result of the laws which the created universe obeys. It is to see a pattern, a wholeness, in the vast range of our human knowledge. It is to discern the operation of a guiding, fatherly care behind the majestic march of the galaxies, the emergence and evolution of organic life, and the restless striving of the human spirit for understanding. Evolution and creation are not to be set in antithesis. They are to be equated. The one is to be understood in the light of the other. The whole of creation "groaning in travail together" (Rom. 8:22) is the vast drama into which we are born, and which makes sense only in terms of the character of the Divine Dramatist, who has revealed himself (so we believe) in the particular events which lie at the core of the Christian religion.

To see the facts of science and the events of history in some such way as this is to begin to *understand* them. Too many people today are content merely to *explain* them. Mere explanation, however accurate within its own limits, can never satisfy.

BELIEVING WHERE WE CANNOT PROVE

Christians have never pretended that all is right with the world. They are optimistic but not starry-eyed. Something evil has entered into the world, into the higher levels of creation, which is contrary to the righteousness of the Creator. All religions point to the good life, often with surprising unanimity. All men recognize the paradox of nonattainment. Only Christi-

anity offers a remedy, a "gospel of salvation," to use the old language. This gospel is the total fact of Jesus Christ.

To believe that the eternal God revealed himself, and acted decisively for man's salvation, in a particular life on an insignificant planet, is challenge enough. That the records are ancient documents, composed in a credulous age, does not make matters easier for modern scientific man. Yet the challenge of that life must be faced—and that honestly. And part at least of the evidence for the truth of the Christian gospel is the power which it still has today over the lives of those who accept it. In other words, the truth of Christianity does not rest *solely* on ancient documents.

The New Testament, moreover, has been studied scientifically during the past hundred years by scholars every whit as honest, cautious, discerning, and capable as those who have applied themselves to any other scientific discipline. What is the net result? Not indeed to vindicate every miracle story and every bit of myth as historical fact. But certainly to vindicate the central facts of the Christian gospel as truly based upon actual occurrences. It proves to be quite impossible to pigeonhole Jesus of Nazareth neatly, like any other great religious teacher. His personal claims, his unique character, his supreme influence, his continuing power in the lives of men, challenge us to a positive acceptance of his divine status. He would remain an enigma of history, the greatest enigma, if we did not recognize that in him the eternal God has spoken and acted decisively.

But what are we to make of the allegedly miraculous elements in the Gospel narratives? Are they credible today? Are they essential to the gospel of Jesus? Here, it must be admitted, scholars are divided. There are those who point to a mythical element in the total world view of the first century which prevents us from ever ascertaining the actual facts of history. Such scholars would class the miracles, the Resurrection, and the Ascension as no more than mythical statements of eternal truth, and the whole New Testament approach to salvation as conceived in mythical terms. It is claimed by theologians of no mean order that for the twentieth century a completely new mode of presentation is required; that eternal truth and Christian gospel must be restated in terms of contemporary existentialist philosophy.

On the other hand many of us are convinced that to rule out the miraculous element entirely is to do violence to the documents, and to the continuing experience of the Christian Church. We would admit the proper place of myth in the presentation of some of the facts of faith, as distinct from events in time and space; but we would contend that there is a hard

core of occurrences of a supernatural character, which we have no right to brush aside. Unless we approach the New Testament with the quite unscientific presupposition that every event narrated in it must necessarily be reducible to conformity with our common everyday experience of the order of nature, ought we not to be ready to recognize the resurrection of Jesus Christ and the release of a new spiritual power at Pentecost as properly attested facts of history?

This is precisely when an understanding of nature, both scientific and theological, can safeguard us from the pitfalls of a too cocksure approach. The laws of the large-scale world are essentially statistical in character. They tell us probabilities (albeit overwhelmingly large probabilities), but not certainties. Nature is more open than an older generation of scientists supposed. What if the statistical character of large-scale events is so ordered as to enable the Creator to act in totally unexpected ways where he wills to do so? What if divine purpose, and not cast-iron uniformity, is in fact the key to reality? What if the essential facts of the gospel, miraculous though they are to our incomplete understanding, do indeed represent the *personal* act of God, the supreme and unique self-expression of the Divine in the history of his own created world? We cannot prove that this is so. A truly scientific approach to reality can do no more than suggest the possibility. It is a challenge to our thinking, and to our moral integrity as persons. And this is where religious faith must assert itself. The modern world needs above all else to recover that faith in God, which dares to recognize his supernatural activity on the plane of history.

What is human life in all its greatness and in all its tragedy? That is the ultimate question. Are we the product of blind chance (whatever that phrase means), thrown up by the evolutionary ocean on a strand where we do not belong and where we can only struggle, and wonder, and perish? Or is the human race the proximate goal of the whole creative process, waiting to be brought to its proper destiny by a decisive act of God in human history? And is the unique, divine-human life of Jesus of Nazareth the new creative act in which God unites man to himself? His is the life over which evil has no hold. His is the life by which man is brought back into fellowship with God. His is the life which has the power to transform and remake all human life—individual and corporate—by the gospel of life through death. This is the continuing experience of Christians. Would it be altogether surprising that the belief in the Resurrection should be soundly based on historical fact? Indeed, if it were otherwise, would it not mean that Jesus

was utterly mistaken in pinning his human faith to a God who is ultimately powerless to vindicate his righteous servant? The meaning of the Cross and the historical truth of the Resurrection are together the acid test of supernatural religion. Accept the gospel of the resurrection of the Son of Man, and man has an eternal destiny in union with a Risen Lord. Reject the Resurrection, and death has the last word—the universe is ultimately hostile to pure goodness, and all striving is vain. This is the challenge of the whole of the New Testament.

If this issue is clear and sharp, each one of us is in a position to make his own personal decision of faith. It remains only to arrive at some satisfactory working hypothesis about the relative roles of physical fact and inspired symbol in the New Testament *presentation* of the gospel of the Resurrection. Here we are necessarily tentative: our scientific training, as well as our spiritual insight, demand a measure of reverent agnosticism as we try to assess the facts. The data we have to reckon with appear to be: *first*, the empty tomb with its collapsed grave clothes; *second*, the resurrection appearances which, however mysterious, the eyewitnesses could only describe appropriately in terms of an objective physical presence. Dare we legitimately suggest that the material of the Lord's earthly body was set free from the limitations which normally condition the material order; so becoming the vehicle of his risen life, and enabling him to bring conviction and certainty to his dis-spirited followers? And if this is indeed the case, may not the strange "event" of the Ascension represent not only the last of a series of appearances to the disciples, but also the symbolic presentation of the eternal truth that Christ now reigns as Lord and Savior, triumphant over death, and exalted to the "throne" of his heavenly Father?

In the course of a short article, we can do no more than attempt a sketch, where justice to the subject demands a full treatment. But the underlying conviction should be clear enough. The Christian civilization of the Western world was built not only on the ethical teaching of Jesus of Nazareth but upon the faith that he is Lord of life, risen, ascended, glorified. In union with him human life is transformed, created afresh; and in him man has an eternal destiny. This faith was shaken to its foundations by the earlier phases of our modern scientific development. But science has not stood still. Nor has theology. The picture is much more open than it was. Nothing is more necessary than that we should recover the supernatural faith of historic Christianity, and integrate it into a world view which is consistent with modern knowledge.

THE MISUSE OF "KNOW-HOW"

In any logical presentation of the crisis through which the modern world is passing, our understanding of the universe comes first, our recovery of faith comes second. Finally our ordering of our corporate life must be based on the truly scientific and truly theological world view at which we have now arrived. We have said something already about the Christian doctrine of man, about his true status as a creature of eternal significance. We have referred, in passing, to the moral teaching of Jesus and to the disruptive influence of evil in the hearts of men. Each individual man stands under the judgment of Almighty God—each of us constantly fails to attain to the highest that he knows. To each individual Jesus Christ comes both as Judge and as Savior; and to that degree religion is a private personal matter between each man and God.

But in these modern days, when technology is organized on a vast impersonal scale, the individual is caught up in a gigantic machine; which he finds impossible to control, which dominates his life, and which threatens him with destruction. The peculiarly modern ethical problems which press upon our civilization, threatening to annihilate it, are the direct result of the wholesale *application* of scientific knowledge. Pushing ahead indiscriminately in pursuit of progress, using every new resource which science places in our grasp, civilization has come face to face with calamity. Man is in danger of wiping human life right off the surface of this planet, through his inability corporately to control his own technological development.

The discoveries of nuclear science, in particular, have placed in our hands unprecedented resources of power which can be used in either of two ways. Turned solely to peaceful purposes, the nucleus can give abundant power for developing backward areas, and for making human life the world over more civilized, more worth while, more productive of the highest cultural attainment. Who can doubt that it was the will of God that mankind should discover this new source of power and use it wisely for the common good? But in point of fact the specter of nuclear warfare, so terrible as to destroy the whole of human achievement, stalks through our modern world. If we cannot learn to live with our new knowledge, we shall die by it.

The truth which has forced itself upon us is surely bound up with the moral structure of reality. Man-in-society is so made that he can either obey the moral law and live in fellowship, or by disobedience bring suffering and death upon himself. As his powers increase in magnitude, so does the calamity which can result from misuse. It is a tragic fact of history that

man has constantly seen the good and chosen the evil. If nuclear devastation should prove to be the end of the human race, this will represent the final judgment of God on man's disobedience in a very real sense. While calmly facing the possibility of calamity, the Christian must recognize, however, that the ultimate destiny of man in the Kingdom of God cannot belong to this world of space and time. The goal of the creative process necessarily lies in the life beyond; and the ultimate purpose of God in creation cannot be thwarted by human folly and wrongdoing, even if life on this planet comes to an end.

True though this is, we can never be content to let things slide. Christians, and indeed all men of good will, must use every influence to avert catastrophe and to ensure that God's gift of nuclear energy is used only for the good of mankind. The deterrent effect of a stock pile or of massive retaliation is a short-lived fear. It cannot give the world peace for long. The only hope for the future is a restoration of confidence and trust between nations. This is manifestly the job of politicians and statesmen; but it is no less the job of every humble Christian who says his prayers.

Science has indeed brought us to the crossroads. It has shown us the way of life and the way of death. At this point it must join forces with its truest ally—the Christian gospel. The result may yet be a flowering of the human spirit in conscious dependence on the Creator, who is the source of all being, of all knowledge, of all power, and of all goodness.

4. Ethical Problems in a Space Age

EDWARD L. LONG, Jr.

I

THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS of a space age stem in large measure from the rapid and unprecedented nature of contemporary scientific developments. It is impossible to isolate any single aspect of these developments and consider its implications for our ethical decisions apart from all the changes that are taking place in the scientific world. Satellites, intercontinental missiles, space travel and similar features of the larger pattern startle our imaginations because they are spectacular and highly visible, but equally serious issues are raised by other kinds of scientific endeavor in our time, as well as by changes in the scientific process itself.

There has always been a sense in which scientific accomplishments have staggered the imaginations of the age in which they have occurred. What seems miraculous to one generation may become quite matter of fact to the next. We must reckon with the possibility, therefore, that our concern about the implications of recent scientific discoveries is simply a case of jitters induced by more severe posing of the same moral problems that have always attended the development of new forms of power. The invention of a primitive blow gun posed the same moral problem as the invention of a hydrogen bomb in so far as the moral issue at stake is an abstract, formal prohibition against killing. But it is possible that the invention of a destructive weapon on the scale of a hydrogen bomb that can be delivered with an intercontinental missile may produce a new kind of moral issue in addition to the old issue it intensifies.

New ethical problems seem to pose themselves with respect to three aspects of contemporary scientific development. (1) Weapons that can destroy incredibly vast areas of distant lands by remote control are bound to require some reconsideration of traditional moral assumptions about the exercise of coercive force, even by those heretofore able to justify such force as a means of preserving justice. (2) The discovery of techniques by which

EDWARD L. LONG, JR., B.C.E., B.D., Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Religion at Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio. He formerly taught physics at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and philosophy and religion at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Author of *Science and Christian Faith* and *Conscience and Compromise*, he is now Editor of Association Press's *The Christian in His Vocation* series.

personality may be altered through impersonalized methods and groups of persons manipulated by undetected means raises acute problems with respect to the exercise of moral control and restraint in the social order as well as problems for the preservation of deliberative democratic decision-making.

(3) The growth of the scientific enterprise itself has become so great and so complex that the individual who works within it loses his sense of personal responsibility for the end-product, if indeed he even knows what the end-product actually turns out to be. Let us look at each problem separately.

A. Our Destructive Potential. This is probably the problem uppermost in the mind of the average individual. The last twenty years have witnessed the development of weapons whose destructive potential outruns the imagination. We have seen the development, not only of one weapon based upon an entirely different physical principle from all previous weapons, but a whole family of weapons based upon this principle. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was but a weak and mild weapon compared with what has since been developed. Some of the so-called "tactical weapons" of today are bigger than the bomb dropped at the close of the last World War.

The average citizen does not exactly know the power that can be released by these weapons: we can only guess and gather intimations. The scientists whose first shock by the atomic bomb of 1945 led them to suggest "One World—Or None" may have overstated the case. Preachers and moralists (including scientists when functioning in these roles) tend to stress the very serious destruction that will follow from a full-scale, unlimited war conducted with atomic weapons. Politicians and patriots (including scientists when functioning in these roles) keep us warned of the need to maintain superiority in the atomic arms race and tend to minimize the dangers involved from the use of a bomb or the fall-out that would come after it.

But even with some uncertainty about the exact extent of the destruction which would be produced by a major atomic conflagration, it is no longer easy to dismiss the saying, "All who take the sword will perish by the sword" as an overly sentimental pacifist motto or an irrelevant kind of eschatological ethic. It is now conceivable that resort to major warfare will vacate both victor and vanquished from the earth (or portion of earth) about which they contest the possession. Up to our day resort to coercive violence has been meaningful because it has been predicated on the assumption that such coercion could preserve a social order against wanton threats from malicious sources. There is a good probability that this premise is no longer tenable. The man who finds in war a way to die like a hero may still find some meaning in universal annihilation, but the man who believes in war as a

last resort for guarding and preserving a particular order of civilization will have to re-examine his premises. If a major conflict destroys both sides it will hardly have served to protect one of them.

B. The Manipulation of Personality. A second group of scientific discoveries which raises new ethical problems includes all the many techniques which man now has at his disposal for manipulating the human personality in the same way he has long been able to manipulate impersonal objects. Included in this category are some results of psychopharmacology, brain-washing by applied psychology, and techniques of group manipulation through subtle and even hidden means of persuasion. Some of these techniques alter the human personality itself while others rob the person of conscious choice. In either case they pose some significantly fresh ethical problems, for they raise the possibility that whole masses of men can be manipulated, not against their consent as with traditional coercions, but with a subconscious consent. The problem raised by these techniques is pertinent to the problems of a space age because decisions regarding the use of space inventions may be made where factors such as these are operating.

Determinists have always held that men are manipulated by factors beyond their consent, but the traditional deterministic assumption about the source of this manipulation has regarded it as an impersonal fate operating in a nonhuman order of causes. It is not our purpose here to reassess the traditional arguments between determinists and those who believe in human freedom of choice. We would point out that it is quite a different thing to face the prospects of being controlled by impersonal forces over which men have no dominion and to contemplate the prospects of being victimized by a few "operators" who can push us around without our knowing it.

C. The Complexity and Secrecy of Large-Scale Scientific Endeavor. The third problem concerns, not the products of the scientific enterprise, but the changes that are occurring within the enterprise itself. The laboratory of the individual inventor has traditionally been his castle, and it has certainly been a place in which the inventor has been aware of what has been going on. The individual inventor has thus been able to reckon the moral implications of his work and react as a moral agent to them. If Edison had invented an explosive with the power to end civilization he could have destroyed his notes and held his counsel. But this option is not open to the average contemporary scientist, particularly the scientist engaged as one cog within a large research operation. Indeed, the individual scientist may know almost nothing about what he is actually doing as regards the application of the end-product of his labors. At best he will know who he is working

for, though the sponsorship of some research contracts may even be a secret. Many a contemporary scientist is asked to put his trust in the government or industry that hires him, accepting whatever it asks him to do as a contribution to a morally responsible end. Not his to reason why—since he may not even know exactly what he is reasoning about. The over-all pattern may be known by the scientist on top, by the political authorities who make national policy, by the industrialist who gets the contract, but it will not be known by the men who do the work itself. Almost all the developments related to space technology are so complex as to pose this sort of problem.

This is a serious matter simply by virtue of the sheer complexity of modern scientific achievements, but it is magnified greatly by the additional burdens of secrecy. Moderate requirements of secrecy exist in industry because successful competition requires "the jump" in matters of new discoveries. Severe requirements of secrecy are imposed in areas related to national defense. It is difficult enough to cope with the problems raised by scientific developments when we are aware as a public of the nature of these developments; it may be well-nigh impossible to deal with them when we hardly know what is being done.

All human activity involves contingent ignorance. We never know exactly the effect that a particular kind of action will have and we are always in danger of falling into traps without knowing it. But in the case of modern technical processes and developments, especially those of a destructive nature (which are the very developments that pose the most severe problems) we have structural ignorance built into the situation as well. It is a bit ironical to find people who assert that the scientific enterprise is the most public and open of all human enterprises, since much of it is clearly bottled up by the regulations of security police. The successful launching of satellites and missiles by the Russians should help us to realize that a working technology is possible under totalitarian conditions. That science can make progress within the confines of a closed society is proof that something other than science is needed to keep a society open and free. If we want to use the term science to cover the freely open thought procedures of a free society, as do some who use the term in its wider sense, then for sheer accuracy of discourse we must find some other term to cover the kinds of achievements that lead to the successful launching of space vehicles.

II

None of the problems that we have discussed can be dealt with on an individualistic basis. All of them underscore the fact that has long been

stressed by prophetic Christian thinkers—that the place for Christian witness and action is in the channels of politics and government. But these developments also call for something more than mere participation in the kinds of political activities that have long dominated our thinking, and few of the old answers will work.

The destructive potential of new weapons raises problems for all the old suggestions about war. It raises problems for both the standard assumption that war can be employed as a last resort for the preservation of justice and for the old pacifist assumption that a sufficient number of conscientious objectors can stop a holocaust. It is worthy of note that students of international relations are thinking along quite new lines concerning the problems of war. They point out that the idea of total war is a relatively recent development and that slogans such as "unconditional surrender" constitute serious obstacles to the successful use of military strategy. Religiously such slogans constitute the final expression of nationalistic arrogance, but politically they make an enemy's will to resist even stronger because the enemy does not know the implications of surrender. Perhaps the new frontier for ethics in a space age is to cultivate the concept of the limited war for specific objectives and to seek the elimination of total nuclear war fought for absolutistic ends. It is of considerable significance that political scientists are writing in this vein. To drop a hydrogen bomb on Moscow in the effort to end the cold war thus becomes politically as ineffective as it is morally despicable.

It is worth noting that the United Nations has actually conducted limited military ventures in several situations. The Korean operation was different from most previous military operations in modern times because we fought in Korea under self-imposed restraints. This process was upsetting to strident patriots because it resulted in a truce. It was also upsetting to pacifists because it resembled a war. In general both the American Legion and the Fellowship of Reconciliation disliked the operation in Korea. It may be that this event is a portent to give us grounds for thinking we need not plunge the world into total annihilation in the effort to battle some issue within it.

We have long heard of the need for international structures that will transcend the sovereignty of nation-states. Certainly the motives and concerns of those idealistic groups that yearn for an international order to transcend national differences stand in such a happy contrast to the predominate nationalisms of our day that it is with great misgivings that one must point to this suggestion as a distant utopia rather than a present possibility,

and a utopia which may undercut the urgency of using present inadequacies to keep arms in check. The work of the United Nations, with its bickering delays and stalemating compromises, is the best we can do right now, and a new kind of moral depth is required to deal with it.

We are in dire need as a nation, of men who have genuine technical knowledge of what methods of inspection and control can be devised to make a system of limited disarmament possible. There is a willingness in political circles to undertake such negotiations under sober hard-headed conditions. While the strident patriots threaten to scuttle such negotiations from one ideological absolutism the religious fanatics threaten to scuttle them from another. The first gives too little; the second demands too much. We must be careful that religious faith gives us more to contribute to current solutions of the armaments race than the spectacle of canoes paddling about submarines in the effort to keep them from being anchored.

If we are to survive in a space age we must overcome both fanaticisms and lethargies. We must learn the art of conducting long, slow, steady, campaigns against all dangers. The pride, self-righteousness, and fanatical devotion that sustain morale in times of war will not suffice for conducting the cold war or undertaking the slow, frustrating, drudgery of disarmament negotiations or "police action" in spots of tensions and potential trouble. The kind of heroism called for by the war of words in the United Nations will tax the spiritual stamina of a people that has heretofore shown its capacity for heroism and devotion only in response to the enthusiasms and slogans of hot wars.

A people accustomed to bouncing enthusiasms and exuberant response to successes will find its greatest moral test in the space age coming from the lack of any neat, clear way to overcome the problems it faces. Our religious outlook, like our cultural temper, is not geared to this sort of process. We can get a thrill out of some radical public protest against a missile base or rocket launching program, but the lifelong task of mastering technical information in order to become a successful negotiator who plays a "staff" role in a nuclear disarmament conference is another matter. Unless we can make religious sense out of the latter we are not likely to make it through the next decade.

Thus while we know that these problems require participation in politics and government they also call for a new kind of contribution to these processes—a contribution which may be made in some measure by sober religious faith. We have, for example, heard much about the need to "negotiate from a position of strength." This formula has had more merit

in relationship to conventional weapons than it may have in relationship to atomic weapons, since even the biggest and most heavily armed nations are highly vulnerable to atomic attack from smaller nations. We need to hear more about the need to negotiate from positions of flexibility. The flexibility may be as hard-headed as necessary, but it must spring from a kind of spiritual security that is just as important to genuine experimentation with new procedures in the field of disarmament as the bargaining position maintained by stockpiles of weapons. Accepted patterns of nationalistic self-interest are too rigid to allow a greater self-interest to be served by devising hard-headed systems of controlled and inspected disarmament, even though idealistically inspired admonitions to unilateral disarmament are too sentimental to be relevant.

The approach to be used in dealing with the problems raised by techniques for manipulating the personality and for exercising control over the huge, sprawling, and frequently secret enterprises carried out in modern science can here only be sketched in brief and shown to be analogous to the problem raised by destructive potential on an unprecedented scale. These problems raise issues for social policy and demand the wisest use of the total resources of the community if they are to be handled.

Suppose that we could devise some propaganda technique or medical procedure by which we could turn all Communists into ardent lip-servants of the democratic way of life. By this technique we could eliminate all opposition to what we regard as the high values of a Judeo-Christian culture and bring peace, harmony, and unanimity of belief to the world. Suppose, moreover, that this "conversion by chemistry" was given to us sufficiently in advance to apply it without any opposition from the other side. Suppose further that the "enemies" of freedom could soon be expected to perfect the same techniques to bring about the opposite kind of conversion. The temptation to use the techniques before they were used upon us would be very great, since what might happen with hidden persuaders working against hidden persuaders belongs to the realm of conjecture. Have we enough wisdom and humility to see the demonic implications hidden in this illustration?

Suggestions that the use of hidden persuasion be outlawed make sense as a strategy within an established political order—though they raise technical questions regarding the detection of such use. We need experts in detection as well as the will to enforce the prohibition. It is probable we shall have to say "No!" to the use of these new-found powers over the wills of men, just as society has said "No!" to the use of other kinds of blackmail

over their lives. But the task of wrestling with the legislative means for controlling threats to personality in commercially tempting techniques like subliminal advertising calls for a greater quality of mind and soul than devising the techniques in the first place—and will probably receive less acclaim or thanks!

If we try to project into conquered space the kinds of arbitrary divisions we have perpetuated on the surface of the globe, only frustration can ensue. Moreover, the secrecy of science must give way when the products are sent into space, for then the security police can no longer bottle up the evidence. Who can imagine protecting a territorial claim to the left-hand side of the milky way? Missiles in space know no arbitrary boundaries for their flight other than those imposed by the laws of nature, and while we shoot down planes that violate earthly borders the satellites of both East and West daily circle around the whole earth. In due time the sheer realities of the case may force us to recognize that the conquest of space can hardly be a nationalistic matter.

This is no place to gaze into a crystal ball and predict how we shall fare in the space age. Hasty, unbridled miscalculations may bring a conflagration of all forms of civilized life. We may bungle along with the tensions of a cold war for decades. We may break through to creative negotiations of agreement and common purpose. The stakes have never been as high nor the indications of the outcome so few. This is what makes the dawning of the space age both a dangerous frustration and a portent of possible hope. By losing our poise we could settle the issue, but in the wrong way. Let us hope that by keeping our poise we can work out something better than the worst.

The New Situation in the Atomic Age

HELMUT THIELICKE

This translation is an excerpt from Helmut Thielicke's *Ethik*, Vol. II, Part 2 (1958), pp. 586-618. Some of the context can be fairly easily comprehended from Thielicke's frequent references to the Noachite covenant (Gen. 9:1ff), to the Tower of Babel, and to the preservation of the social structures necessary for human existence. (The meaning of these biblical references is primarily theological, not historical.) The audience for this discussion, however, is not highly visible to the American reader. This audience explicitly includes "two extreme wings" within the church—the "pietists" who would withdraw and the "activists" who would remake the structures according to a Christian blueprint. (See the preface, pp. vii ff). It is to the second group primarily that Thielicke is speaking in this excerpt.

Footnotes and references to the literature have been almost completely omitted. In several instances paragraphs have been combined. Clarity in presenting the main line of argument has been the major criterion used in translation.—KARL H. HERTZ

I. IS AN ATOMIC PEACE POSSIBLE AND PROBABLE?

A. The new "quality" of war.

The introduction of atomic weapons has brought about a qualitative change in the nature of war. Following the line of thought found in Hegel and Marx, we could say that the intensification in the degree of effectiveness of modern weapons has transformed a quantitative increase into a new quality and thus given war a new nature. The difference is so radical that we have thought that strictly speaking one could no longer speak of "war as such," because the general concept "war" will not serve to include both the use of military power in the prenuclear age and that of the atomic age.

The definitive difference between then and now becomes evident when we make clear to ourselves that a future war between opponents with half-way equivalent atomic potential must not only destroy the opponent but must at the same time lead to self-destruction. A future war will pose not

HELMUT THIELICKE is Rector of the University of Hamburg, Germany (the first Protestant theologian to hold this post), and preaches in St. Stephen's Church in Hamburg; several books of his sermons have appeared already in English. The above translation is published here by permission of Dr. Thielicke; of the German publishers of his *Ethik*, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen; and of Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, which is to publish the *Ethik* in English.

KARL H. HERTZ, Ph.D., the translator, is Professor of Sociology at Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio.

only the problem of killing, but also the problem of suicide. As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry once commented on the weapons technology of World War II, "War has now been reduced to a kind of surgery, by which an insect directs its sting at the nerve center of its opponent." With reference to nuclear and supernuclear weapons one could say that—like a bee which loses its sting and thus receives a fatal wound—the insect dies of its own bite.

It is worth noting that as early as 1932 (!) Emil Brunner in his ethics expressed the thought that in the light of modern war, "all analogies with the past fail" (*The Divine Imperative*), that "war has begun to outlive its usefulness," that "today it is suicidal," and that "it no longer has the significance it once had."

The only possible conclusions which can be drawn from the recognition of these facts must evidently be (1) that no nuclear war must occur, and (2) that the traditional question of Christian theology, whether a just war is permissible, has become superfluous and is not applicable to an atomic war.

For the idea of a just war, namely, of a *defensive* war, makes sense only so long as defense is at all possible, so long as *to begin with*, chances of survival exist, and *furthermore*, a commensurate relationship exists between the destruction which occurs and the values which are defended. But if attack as well as defense by powers of equal atomic strength becomes more and more identical with self-destruction, these distinctions fall away and the idea of a just war becomes absurd.

Traditional conceptions are in any case no longer adequate for the description of contemporary problems. It is very difficult to imagine defending some good or value whose defense includes not only the risk but the probability of a total annihilation. The emotional ardor of the wars of liberation of the past would in our day have a hollow sound.

What conclusion could be more obvious than that there should also be no atomic weapons, if an atomic war is absurd? If a particular end is recognized as impossible, then logically the means to that end must also be judged impossible. If atomic war is to be abolished, then we must also abolish that which makes it possible. Or else?

In the step from these premises to these conclusions a unique difficulty becomes evident. For while both the possessors and the nonpossessors of atomic weapons agree that an atomic war is absurd, some of them hesitate to draw the apparently logical conclusion and also to abolish these weapons. Why does one persist in the "logical contradiction," denying the end, while affirming or *apparently* affirming the means?

B. The "logical contradiction": denial of atomic war and affirmation of atomic arms.

One of the formulations we have just used will perhaps help us get beyond this striking observation. "If atomic war is to be abolished, the means making it possible must also be abolished." This formulation prompts the question whether atomic weapons constitute the only possibility and condition for atomic war.

If we put the question in this form, we can only answer "No." For we must also include among the contingencies and conditions, in addition to the weapons themselves, the one who owns them and may perhaps be determined to use them. If one cannot trust the possessor of atomic weapons, then the above formulation must also read: If atomic war is to be abolished, we must also get rid of the one who makes the war possible—the questionable, dubious possessor of these weapons. For *he* is the one on whom all suspicion falls, the true source of the possibility of atomic war, and the one therefore who forces me in every possible way to remain his equal in corresponding armaments.

"Getting rid of him" does not at all need to imply destroying him. Rather one must be able to get rid of those traits which make him an object of suspicion. One must, therefore, be able to *change* him, in order to get rid of the contingencies and conditions of atomic war. One must be able to make him trustworthy. But how?

One may answer that the question is totally unrealistic. For if man himself is the condition making possible an atomic war, then this war would seem to be inevitable, because one simply cannot change human nature. It is impossible to take the human nature of one who is the object of our suspicion and transform him into a *trustworthy* partner. We live within the dimensions of the post-Babel world.

One could, however, answer quite differently: In the face of the existing suspicion, one must obviously remind oneself that suspicion is always reciprocal. Each expects the worst of the other; each sees in him a potential aggressor. And by acting accordingly, each progressively strengthens the mutual suspicion.

If this is true, only one way out of this deadly spiral seems still open to me, namely, that I give evidence of trust at a place over which I have control. This *one* place is the place in which I find myself as one of the two partners. If the other could be persuaded to have the confidence in me that I am no threat to him, the relaxation of tension that would follow

might possibly allay his fears and make him a party to a contract with whom conversation is possible, who would also gain my confidence and would thus be changed to this extent.

This is a rule elsewhere in life, namely, that *I* must change myself, if the relationship of the other to me and he himself are to change. Individuals and nations are inextricably bound to one another; it is part of their very essence to be "in relation." Therefore change must be reciprocal in form, and the desire to change must take the form of my altering *that* part of the partnership over which I have control, namely, myself.

Can this insight be applied to superpersonal forces like states and nations? The impossibility of accepting the same laws for both the I-Thou relationship and the superpersonal plane of the orders touches the central problem about which the doctrine of the two kingdoms concerns itself. In the present instance the impossibility is manifested as follows:

The crisis of confidence between two armed opponents would be set aside if one of the two by his own atomic disarmament took the initiative in breaking the vicious circle. In personal matters we are undoubtedly challenged to dare to initiate such acts of confidence and thus to give the other a chance to change. For in this situation it is true that confidence does not depend simply on the previous trustworthiness of the other but that the risking of confidence has creative force and *makes* the other trustworthy.

By "giving" (!) another my confidence, even though he has not "earned" it, I may help him become trustworthy. The same holds true of the creative act of love; love also does not depend upon previous lovable-ness—that would be *eros* and not *agape*—love makes the loved one lovable. God does not love us because we are so lovable and worthy, but we are worthy because God loves us. Our love arises as a response to the initiative of God.

In the realm of personal relations the risk of offering trust in advance is both possible and obligatory, because I undertake it as a personal responsibility and cost, and risk my own person. In the superpersonal sphere of the orders, the situation is different in so far as, *first*, I draw entire nations and cultures into this risk and as, *second*, I cannot make my disposition to risk confidence manifest in the same way as in the personal sphere—in fact, this disposition *cannot* be made manifest at all in such an unambiguous way.¹

¹ Weissäcker also concedes the impossibility of a unilateral initiative in *this* realm or at least he subordinates it as a universal insight. "With respect to states we also do not believe that one of the great powers can disavow atomic weapons unilaterally. At best a smaller country—which thus also does not occupy a key position in the political play of power—is in this position."

No matter how we turn or squirm, apparently insurmountable difficulties oppose all efforts to change the world of suspicion in the situation existing since the Tower of Babel. It can only be overcome symbolically "for a moment," when in the encounter of man with his fellows, with the neighbor, the miracle of the gospel and its love become a reality.

The hopelessness of this situation is made even worse when it involves the opposition of antagonists, for whom there does not exist even remotely "the community of world view." In fact the opponents in the conflict of East and West are powers who act according to completely disparate norms, who mutually interpret the other differently than they interpret themselves, who thus become incommensurate with one another and who are thus committed to a similar essential and mutual mistrust.

Through this confusion of tongues, norms, and concepts the concern must understandably emerge, that the other will understand an offer of trust, i.e., taking the initiative in disarmament, differently than it is meant at home; perhaps as a tactical move on the checkerboard of politics, as the expression of a feeling of superiority because one has still other unknown resources at one's disposal, as resigned acceptance of defeat in the competitive arms race, or even as symptomatic of idealistic fantasy.

These considerations at all events emphatically instruct us that the peace of this world is different from that of the Kingdom of God, that it is a peace of fear and servile anxiety. This is also the reason why in the worldly kingdom power must exist and why the state and the law must be equipped with this power to restrain and to defend.

The fact that all desire indeed to do away with atomic war but not with certain possibilities on which atomic warfare rests, is therefore despite all appearances not grounded in the logical self-contradiction of all the participants. This would be possible only if all the possibilities were contained in the atomic weapons; but they are also and at the same time part of man *himself*; they are a part of the unalterable character of the world.

Because we understand this—more instinctively than consciously—that we cannot change the *one* decisive factor in these contingencies, the abolition of the whole complex of contingencies becomes an almost hopeless problem. Theological reasons stand in the background of the impasse over disarmament, namely, man in his situation before God and therefore also the world in its situation before God.

In the framework of the atomic question this situation leads to the following result: The fear that the other partner will be able to produce

atomic weapons secretly, or that he will not destroy the supply at hand despite all the agreements to disarm, but will be able to conceal them, or that he will be able to push the release button for an atomic attack a moment earlier—this fear leads both partners to refuse to surrender the relative security factor of an equivalence of strength. The real impediment is, therefore, not to be found primarily in political and strategic considerations but in the prior fact undergirding these considerations, the fact of a human existence condemned to mistrust. . . .

C. The problem of the distribution of atomic power: physical equivalence.

In order to understand this distrust in the full scope of its political consequences, we call to mind an idea which we already touched on in the discussion of the power problem in general and to which the example of the pistols gives a further confirmation. Distrust of the partner is intensified to the same degree as the partner is armed and the dangers which lie in the incalculability of his power increase. Since power, above and beyond this, may contain additional alluring temptations of its own, even someone with a relatively harmless disposition—let alone a thoughtless and cynical opponent—can become a street bandit.

This distrust of power and this thoroughly critical view of human nature is the basis of democracy. For it is an axiom of every democratic constitution to prevent an accumulation of power, and, therefore, a *monopoly* of power in *one place*, and instead to divide power and thus to control it. This insight is the basis for the principle of the division of power. What is taking place in the world arena at present is in fact nothing other than this attempt to develop from the distrust of the atomic powers a kind of *atomic division of power*, and consequently an equilibrium of forces, a kind of neutralization of atomic power and thus an atomic peace.

We must freely admit that at first glance (and then only relatively) this notion of an atomic peace is alluring. But after deliberation some rather difficult objections arise which also call into question the validity of the analogy to the structural principles of democracy.

On the one hand, the notion of a *pax atomica* is misleading in that it may make possible a transient condition of relative security, but on the other hand, even the performance of this function necessarily poses a serious threat, and the possibility of an emergency must be included in the calculations. For if there is *no* such determination really to use the atomic weapon, even at the risk of self-destruction, then this weapon appears to lose its

psychological effectiveness and consequently cannot effect an atomic peace. For then the situation is no different than if the bomb did not exist at all and as if atomic armament had become altogether an absurd apparition.

C. F. v. Weizsäcker has said: "The old weapons made it possible to survive a war victoriously. The H-bombs permit one only to threaten the possibility of immediate retaliation, if one is prepared to go under simultaneously with one's opponent. A threat which can only be carried out at the price of one's own destruction is no threat at all. If every one knows that these bombs will not be dropped, then they may as well not exist. The danger for all of us lies in the fact that the owner of the bombs, in order to be able to use them even as a threat, must be willing actually to use them."

But if the program for an atomic peace includes the determination to face the emergency and the readiness to be destroyed with the enemy, then we must consider as absurd not only every possibility of defense and the idea of a just war, but we must apparently also draw the further conclusion that it is no longer consistent with any ethical or Christian responsibility in any form whatsoever by encouragement, consent, or action to take part in atomic armament.

For if the distrust existing in the world, about which the Christian is particularly informed, demands the therapy of a balance of power, then such a therapy nevertheless can be one which Christians can take seriously and which can be based on the Noachite covenant (Gen. 9:1ff) only so long as genuine possibilities exist for punishment, resistance, deterrence, or defense.

At the very moment however in which the readiness to perform these legitimate functions is not only combined with inhuman atrocities against immense numbers of combatants and noncombatants, but in which it is also simultaneously a readiness to commit collective suicide, then this presumed therapy is not only logically absurd but also becomes blasphemous in the religious sense. For these functions took their meaning and legitimacy from a divine order for the preservation of the world. But here they become means for the destruction of the world.

Gollwitzer draws this conclusion when he says:

Having determined that there dare not be any atomic wars and that the concept of the just war becomes obsolete, then just as certainly as the Amen follows the sermon, the third proposition must follow, which Thielicke mysteriously enough does not assert, namely, that there will be no atomic war, i.e., in so far as this depends on us, the Christians and Christian political leaders, on me and you, because at any event—this the Christian theologian must say—neither you nor I will seize these fiendish instru-

ments, not even to retaliate [Gollwitzer probably means an atomic counterattack against an atomic attack]; because under no circumstances can Christians take part in it, for since the beginning participation was possible for them only in the extreme instance of a just war. If all, then not I—this is the first and last thing a Christian can answer to the question of participation in this government-sponsored preparation for loathsome massacre if things are as Thielicke says they are—and they most certainly are.

Is this conclusion valid? We must examine an entire sequence of ideas to determine this.

First of all, we recommend that the conclusion be viewed not only in the abstract but in its historic reality. From this perspective his conclusion expresses two ideas.

First, that one of the two partners—in this instance the West—must unilaterally and radically disarm, because it must be unilaterally and radically resolved not to use the atomic weapon under any circumstances, not even if the opponent uses it in an unprovoked attack. This unilateral and radical disarmament will be logically required of the West, even if the East is not resolved to take the same steps, if consequently the atomic power accumulates in *one* place in the world and this *one* place then uses it presumably to exercise not only the potential but the actual world dominion which its doctrine has always postulated.

We regret that we cannot spare Gollwitzer the rebuke that, despite his innumerable comments on this subject and his inclination to parcel out reproaches in all directions from his lofty perch, he is silent about this elementary fact. If it has escaped him, this would be a blameworthy oversight. If he has kept quiet about it, he has been unfair, because the peril-laden decisions of political leaders, including Christian political leaders in the various countries of the West—refer to just this particular fact.

Gollwitzer should, then, also have the courage to approach the political leaders with *this* demand and to require of them also to give up "the relative security of an atomic equilibrium." To refer only to atomic atrocities is not to argue but to appeal to the emotions. For certainly no political leader in the world, regardless of his leanings or his country, is uninformed about "the atrocities." Where do we find in Gollwitzer any ideas that take seriously the task of discussing how to obtain controlled disarmament and thus to combat atrocities with methods suited to the medium of *politics*? To assert theologically what ought to be, without indicating the concrete structure which includes this "ought" in itself, and without naming the actual alternatives for political decision, is a cheap way to argue.

Second, consent to a unilateral imperialism includes the consequence

(on which again Gollwitzer is silent) that one is prepared to accept a communistic world order as his destiny. This conclusion follows not only from the theologically supported considerations that unlimited power is impelled to realize its absoluteness, but it also follows as well from our specific knowledge that Marxism-Leninism has unmistakably stood for world dominion in its ideological program.

Much would be gained if these two consequences were looked at realistically, if one thus stopped blotting out the factual contours of the problem with "Christian" emotions.

D. The Alternatives: Communism or Annihilation.

Despite this, the bare determination of the consequences is no refutation. Even if up to the present neither the colleagues of Gollwitzer who have the same theological orientation nor the atomic physicists who have warned us have forced the issue to the alternative, that if the choice lies between communism and destruction we should choose communism—we must nevertheless examine this alternative. That is, we must now equally forbid ourselves to seek an emotional effect in the sense of reacting to this alternative with the determination, "Under no conditions will we accept communism."

For it is at least conceivable that even with a fundamental rejection of communism, capitulation to it could *then* be required or permitted if the alternative to it would be the devastation of the whole world. One could nevertheless still argue that survival offered certain chances also to survive communism. For only according to its own interpretation of itself is it the final goal of history; we are free to believe that it can be overcome and destroyed as a world power. But if the total annihilation of friend and foe takes place, even the chances of survival and victory are gone.

This argument is not to be dismissed lightly. Even he who sees communism as an impossible historical development, for whose defeat no price is too high, can hardly close his ears to this argument, when he considers *what* alternatives it presents. Nevertheless the basis on which the argument rests is falsely chosen. We can therefore deal with it only if we question this basis.

The choice is not primarily between communism and destruction; the basic issue is rather whether we must in principle recognize the right of the stronger. The question is not whether in the extreme instance we should capitulate to communism, but whether we—again in the extreme instance, but then as a matter of principle—should allow power to become unlimited and to refuse to accept any law as a barrier.

This question is only conditionally concerned with the fact that in our instance this power appears in the concrete form of communism. It could also be an entirely different kind of power. The fact that in our instance it is communism sharpens the issues only in the sense that the power representing the right of the stronger again includes in itself—in its essence, ideologically—a concept of right, which gives the primacy of power and of the ends of action an additional unfair advantage.

The person who chooses unlimited power must recognize what his ultimate choice is: He has decided against the Noachite ordering of the world, in which uncontrolled unlimited power was to find its limit in opposing power, and in which the principle of world-preservation consisted precisely in the fact that limits were set and, if occasion arose, were enforced by the use of power.

Consequently, whoever chooses the right of the stronger decides against this principle of world order from which the state arises—indeed, by which all authority and justice are held together. He decides against the foundation of the world and he must clearly recognize, once this choice has been made, that the legitimacy of all *the other* orders has been fatally touched—the legitimacy of obedience to parents, decent practices in business and in other competition, the hierarchy of superior and subordinate, the freedom of the person in any of the orders, and so on.

One will not be able to answer that the world has always been the scene of such victories of the stronger and of such surrender of the weaker and his rights, and that from this fact indeed a confirmation rather than a refutation of the Noachite order is to be derived. This objection simply would not meet the issue because the decision in question is not a trivial occurrence in an obscure corner, which could somehow be buried in a historical narrative, in which the orderliness of the world (in intention) is very well observed and in which consequently the slogan, "Right before might," remains valid. What indeed is at stake here is nothing less than a global decision; consequently a decision for the earth.

That sounds highly emotional, but it signifies the naked truth. For we must be clear about the following. *In the same sense in which the atomic weapon affects the entire world and is therefore qualitatively different from all earlier weapons which had only local significance, all decisions taken with respect to this weapon also affect the entire world and are therefore qualitatively to be distinguished from all earlier decisions, which were also particular and did not affect the total course of history.* Our generation will need much more time before it has accustomed itself to this change of

perspective and comprehends the transformation of the issues that has occurred even at the furthest circumference of the atomic problem.

The decision between the alternatives, communism and destruction, in favor of communism thus affects incomparably more basic spheres of existence than at first appeared to us—in that first moment when we saw the issue posed as a question of survival and its chances over against communism.

The issues look essentially different, when one poses them as a decision between two forms of annihilation, both at any time total in character, "physical" annihilation, or the "moral" annihilation of the world in which the fundamental choice in favor of the right of the stronger has been made for the whole globe and the last principle of all order denied, in which physical deliverance is possible only at the price of "dead souls."

No one in our generation may dare to calculate the scope of this decision in such a way that he would be willing to do more than risk making it for himself alone, if he could be in a position and vested with the full authority to give an answer which would bind *the* Christian world in a confessional way to one or the other reply. *For no generation has ever before faced this question.* This may be the reason why it is so consistently avoided in the pertinent literature.

Since we cannot therefore make a decision of this importance and of this inevitability (conceding this simply for the time being) in a theological ethic—which strives for more than a personal witness and claims universal validity—and thus simply make it the basis of all further discussion, the only path open methodologically is to follow two lines of thought and to consider both solutions of the alternatives.

1. If in the light of the fatal trauma of world order I decide to choose "preparation for annihilation" as the ultimate possibility, then this choice implies that I affirm the equivalence of atomic power and indeed with the end in view of preventing the otherwise unlimited development of atomic power in *one* place.

This choice also implies that I accept the risk that the *pax atomica* could someday come to an end in a world conflagration. Since I cannot desire this annihilation, but consider it only as the lesser evil among these desperate and pressing alternatives, I will do everything which lies within the scope of my insight and resources to achieve a controlled disarmament, effectively to reduce suspicion, and to be prepared for the sake of this goal to take far-reaching partial risks and make great sacrifices.

2. If, on the other hand, I decide that I *cannot* face preparation for

annihilation as the ultimate possibility, then I must ask whether Gollwitzer's consequence follows, that I may *therefore* not possess any atomic weapons, that I must consequently disarm unilaterally, for every beginning is in this instance the beginning of the end; *or* whether this conclusion may still be avoided, whether consequently an equivalence of atomic power and a *pax atomica* can still be taken into consideration.

To follow up this line of thought, we must first make explicit that this solution requires that an open atomic war is to be avoided at *any* price, even if the price is the capitulation of the world to communism, and if, consequently, the cynical opponent, to whom humanitarian or even Christian objectives are alien, may move unopposed to expansion and victory.

This decision has the consequence that *one* condition exists in which I must choose complete atomic disarmament, namely, if it becomes clear that the possession of atomic weapons will necessarily lead to an atomic war. This condition appears to hold at that point where both sides are really determined not to limit their use of the atomic weapons only to the psychic effects of deterrence, but to use them, if the emergency demands it.

This brings us back to Weizsäcker's thesis that he who wishes to use atomic weapons as deterrents must also be determined to use them. For if each knows that the other will not act when things become serious, then the atomic weapons surrender their deterrent effect and the situation is no different than if they were nonexistent. But if only one of the two is *not* ready to use them, when things become serious, the other can act without restraint, as if he alone possessed an atomic monopoly. Thus both opponents *must* be determined to drop the bomb in the time of crisis.

If this is or will be the situation, then at *this* level of thought one cannot in fact come to any other conclusion, if mutual disarmament is not possible, than that one must disarm alone and unilaterally. Then the issue becomes sharpened to the *single* question about the relationship between deterrence and the determination to use the bombs, about the relationship of the psychic to the violent effects. Is the thesis correct that these two are inseparably bound to one another and must be accepted together?

E. The strategy of terror: psychic equivalence and the effect of unpreparedness.

This proposition, we believe, rests on an incorrect way of putting the question. But since the way of putting the question bears the weight of all the propositions that follow, and since this is a central and fundamental question, the consequences for clarification are fateful.

We would reason as follows:

The determination to use the bomb in the time of crisis is in no way decisive for deterrence and the prevention of nuclear war. Since the deterrence as a goal rests on a psychological consideration, this consideration must be thought through psychologically also in a thoroughgoing way.

The point is this: What counts is not whether I am determined to act in the time of crisis, but whether the opponent *takes account* of my determination. These are two different matters.

The question to what degree the opponent takes my determination into account is not answered simply by the propositions at hand. He takes it into account to the extent that I succeed in giving this impression, either by demonstrating my actually existing determination with sufficient clarity or by succeeding in deceiving him by hypocritical, swaggering talk about my nonexistent determination. This answer is only correct in a very limited way.

The deterrent effect does indeed depend on the success I have in giving my opponent a definite impression of my determination and thus making him take it into account. But whether he really will take this into account depends on an essentially different set of circumstances. He will take this determination into account only in the *same* degree that he himself possesses it. He is also familiar with the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. If he rates this potential so high that he considers their use impossible on the grounds of his own survival, he will accept *unwillingness* to act in the time of crisis only in the *same* measure in which he sees himself compelled not to let the crisis arise.

Under these circumstances the unwillingness he attributes to his opponent will no longer be damaging because it corresponds to his own and thus the "psychic equivalence" comes into being—unless he possesses such a superiority in nonatomic weapons that under the cover of a common atomic fear, he can continue on a military execution of his will within the framework of conventional warfare and without nuclear intervention. (We shall return to this last point.)

We will apparently find ourselves for some time to come in this stage in which one partner must count on the unwillingness of the other. This respite could possibly come to an end through further development in the technology of weapons or in atomic strategy, which in distinction from the previous history of warfare would have the paradoxical effect of reducing the superiority of atomic weapons to manageable proportions and make possible once again a strategy of local and in every instance limited encounters.

This speculation goes beyond the competence of a theological ethic. On the other hand that competence *does include* the following question which now arises.

If, first, the deterrent effect of the atomic weapon does not rest on the factual determination to use it in the time of crisis, but only on the *presumption* of this determination; if, second, the presumption of such a determination on the opponent's part rests on one's own determination; and if, third, in the present situation, an "equivalence of unpreparedness" must prevail, then the question cannot be avoided, why indeed the two sides are plunging into the terrible expenses and risks of the manufacture and storage of nuclear bombs. The answer can only be: *They act in this way because the effect of preparedness will vanish in the moment in which only one of them controls atomic weapons.*

For under this condition it becomes possible for the possessor of the weapon to allow the crisis to occur without the danger of self-annihilation (because the other cannot retaliate and even the source of the danger of explosions at home disappears). Unilateral possession of atomic bombs would allow him to push forward into a vacuum with the help of atomic power, without indeed having to give in to the temptation to take this weapon out of incubation and let it become virulent. (The conclusion of the Japanese-American war after the two atomic "tests" is a typical instance.)

Mutual atomic armament thus has the significance that a dangerously one-sided situation is prevented. It does not immediately require the determination to use the bomb in the time of crisis, but only the determination of a prophylactic defense.

That under the circumstances of mutual possession of atomic weapons the crisis will occur is *improbable* for the reasons just given (effect of unpreparedness.) That under the circumstances of unilateral possession the resulting vacuum would be filled by imperialistic action on the part of one partner is *certain*—especially if the other partner is the spokesman for an expanding and militant doctrine of world salvation. We are thus led to a conclusion which in the light of the prevailing discussion is unexpectedly encouraging.

The false proposition that deterrence necessarily requires the determination to act in the time of crisis, in connection with the second proposition, that one could not answer an active communistic threat to the world with an atomic defense and the risk of total destruction, led to the conclusion that a radical and unilateral renunciation of atomic war was mandatory and that in any event the Christian had no choice. This second proposition

could not be logically refuted, because it rested on an ultimate ethical decision which we had to respect for the reasons given and which we supported as correct. But we have attempted to weaken the first proposition, the interdependence of deterrence and the determination to act in the time of crisis.

If we have succeeded, then the conclusion drawn from the propositions also does not follow; namely, that unilateral disarmament is, as Gollwitzer insists between the lines (but with complete unambiguity) so conclusive that it is possible to make it a matter of confession of faith and moral compulsion for the Christian. There are quite clearly good reasons for holding that the fundamental law of the Noachite world, according to which in the worldly kingdom force is countered by force (and servile anxiety serves the political use of the law), has not simply been abolished in favor of atomic force. We are consciously saying, "Not simply." For we will not question that in this boundary situation the ultimate limits of the principle are visible. For the resulting *pax atomica* is much more precarious than any other peace based on fear.

Indeed despite the forms of equivalence and neutralization we have just described, it is conceivable that unexpected sparks would fall too close to the nuclear powder keg and that then the balance of power now existing as an emergency necessity would give place to a horrible world catastrophe. One needs only the apocalyptic vision that Hitler might have had atomic power at his disposal and would have drawn the world into his own finale, to hint at one such possibility.

Consequently the *pax atomica* will never be a quiet peace. All our energies will be demanded to bring mutual atomic disarmament into being.

The refutation of the propositions favoring unilateral disarmament dare not give the impression that a *pax atomica* would be "not so bad," and that we could even console ourselves with the feeling that we have succeeded in bringing the atomic age also under the relatively permanent—surviving at least until the judgment day—emergency ordering of the Noachite world, and thus made this order secure.

Our choice lies between two evils, and it is a question of prudent calculation, not of faith, which one considers the greater danger: either the situation of an atomic power on one side and a vacuum on the other, or an existing equivalence of atomic potential which indeed leads to mutual unwillingness to take the final step, but which for this reason must remain very labile, because fallible humans are in charge or because it could in a moment be betrayed into the hand of criminals.

In *every* instance Christians, especially Christian political leaders, are duty-bound to strive for mutual disarmament and a reduction of that risk which is found in the reciprocal limitation of *superdimensional* powers.

II. PROBLEMS AND TASKS WHICH THE CHURCH FACES IN PREVENTING ATOMIC WAR

A. Radicalism and realism: the problem of a word "for the situation" from the church.

We have established two points in the above sections. First, a peace which rests on an atomic division of power and the resulting neutralization is a peace fraught with anxiety. The world outside the gospel cannot know the redemptive freedom of the divine good will, but the unredeemed freedom of the world, i.e., the quiet submission born of fear and a world order, in which according to the Noachite covenant a neutralization of the elements of disorder is demanded. Servile fear takes the place of childlike love.

The identifying mark of a peace which arises in this manner is its great relativity. This relativity consists in the fact that it is not a genuine peace but an armistice, which in itself is very unstable. This instability, which in the warlike condition of this eon has fundamentally always existed, is incomparably more dangerous than in previous epochs because the sparks of the "cold fire" of the peace of anxiety can always lead once again to explosive situations, and so mankind will live permanently in the shadow of the ultimate possibility.

For just this reason Christendom is here called upon to judge, warn, and console in its witness, because the circumstances of this peace of anxiety are rooted in the human situation itself and in the nature of the human world. If man is the one to whom law and gospel are addressed, then the world situation which mirrors his essential nature must be included in the message.

Before we can define this witness of Christendom more closely, we must reflect on the dangers which threaten a witness of this kind and the false roads which may be taken. . . .

First, since the church itself may not act politically and therefore neither has the prerequisite sources of information which help determine the decisions of statesmen nor stands under the burden of these decisions, it is gravely tempted to formulate very general and absolute demands.

In the circle of responsible political leaders (whether they belong to the government or the opposition) these are then found to be unrealistic

and thus understood as a burden or even utilized tactically. In public life they contribute to certain false directions and terrible simplifications of the situation. Under the cover of radical and religiously intended (or religiously appearing) demands, men cheerfully play politics without providing legitimacy for their activity or meeting the necessary preconditions.

A conscience which is not under the pressure of knowledge and the necessity of decision, which does not need to take any active responsibility and is outside the (relative) autonomy of spheres of life such as politics and the economy, is altogether too prone to be abstractly radical and from the distance of a Christian or ethical platform to become pharisaical or enthusiastic.

Just this consideration has previously led us to the method of using model situations in theological ethics, because in this way we were compelled to analyze a concrete piece of reality and thus to take into account the inseparable involvement of issues of principle and of prudential calculation, as well as in this process to figure out the distinction which exists between taking a position in principle independent of the situation and the pressures of calculation and decision *in* a situation.

This transformation in the way of stating ethical questions when we move from the one situation to the other can be clearly seen in the situation of the *atomic scientists*, who in part took this step in person, and from being "intellectuals at a distance" suddenly became actors with political responsibility. This change brings with it necessarily a change in the situation of conscience.

After the last war (until about 1949) leading American atomic scientists could seriously entertain the idea that they could not for reasons of conscience take part in the construction of a superbomb, and thus they set the stage for something like a *strike* of atomic scientists. They thought that they could here control an inviolable area of freedom of conscience and were obligated to protect it.

This situation changed at one stroke when the news came that the Soviet Union had fissionable material at its disposal. The decision to agree to the construction of the superbomb under these altered conditions was a test case of a most exemplary sort. Suddenly one discovered the shocking reality that every ethical decision about atomic weapons was included under the political law of action and reaction. The ethical problem no longer took the form of a question whether one could accept the responsibility of bringing such an irresistible destructive force as this bomb into existence. In this abstract form, one could actually answer no. But the question now read:

Given the existing state of affairs, i.e., under a new complex of conditions (in which the potential opponent also controls the atomic bomb), can I accept the responsibility of withdrawing from the manufacture of supernuclear weapons? Or still more pointedly: Can I through the contingency of my refusal accept the responsibility of giving the antagonist atomic superiority? Should I not now rather see it as my duty at least to contribute to atomic equality and to protect my country from the fate of becoming a defenseless object of the opponent's caprice? Is not the pledge of a weapon which belongs to us also necessary, when the next step must be the establishment of international control and the initiation of disarmament negotiations?

One can imagine the shock this transformation of the ethical question—for this is what is at stake—brought about among the atomic scientists. Here at all events the problem of political ethics takes on all the clarity one could wish for: ethical decisions are not taken in a vacuum freed of facts, but they are taken under the pressure of particular conditions and in the framework of definite necessities.

One must not forget that Einstein himself, in his famous letter to Roosevelt in which he urged the United States government to accept the uranium problem, lived and suffered through these same experiences. When he, the pacifist and representative of humanitarian thought, received the news of a presumed German atomic armament, his decision moved from the medium of abstract principles to the medium of facts. And the question which the facts posed was, Should the world remain defenseless in the face of the terror of a Nazi atomic initiative?

The transformation of the ethical question which occurs when this step is taken from a position *outside* the system of politics to one on the *inside* is characterized by the fact that the new ethical decision must include in its calculations *the conditions* over against which and under which the choice must be made.

The most prominent of these conditions is that politics belongs in the sphere of the encounter of forces, that in it power must be striven for (in order that goals may be realized), and that consequently increase in the power of the opponent (whether in industry or weapons, in the improvement of geopolitical bases or in the building of alliances) must be answered with a corresponding increase in one's own strength.

Thus we arrive at the *inevitable succession of action and reaction* in the superpersonal spheres of life. Whenever in any sector of industry an important technological improvement occurs, e.g., automation, entrepreneurs in the same branch must follow suit in order to remain in a competitive

position. The same law holds, as we have seen, with respect to military potential, even when the desired equivalence of power or the superiority of our own power is intended only as insurance against war.

Even when the competitive armament race which this principle stimulates is recognized as insane and both sides agree on disarmament, this disarmament will also be subsumed under this *law of action and reaction*. For its individual phases will have to be given a precisely synchronized reciprocity, because the equivalence must also be retained in the *reduction* of power and remain as a security factor in a world of suspicion. For this reason determination of phases and of controls stands at the heart of all disarmament negotiations.

The rule of, "As you do unto me, I shall do unto you," permeates all spheres of life—even the personal relations between my neighbor and myself. Only the person who recognizes this knows how to evaluate what a radical innovation comes onto the scene with the gospel. For the gospel suspends this principle of reciprocity for the I-Thou relationship. It breaks through the vicious circle and in the golden rule imposes on me the responsibility of a new beginning and a new and daring initiative.

But the creative breath that here comes into my relation with my neighbor and thus makes something new possible can only conditionally, i.e., only with reference to the previously mentioned structural laws of this eon, be transferred to the *superpersonal* spheres of technology, economics, and politics.

The attempt to grasp the distinction between the two spheres of life conceptually, not simply to separate them and to let them fall apart, but to *distinguish* between them, this effort on the part of the Reformation achieved its most prominent structural reflection in the doctrine of the two kingdoms. In Catholic moral theology something similar is seen in the natural-law distinction of nature, condition, and circumstances, and further in the differentiation between primary and secondary natural law.

But the church itself is now in the situation to be tempted to confuse the two kingdoms because from its place "in the distance" it is inclined to overlook the sphere of "the conditional"—both with respect to the concrete situations and also the structural conditions of the existing spheres of life. . . . All those who as ethical or religious spokesmen from the outside would admonish us in political affairs must be aware of this danger.

Not that the admonitions should stop! We ourselves are also engaged in the task of finding legitimate themes and forms of Christian admonition. But we cannot arrive at these admonitions and critiques with as little effort

as in many instances is true—especially in connection with the problem of the atom. Those who bear the burden of a political mandate and are confronted with concrete “conditions” must not be sacrificed to fanatics of the absolute and to utopians—not even those of Christian origin.

Second, Christian utterances of this sort must take into account a circumstance on which we have already touched in our analysis of the atomic situation. In the face of a specific alternative we had to concede that on the threshold of the atomic era just now beginning, the full implications of many decisions can hardly be comprehended: this limitation of the field of vision affects both theological reflection and the right of the church to speak to the situation. (Perhaps the hesitation of the Catholic ecclesiastical teaching office on atomic questions is related to this insight; it thus distinguishes itself favorably from the far-ranging subject matter and the excitability of many pronouncements on the Protestant side.)

It is most urgent to point out the limits which are thus set on our insights. If we are right, the biologists are much more consciously aware of this limitation than the theologians, and also than political leaders and technicians. Thus Konrad Lorenz, e.g., in his zoological writings points out that the great climatically and geologically determined environmental changes in the early periods of human history transpired very slowly, and that man consequently had correspondingly long periods at his disposal to adjust himself to the changed environmental conditions. Technology (particularly the peace and war technology of the atomic age) now brings about a far-reaching change in our environmental situation. But these technologically determined changes differ from the geologically and climatically determined processes just in the fact that they have *suddenly* broken in upon us. These changes have taken place in a few decades.

Innumerable problems of the contemporary technological world (from transportation to atomic disarmament) may no doubt be traced back to the fact that we have not yet acclimated ourselves to this radically transformed world and that we still move around in the new atomic world as strangers, shivering, unprepared, and often in a state of shock. Just this is what Saint-Exupéry means in saying that for the time being we are living in the technological age like those under a ban, for whom the new world has not yet become a home. We are uncivilized barbarians and still gape at our new toys. But these new toys are also playing with us.

We have deemed it important and even obligatory in view of frequent abuses to make clear these difficulties and limitations with which a Christian message to the atomic age sees itself confronted. This demand for caution

is important just at the point at which a theological word is to be addressed to the prevention of atomic war. Here we are threateningly near the boundary line beyond which the dominion of incompetent advice and general or empty platitudes begin.

The totality of what the church has to say to the atomic age and on the matter of atomic war is analyzable into two themes: first, what the church is to preach on the subject, and second, what the church is to counsel.

We shall concern ourselves first with preaching.

B. "Preaching" on the atomic problem.

If the causes of the cold and the hot war are to be searched out in the innermost depths of fallen humanity, then Christendom must *first* of all warn us against *all false hopes*—hopes, e.g., that rest on overcoming war through institutional and organizational measures, through alliances, through disarmament conferences, through the realization of a *pax atomica* or through unilateral renunciation of self-defense.

For just as man can hardly become just through "good works" and change his nature, so he also cannot change the nature of the world through organizational and institutional "works," which are his objective expression. And just as he can hardly place his trust in works of this kind, so he is also not permitted, in his confusion, to point to specific *situations* which he considers responsible for the possibility of an atomic war (to particular constellations of power—or to the discovery of the splitting of the atom, and so forth). Here too he is the one himself who is responsible for these possibilities because he is the provocateur of a world of suspicion and of centrifugal tendencies. The first theme of the sermon addressed to the atomic age and its anxiety must therefore be determined by the greatness, misery, and vocation of man.

Furthermore, the message of Christendom must also proclaim the consolation of the gospel over this global landscape. This consolation must be directed particularly to the anxiety which feeds on the atomic threat. This consolation rests not only on the individual application of a grace which gives peace and thus removes "the anxiety of the world," but it rests in addition on the knowledge that the rainbow of divine reconciliation stands over a fallen world—as a sign that this world too shall not go under through its own destructive powers and that, "as long as the earth stands, seed time and harvest, frost and heat, winter and summer, day and night shall not come to an end"—if and as long as there remain some who keep the covenant in the midst of such a world.

The church in its preaching will thus resist the temptation to utilize the panicky feelings of world annihilation for its own ends and to use the atomic bomb as a homiletical tool, in order to bring about decisions of repentance and yearnings for a "cease-fire." On the contrary it will work against the emotional confusion and provide legitimacy for the truth that salvation is also salvation into *a world of facts*, that it offers sobriety, and that consequently both objectivity and impartiality belong to the fruits of redemption.

In its preaching Christendom will *finally* also preach against false absolutes and doctrinaire alternatives. In our instance this implies the following: Christian realism consists in the fact that it never demands absolutes (because this demand would be the utopian form of idolatry) and that as a result of this rejection of the alternatives between enthusiasm *and* the terrible absolute, between the illusion of world peace *and* the illusion of an equivalence of power among the atomic giants, Christian realism *is directed to the most immediate and realizable portions of its tasks.*

The Lord's Prayer does not instruct us to ask for the complete ration of food that will insure our needs until the end of our days, but to ask for the bread which we need "today." The gospel gives sanctity to the next stage of the journey, not to the distant goal. In this way it distinguishes itself from the Utopias. The word of God is a lamp unto our feet, which lights up only the next step and lets us look forward to the one beyond it with expectant confidence, not a searchlight, which makes it possible to see tremendous distances. Just as the gospel finds it necessary to venture confidently into the dark and let itself be led, so its duty is also only the immediate course of action to be advised, not an explicit program for all future activity.

Thus the gospel and the love deriving from it finds itself at home in a style of *improvisation*, in attention to what is immediately at hand. Instead of the general proclamation of the absolute of world peace or a total renunciation of atomic weapons, which would echo without effect and which at the same time—without possessing legitimate reasons for provocation—would be laughed at, because it overlooks the sphere of "conditions," it is fitting for the church to summon men to the humility of the small fragments and to give courage to accept the cares of this day as one's duties and not to despise them or confound them in the name of Utopia.

In order that in this application we do not become lost in the general, we shall clarify what is meant by two models, which will still keep their illustrative value even when the facts to which they refer have passed into history.

First, such partial solutions, which do not get their vitality from the emotionality of the absolute, could include the willingness to accept a *limited* moratorium on atomic bomb experimentation and the further manufacture of such bombs. This willingness would have exemplary significance, in pointing out how a Christian ethic is to address political problems. For it would represent a first, albeit very modest, initiatory step, which is not simply subsumed under the law of action and reaction, movement and countermovement, but which tangibly moves out of the spiral of the arms race. What counts at this point is not that we expect the *opponent* to take the first step and to provide the first evidence of credibility, but that we can ourselves make the beginning, and that after the failure of these efforts we can always begin anew. What we are attempting here is clearly within the limits of the possible, to carry over from the plane of the I-Thou encounter into the realm of politics the surrender of the principle of reciprocity which the gospel requires and the demand for a new beginning.

Such an initiative would also constitute the only remedial action which could possibly lighten the burden of suspicion by a single gram and thus get at the source of the world's sufferings. For the first step to such a renunciation at the same time takes on to some degree the form of an argument for the seriousness of our purpose and thus also helps to reduce suspicion. That the moratorium can only be "conditional" and that it passes responsibility to the partner, whether it is possible to prolong the moratorium and to take the next step—this is probably the most that can be accomplished within the framework of the political struggle for power and its particular principles of action. But this first step must be taken, if we seriously intend to set our course towards the larger goal, namely a neutral and controlled disarmament.

Second, among the illusionary and absolute propositions which Christendom must attack we must include the statement that the next war will be an atomic war or there will be no war. We take for granted that the church cannot take a stand against this proposition in the name of some other strategic prognosis. She can oppose this proposition only theologically, i.e., ethically, in so far as she ought to be certain that the statement does not contain only (and perhaps not at all!) a strategic insight, but expresses a particular understanding of oneself and the world. It must indeed be assumed that a totally *different* meaning is concealed in this statement.

The statement can be the result *on the one hand* of the conviction that wars are always provoked and made possible by the weapons which are at hand for conducting them. According to this position, war industries

necessarily lead to war and atomic weapons to atomic war. If this is the meaning of the statement, then we must argue that war never comes upon man from external sources, from the world of things, but from his own world, and that war consequently—it does not matter in what form, in what area, or with what weapons it is conducted—is always an expression of a “Babylonian heart” (Francis Thompson) and of man’s post-Babel world.

On the other hand the statement can be based on the purely economic consideration that atomic arms and consequently atomic war are incomparably cheaper than war with the traditional weapons. (Gollwitzer quotes Ernst Teller that a pound of fissionable material at the time cost only \$7,000, so that, using this material, an explosion of a given magnitude would be considerably cheaper than one with conventional explosives. Furthermore, the cost of delivering such a bomb to the enemy is also considerably less than that of a bomber squadron. Against such evidence the church would appeal less to theological than to pastoral arguments. In this situation she must concern herself with a double challenge.

First, the church must ask who could defend the massacre of millions and their descendants for economic reasons; she must ask whether it is not an example of “the folly” of the godless to offer a cunning calculation which may be economically convincing but which would tear the calculator himself into the abyss and leave only the laughter of God.

Second, the church even here must not be afraid to ask very concrete questions; such concreteness would in such an instance not exceed its competence. Precisely because the church knows that war—even if in a variety of forms—has a *character indelibilis* in this eon, that it will continue in the form of local acts of violence, revolts, partisan combat, and so on, she must insist upon knowing whether such relatively trivial impulses should be held to be sufficient to involve the ultimate means of the atomic bomb, because someone has perhaps failed to keep other means of settling things in readiness.

In the suspense-filled interim between the dominance of conventional weapons and of atomic weapons, ordinary discretion suggests that in the age of nuclear weapons it will still be necessary to have traditional military forces at one’s disposal because they will make it possible to control local brush fires. An exclusively atomic armament will *on the one hand* be immobilized and require passive acceptance of the limited offensives of the opponent who launches them with conventional weapons. For it would hardly be worth the price to unleash the mortal combat of the giants for the sake of a local fire. For this reason atomic weapons will be unproductive of

defense against such situations. *On the other hand* an exclusively atomic armament will involve the temptation to strike, after the limited offensives have reached a certain intensity, if only because the nervous strain becomes unbearable.

It is part of the custodial and pastoral office of the church not to let up with its sharp and persistent inquiry, whether this discretion perhaps has been or could be sacrificed for the economic reasons given, or whether we do not shrink back afraid in the face of the terrifying human, economic, and domestic political demands which the conventional military forces make and whether *for this reason* we risk everything on the play of the destiny-laden card of atomic armament. One need only reflect what the course of World War II would have been if we had employed chemical and biological means, in order to expose the demonic school-girl arithmetic—for here we face just such a paradox of diabolic cunning and stupid banality—concealed in these economic calculations.

This model presents one of the instances in which the message of the church must enter into the details of political and strategic considerations, in order to discover words of concern and watchfulness.

At the same time we see how the message of the congregation of Jesus Christ himself is rendered impotent, if instead of tackling particular duties and specific issues it withdraws into the enthusiastic proclamation of absolutes. *For if she only condemns war as such and demands the total abolition of atomic weapons, she is no longer able to put those highly differentiated questions of conscience to political and military leaders;* then the distinction between atomic and conventional weapons no longer involves a theological-ethical problem, but both stand under equal condemnation. If the church speaks only this word of general condemnation, political leaders will find it easy to describe her message as unrealistic or to dismiss it silently with a wave of the hand. Political leaders are then relieved of the responsibility of answering the above concrete inquiries—because they can no longer be undertaken.

Thus we have seen how preparation for the “particulars” which can be implemented works out, and what this means for how the church will preach.

C. The “counsels” of the church on the atomic question.

Having thus examined the preaching task of the church in the face of atomic armaments and atomic war, we now turn to the second task we set ourselves in order to consider what the church may counsel.

That the church has this additional task of giving advice is based on the fact that her knowledge of the ultimate source of disorder is significant also for a society which is made up of Christians and non-Christians and which therefore (as every concept of the church, no matter how defined, affirms) can never in its entirety be congruent with the congregation that hears the sermon. If this advice refers not only to a concrete application of the sermon but also applies beyond the congregation hearing the sermon, if outside the walls of the church this advice takes *the place* of the sermon, it can speak to only one question. That question is, what can be done so that the spirit which informs the heart of the belligerent—if it cannot indeed be purged by means of the law—will not step outside its incubator phase and become virulent.

In distinction from the sermon, the counsel of the church aims only at a set of symptoms. But this advice will also at the same time become a treatment of symptoms in a further degree, namely, to the extent that, unlike politics, it is not satisfied only with an external restraint of the expansion of power and the equilibrium of forces but it also undertakes to control the belligerent spirit *itself* and thus reaches the source in the human *heart*. The countermeasures to be advised include essentially the following:

1. Resistance to every ideological transfiguration of collectivities, e.g., the idolatry of class, race, nation, and interest group.
2. Education for tolerance and a willingness to compromise in the spheres of everyday life within our comprehension. This includes a new evaluation of *compromise* in all fields of interest and calculation. Only on this basis will it be possible to reduce the desire for violent solutions in certain spheres.
3. Education for the capacity to distinguish between a man and his cause and thus not just to think statically in terms of "fronts" and antithetical ideologies, but to see the living human being who is *not identical* with the front he puts up. (The ability to make this distinction is the basis for the New Testament command of love to one's enemy.) Practically this capacity is to be sought in *such* a manner that actual opponents are brought together and in some respects are compelled to live together. This means we must bring into being the structured forms as possible means by which these encounters can be realized and the related relaxation of tensions achieved.

The German evangelical academies may be cited as examples of this kind, for their essential contribution is probably less to be found in the factual solutions and "helpful formulas" which they have to offer than in the establishment of such places of encounter, in which the representatives

of opposing points of view learn to recognize in one another the respects in which living persons transcend the front and the cause they represent.

4. Kierkegaard once formulated the essence of sin to be that it prompts man to cling absolutely to the relative. One form of this absolutization is found in the ideological intensification of positions which should rest on factual disagreements. Debate, even where the disagreement is very great, does not destroy communications, because the debaters still are bound to one another by a middle term of common factual criteria, and because the form of argumentation built on thesis and antithesis *searches* for that which complements it. But the ideological intensification of positions makes them *exclusive* and plunges their representatives into doctrinal irreconcilability. Thus the blunting of contradictions in our everyday life must be carried on in such a way that even in the child one resists ideological prejudgment and in one's ethics honors the sobriety of factual rationality.

The definition of sin as the inclination to cling absolutely to the relative also brings together in the closest relationship both the macrocosmic structure of war and the structure of the disorderly man. For it demonstrates that disruption of the vertical (relationship to God) at the same time effects the disruption of the horizontal, and leads to the hostile opposition of those who must coexist.

At the same time this proposition also demonstrates that real peace among men and among powers is *the peace of God*, inasmuch as only this peace heals this disorder. Everything else—including what the church may advise beyond its preaching—is an emergency measure against disorder, but it is not in itself peace. It roots in the knowledge that in this eon wars may undergo manifold changes of form (from world wars to local ones, from national wars to civil wars, from atomic to partisan wars, from hot to cold, from military into industrial wars, and so forth) but that they will not cease, because the grandeur and misery of man will not come to an end in this eon.

"The peace of the world" is at its best coexistence but not pax. Thus preaching cannot aim at too high a goal—since it must be the eschatological kingdom of God—and counsel cannot state its aims too modestly.

Whoever confuses these two—and this seems to be not infrequent in Christian utterances—makes the word of Christendom incredible and hardens hearts. Instead of "the word" he preaches plans of reform, and he counsels goals which are alien to the world, because they are at home in a region where neither suffering nor woe has any further dominion, where the alarms of war are silent and the last enemy has been conquered.

Mao Tse-tung and the Decree of Heaven

JEREMY INGALLS

IN ITS CHINESE FORM as Maoism, the threat of Communism as a zealot intention to "bury" all who challenge it has entered a further and even more ominous dimension. Maoism defines itself as a "spiritual collectivism." Claiming to be not only "more rational" but "more spiritual" than any other world view, and daily drilling both its voluntary and its enforced converts to this faith, Maoism raises an even more insidious challenge than any developed by Kremlin dogmatists not only to all free nations but to all the higher religions.

Though still seldom remarked upon in the public press, a major portent in the development of Maoism toward its first half century is its religious motivation and structure. Within free nations an uncritical tendency to equate such terms as *religious* or *spiritual* solely with already known religions has unwittingly contributed to the illusion that the conflict with Communist China is a simple extension, rather than a portentous further transmutation, in the struggle with Communist drives toward world control. Maoism is nonetheless a phenomenon in religion, a system of beliefs claiming to provide an integral answer to all questions concerning the process of the universe in relation to human destiny. In their daily self-examinations and confessional struggle-meetings toward becoming *sheng* ("saints") sufficient to the "holy wars" (Mao Tse-tung, addressing the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1957), Maoists have developed an image of themselves not merely as outwitting all other views of social order but as universally ordained saviors of the human race in the name of a concept which they have carried over and adapted from Neo-Confucianism to their own Maoist purposes, the attainment of *Ta-t'ung* ("Great Togetherness"), the Maoist kingdom-of-heaven-on-earth.

Maoism is initially and thus far continuously the product of specific motives and conscious planning publicly traceable in the personal history

JEREMY INGALLS, M.A., L.H.D., was until recently English Department Chairman and Director of Asian Studies at Rockford College, is author of *The Galilean Way* and also a nationally recognized poet. A scholar in classical and preclassical Chinese, she has done research, on a Ford grant, on current Chinese newspapers and other publications. She edited and translated (with S. Y. Teng) Li Chien-nung, *A Political History of China* (Van Nostrand, 1956).

of Mao Tse-tung. Like all "new" religions Maoism in its surface phenomena appears to be a product of its immediate time and place. But like all expansive religions in their initial period of development, Maoism derives its inner dynamic from thought-habits familiar for centuries to the initially "converted" population. As in this case with a percentage of the Chinese population, the thought-habits are so thoroughly ingrained by long oral as well as literary transmission as to be taken for granted and seldom consciously questioned.

BACKGROUND AND INNER DYNAMIC

Among the several world views which have competed in the Chinese area, from neolithic animism to the incursions of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, the most ingrained world view remains the *chih teh yao tao* ("quintessential inner-power Way") of the *hsien wang* ("former kings" or "ancient rulers"). Present-day Maoists consciously link their collectivist discipline to this "way of the ancients" and its implication. The implication follows directly from the opening lines of traditional Chinese instruction for children: the "way of the ancients" operates and is to be exercised "in order to insure the obedience of all who live under Heaven"—i.e., the human race. As is typical in all "new" doctrines, Maoism has altered some of the emphases in the traditionally prescribed sequence of obediences. Maoism eliminates the old emphasis on obedience to parents, but re-emphasizes the equally traditional "central" emphasis on obedience to "those in authority" (now the Maoist Central Committee). The motive remains the traditional motive, the development of a wholly docile, conformist world society. The assumption is that this conformist society is preordained in the nature of the universe; it is, Maoists assume, "the will of history." The "ancients" called it *t'ien ming*, the Decree of Heaven.

Some five hundred years after its first promulgation by the Chou tribe who founded the Chou kingdom in north China during the twelfth century B.C., Confucius and his followers revived, refurbished, and zealously promoted the doctrine. During the second century B.C. and actively into the first century of our Common Era, Han dynasty Confucians further organized, dogmatized, and dramatized the "way of the ancients" as the revived basis of the imperial rites of Heaven and Earth and the prescribed basis of education for government service. Despite subsequent periods when sects of Buddhism, Taoism, or sporadically even one or another form of Christianity were popular, neither imperial Heaven-and-Earth rites nor the order of studies for government-service degrees ever relinquished a major emphasis on the constellation of doctrines epitomized in the Decree of Heaven.

Citation and promotion of the dogma is emphasized in every revival, from the initial Chou revival under Confucius to the Han restoration, to the medieval T'ang dynasty zealotry of Han, Yu, on to the Neo-Confucian enthusiasts who ruthlessly furthered the system of thought-control under the Manchu emperors. Much of the effectiveness of the first revival of Chou doctrine, by Confucius in the fifth century B.C., ensued, as he himself astutely predicted, from its already long transmission among "ordinary people." And as observers of Chinese history have long since made a commonplace, other views (Taoist, Buddhist or whatever) were always adjusted on the basis of the "ancient" doctrine rather than displacing it. Rebellions, revolutions, and changes of dynasty by military action, even the so-called "Christian" T'ai-p'ing struggle in the nineteenth century, used the rationale of "correcting errors" in furthering the Decree of Heaven. And Mao Tse-tung has made no secret of his careful study of the "errors" not only of previous dynasts but also of both the leader of the T'ai-p'ing and of Sun Yat-sen. Mao has made no secret of his intention to "correct" the "errors" and so to insure, from his view, a final world obedience to what the "ancients" called the Decree of Heaven.

Much current debate on the relation or lack of relation between Maoism and Confucianism springs from too-literal acceptance of Maoist claims to be anti-Confucian or hair-splitting demurrers over minor shifts of emphasis. Nonetheless, as John Fairbank, Benjamin Schwartz, A. D. Barnett, and Chang-tu Hu, among others, have demonstrated, the main current or relationship continues between traditional Chinese collectivism and its twentieth-century Marxist-Leninist surface. By looking to twelfth-century B.C. Chou dogma, to the matrix even of Confucianism, we find the initial dynamic common both to Confucianist sects and their latest offshoot, Maoism.

A key text, among twelfth-century B.C. Chinese texts made canonical in the Han dynasty a thousand years later, is the harangue by the Duke of Chou demanding improved production and co-operation from the recently conquered Shang citizens, whose ruler the Chou had assassinated and whose cities the Chou had pre-empted or laid waste. A large stubborn Shang population had been forcibly driven eastward from their own home areas and set to forced labor, building a new political and religious capital, Lo (Loyang) for the Chou conquerors. The Duke of Chou's premises, rationalizations, and even his rhetorical turns, in his now three-thousand-year-old tirade against the quisling Shang cadres who were failing to keep up "production," foreshadow, with chilling accuracy, typical Maoist exhortations.

The Duke of Chou's harangue, to the district supervisors for the building of the city of Lo, opens with a long political, theological, pseudohistorical justification of the Chou conquest as, by its military success, thereby proven righteous and designated by the Decree of Heaven to rescue the (evidently ungrateful) Shang from their "decadent" rulers. This peroration leads to the crucial query: "Why haven't you come up with a satisfactory production quota from the districts we have assigned to you?" Thus far, the premises might seem to be merely those of any old-style collectivist state or modern Soviet, in which the general population exists, by collectivist definition, merely as production units. But the typical Chou "spiritual" twist to the exhortation immediately follows:

Why aren't you showing appreciation for what we've done for you? Why aren't you co-operating with the Chou War-Chief, he who holds the Decree of Heaven? You are allowed houses to live in and fields to cultivate. Why are your hearts stubborn against our chief, he who holds the Decree of Heaven? We have shown you how to proceed, but here you are still bickering. What you don't seem to grasp is that your only security is the house which holds the Decree of Heaven. What you seem able to grasp amounts only to a spilled basket for the Decree of Heaven.¹

Continuing with the recognizable brainwashing technique of interlocked blandishments and threats, the Duke's oration culminates, as do Maoist sermons in our own time, not in the cruder put-up-or-be-shot-up approach but in the blandly insidious approach of the inquisitor pursuing heretics. If you Shang, says the Duke of Chou, dislike having been sent up river here to build this city for us, you have none to blame but yourselves; we are proceeding in your own interest, says the Duke of Chou, and if you will only devote your hearts to us as holders of the Decree of Heaven, you will find that it is not we who should be blamed but the wickedness in your own hearts.

According to the records, which appear to be relatively accurate for this text, this harangue was delivered by the Duke of Chou during the first decade after the Chou conquest. Within the next two or three generations, except for such Shang families as were either exterminated or actively in flight from the Chou area (many did migrate during the first Chou onslaught), all other Shang families were well absorbed and indoctrinated. Five hundred years later Confucius himself, reputedly a descendant of an old Shang family, regarded the Duke of Chou as the fountainhead of true doctrine and devoted himself to reviving enthusiasm for Chou dogma and Chou techniques. They became the Confucian panacea for the salvation

¹ Translation by the author.

of competing states and the "correction" of tendencies toward independent thoughts and attitudes. A further five hundred years later, at the height of Han imperial power, contemporary with Rome, no one any longer knew anything of the Shang except the distorted accounts of Shang history concocted by the Chou conquerors.

The Shang were literally "buried" by the destruction of their cities, the gradual decay of their rites, and the busy Chou-sponsored "corrective education" of Shang families. Only the archeologists' spade and the paleographer's skill in our own century, three thousand years later, has brought back the evidence that the Shang were looted of their technological skills, including their architectural arts, metallurgy, and ability to read and write. Their history was "adjusted," and their people indoctrinated and "saved" by Chou devotion to the Decree of Heaven.

MAOISM AND MAO TSE-TUNG

We are rather accustomed in our time to rediscoveries of buried civilizations. We have perhaps too seldom observed that those most thoroughly buried—Shang under the impact of Chou, Indus Valley under the impact of the Aryans, and Canaan under the armies of Joshua—went under in the onslaught of a military conquest accelerated by religious zeal. But even when we observe it, we are likely to assume this is all in the past. Maoism, meanwhile, has been actively swallowing up Tibet by accelerated zeal.

Incredibly, and despite the maximum efforts of both the Tibetans and their friends among individual Asians and Westerners to rouse the world to the defense of Tibet, Maoist political, military, and religious assault on Tibet, the slaughter amounting to genocide, the destruction of temples and libraries, the forcible re-education of children, and commandeering of an area as large as Western Europe into a vast slave-labor resource for expanding Maoist power, appears scarcely to have grazed the consciousness or the conscience of the rest of the world. Despite the courage and competence of the young Dalai Lama, the articulateness of the Tibetan government in exile, the validated investigations by the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, and despite incontestable historical evidence that Tibetans have been actively fighting off the Chinese for centuries, Maoists have so efficiently exploited the old imperialist Chinese version of their paramount claims in Asia as to have, thus far, constrained all sovereign nations to accept the Maoist "adjusted" version of Asian history and to regard the fall of Tibet as a Chinese "internal affair."

We shall have occasion to return to the case of Tibet in pointing con-

clusions to this essay into the impetus and expansive missionizing intent already plainly observable in Maoism. But as material evidence toward these conclusions, having glanced at the general dynamic in the traditional Chinese "way of the ancients," we have next to familiarize ourselves with the immediate dynamic in the life history of Mao Tse-tung.

Among specialists who have assembled data for more thorough understanding of Maoist dynamics, A. D. Barnett in his *Communist China and Asia* has pertinently characterized Maoism as "revivalist" in temper and tempo. He aptly documents Maoist Chinese zealotry for "not only passive acquiescence to their control but positive conversion to their beliefs."² This drive for assent by "positive conversion" has its immediate precedents in Mao Tse-tung's personal enthusiasms. Along with his traditional Confucianist environment in Hunan and his boyhood addiction to medieval Chinese novels dramatizing the religious sanctity of militarily successful "reform rulers," Mao's admiration for the most truculent of Chinese traditionalist zealots, the T'ang dynasty Confucianist Han Yu, has shaped not only Mao's attitudes but also his sermonizing style. Both in its structure and phraseology, Mao's rodomontade echoes Han Yu's eighth-century tirades against heretics and foreign devils.

Biographical data Mao has himself supplied to Western interviewers since the 1930's and that provided by early associates—as notably Siao Yu's *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars*³—substantiate Mao's dogmatic acceptance of the Chinese traditionalist theory that a successful emperor by military conquest is thereby sanctified as Heaven's choice to supervise and control the earth. Highly pertinent is Mao's special idolization of the founder of the Han dynasty, the dynasty under which the traditionalist Chinese view was most elaborately organized as imperial doctrine. Maoists' formal documentary use of the always popular name *Han* (one of the several common-usage names for the people whom outsiders call "Chinese"), and especially the Maoist emphasis on the term *Great Han*, is one of a number of keys to their view of their role as successors to and expanders of both Han imperial rule and Han doctrine.

Two thousand years ago the Han empire was the Roman empire's one peer and chief threat. It may even be pertinent to recall that the Han Chinese drain on Roman gold was the actual occasion of Roman attempts to proscribe the wearing of silk and of the poet Horace's versified commiserations on the financial worries of Maecenas. Power politics involving

² Harper & Brothers, 1960, p. 20.

³ Syracuse University Press, 1951.

Rome, Parthia, and Han China contributed to the ill-starred ventures of Nero toward the Caspian; contingently, and with perhaps more curious pertinence, these same ventures contributed a vocabulary for the prophetic text of St. John's Revelation.

As with our previous excursus to the Duke of Chou, such looking backward is not, with regard to Maoism and Mao Tse-tung, antiquarian irrelevance. Mao's concentration on recovery of Chinese power led him even as a boy to careful study of both the travels and the text of the Han Confucianist historian, Ssu-ma Ch'ien, and to a self-conscious pilgrimage up T'ai Shan, the mountain on which the Han emperors performed their maximum rite as doctrinal vicars of Heaven. In Mao's conscious use of history as a guide, he has, furthermore, built his conspicuously successful techniques of guerrilla warfare, including the careful attention to psychological infiltration, on the precepts of Sun Wu's fifth-century B.C. *Art of War*. Mao's battle campaigns of the thirties and forties also derived some of their genius from his selective use of data in old war chronicles of 600 to 200 B.C. and other campaign accounts from medieval Chinese novels. And during the more than a decade from the end of the Long March (through West China and eastern Tibet) to his entry into Peking, Mao's choice and retention of Yen-an as headquarters had (as Robert Payne has shrewdly observed in his *Mao Tse-tung*) specific historical significance.

The Yen-an region, as Payne observes, was the area of crucial initial success for the Han dynasty two thousand years earlier. We can also remember that it was the area of crucial initial success for the Chou dynasty three thousand years earlier. When Mao speaks of "the will of history," the USSR Supreme Soviet may assume he is using standard Marxist-Leninist phrasing; and Westerners may perhaps assume he is echoing Hegel and Herbert Spencer, whose ideas also much interested Mao in his school days. But when Mao, as he does, conjoins "the will of history" with the phrase "our holy wars," he himself and his Chinese listeners take their reverberation from generations of commitment to the dogma of the Decree of Heaven and the revived goal, a commonplace in the writings of K'ang Yu-wei (influential among reforming Confucianists during Mao's formative years), of *Ta-t'ung*, the Great Togetherness of world docility under the "benevolence" of a newly imperial China.

The portent of Mao Tse-tung is made no less ominous by what might appear to be his current retirement. Though Liu Shao-ch'i as possible heir-apparent heads the government, Mao still heads the "church"—i.e., the Maoist Communist Party. Having successfully exercised the other historical

precedents, as revolutionist, guerrilla strategist, and fraternizing cave-king (Yenan) on to his recognized first apogee as head of the nation-state (Peking), Mao's current move, as potential world-ruler, also follows the precedent of earlier Asian imperial despots. His reduced public appearances allow the already semideifying legends to crystallize and increase his power to re-emerge at any critical moment under his already legendary status as the "Saving Star."

In Chinese imperial precedent this moment in the strategy of imperial power, as cited in both Confucian and Taoist theory, is known as "sitting in the north and facing south." In "spiritual" achievement it is known as *wu wei*, "operating without operating." Though to over-narrowly focused political scientists these doctrines may seem only quaint superstitions or vague ideals, they are valid strategy for the astute leader of successfully indoctrinated zealots. As with early Hebrew kings and a few Buddhist, Brahminate and Islamic rulers (always characteristically early in a religiously motivated dynasty), a shrewd leader guards against attrition from over-familiarity and augments his psychological impact by becoming the Invisible One.

The initiating psychological impact was already carefully developed and personally supervised in the cadres, Party instruction meetings, and Party confessionals over a quarter of a century ago. In contrast to Russian legalistic terminology of the prosecutions for crimes-against-the-state, Maoism has adapted, combined and integrated both the Chou and the Confucian confessional terminology of "correction of the heart" and the general religious symbolism of "purifying," "washing," "cleansing" the mind and the spirit, "purifying" the heart from what Maoists call "earthly individualism" and disciplining the spirit to "spiritual collectivism."

This collectivism, in Maoist political terms, goes by the name of "democratic centralism." Defined by Liu Shao-ch'i in 1947 as "democratic because Party members are free to discuss and express opinions on any subject until the Central Committee has expressed its opinion," and "centralist because, when the Central Committee has announced correct opinion, everyone must accept the Central Committee's ruling," this Humpty Dumpty rationale acquires its force-in-depth from long conditioning to the overtones of a "spiritual" and not merely "legal" function of a collectivist society. Street ballads regularly proclaim Mao as "father-teacher" and thereby the implied doctrinal center of the Central Committee. Texts by Mao are thoroughly established as both schoolbooks and canonical authority. Mao thereby becomes a newest mutation of the Chou-defined and Confucian-

idealized ruler, holder of the Decree of Heaven, simultaneously father-and-mother-of-the-people and priest-philosopher-king or, as Mencius would say, "kingly king."

Maoist spirituality, however, and belief in the will of the universe toward the Great Togetherness has no point of compatibility with either Buddhist compassion or Christian *caritas*. Maoist scorn of both tolerance and forgiveness was already official in 1942. It has entered the Maoist canon by continued publication of the proscription, as set down in Mao's *Problems of Art and Literature*.⁴ Anathematizing, face to face, a number of liberalist Chinese intellectuals who had come to Yen'an in the early 1940's Mao pontificates: "There can only be love of class or class love in a class society. Yet," Mao goes on with pompous irony, "these comrades seek a love that stands above all class distinctions." With continuing scornful dismissal of such "liberal" heresies, Mao mounts, hour by hour in the Maoist sermonizing fashion, to his next climax: "Will not Marxist-Leninism thus destroy the creative spirit? Oh, yes, it will. . . . It will destroy every kind of creative spirit which is not of the masses and the proletariat. And is it not right that these kinds of creative spirits be destroyed? . . . I think so."

But having expelled or destroyed, at least by 1957, "these kinds of creative spirits," significantly in 1958 Mao announced a new dispensation in literature, allowing "romantic imagination" to assist the long mandatory "revolutionary realism." In illustration of this "correct" literature, however, the only example presented and reiterated by Maoist literary commentators turns out to be Mao's own *Nineteen Poems*. For twenty years poems of Mao's which have escaped to the West have been remarked upon, by non-Marxists, as noticeably unproletarian, formal, Confucian in premise, and traditionally and ingeniously symbolic, an antithesis of voice-of-the-masses in both style and vocabulary. Now, power assumed to be secure over the first 650 million people, Mao first assures the announcement of a "new" literary model. After a quarter-century's "modesty" over his poems, poems which might have inconvenienced his climb to power, and after the final purging of any other "creative spirits" by 1957, Mao now emerges in the traditionalist emperor role as imperial poet in Chinese traditionalist style and spirit.

In *Snow*, to which the authorized Maoist commentator Tsang Keh-chia⁵ appends the eulogy, "a majesty and heroic tone . . ." having "hardly any parallel in history" and "a paean of triumph of the human spirit," Mao

⁴ English version, International Publishers, 1950.

⁵ *Nineteen Poems*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958, p. 58.

incorporates his view of his own achievement as both successor and cultural superior to the founders of the three mightiest preceding dynasties, Han, T'ang, and Yuan. In 1958, with already 650 million subjects and with Tibet, after eight years of relentless assault, about to fall to his hand, Mao permits public, official circulation of his poems. In them he had long since prophesied to himself his conviction of his ordained future as recoverer and sustainer of the Decree of Heaven.

PAST AND FUTURE

Maoist maps of China for over ten years show China as including not only Tibet but major sections of southeast Asia and north India. On the Chinese traditional imperial premise, which registered any world area with which any Chinese official had ever held any dealings, however ephemeral, as thereby tributary to China, Mao himself or his successor among the Maoists may predictably point to Genghiz Khan among the predecessor Sons of Heaven cited in the now canonical poem, *Snow*. Maoists will forthwith "officially" claim the maximum extent of the medieval Khanate, which will thereby encompass all of mainland Asia and much of eastern Europe, inclusive of the USSR. By the same "rationale," citing the notable confrontation between the claims of K'ang Hsi as emperor of China and the claims of the Vatican during the eighteenth century, Maoists will predictably claim "historical precedent" as destined spiritual-temporal authority for the whole human race. Preposterous? The precedent, as religious-political theory, has already been familiar for three thousand years in the old doctrine of the *t'ien ming*, the Decree of Heaven, for *t'ien hsia*, "under Heaven," "the human race."

Despite the forthright appeals of the Dalai Lama, despite the articulate and justified petition of Tibetan officials to the United Nations, Tibet appears already to be all but utterly swallowed. Southeast Asia is perilously under the claw. Nehru remains curiously hypnotized, despite the shouts of warning and protest in his own parliament. Even the Kremlin "old dispensation" in Communism is hard-driven, not only in the always sufficiently ominous Communist Pact Councils but also in the world-wide infiltration duel of Russian Communist and Chinese Communist "trade missions" and "cultural missions."

All of us with our ears open in this century know we are engaged, essentially and crucially, not merely in an armaments race or a wrestling for national destinies or a conspiracy over outer space, or even that most inhumane of all quarrels, a competition of "races." The ominous and ulti-

mate engagement, toward which Communist zealotry exploits all contingent quarrels, is an unequivocal religious conflict. Facing the old despotism of the State, claiming to be the ordained owner and disposer of human beings since before the Pharaohs to the present Central Committees in Moscow and Peking, stands the doctrine of "noncollectivized" responsible human freedom, foreshadowed by Jewish prophetic, Hellenistic, and Mahayana Buddhist teachers, and made explicit and finally demonstrable in the life, death, and resurrection of the Christ. In dynamizing the old despotism of the State with the double whip of Marxist-Leninist "rationality" and traditional Chinese "spiritual" determinism, Maoism becomes the most formidable present mutation of the centuries-old arrogance of Central Committees claiming to "save" the human race by enforced, production-unit "Great Togetherness."

As George Patterson tells us in his indispensable report, *Tibet in Revolt*,⁶ nine Tibetan princes whom the Maoists had supposedly successfully indoctrinated nonetheless went to their deaths in Lhasa; in the crisis the nine princes refused to renounce their Buddhist convictions. Have the nine Tibetan princes made no mark in history except in the minds of Tibetans and of one Christian missionary named George Patterson? The question faces all the higher religions. And however preposterous, irksome, or inconvenient it may appear to some Christians, the ultimate challenge of Maoism is to us in Christendom. It is not likely to be a short war.

⁶ Faber and Faber, 1960.

Walter Rauschenbusch and the New Evangelism

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH may best be described as "a lonely prophet," for few men have been so badly misunderstood and misinterpreted.¹ He has been remembered as a social prophet and a social reformer, but in conscious intention he was more than that. In terms of his own understanding of his vocation, he was an evangelist in the tradition of the great revivalists, seeking to win men to an experience of Christ and to put them to work in the interests of his kingdom. He had entered the ministry with a strong desire to "save souls," and throughout his life this continued to be his constant objective.

One of the most interesting features of Rauschenbusch's evangelistic concern was the way in which he sought to identify those facets of the gospel which would speak most clearly to the men of his time in terms of their own situation and so to state these truths that men would be deeply stirred and grasped by them. The situation in which men find themselves today is vastly different from the situation at the turn of the century when Rauschenbusch was preoccupied with the problem of an effective evangelism, and consequently Rauschenbusch's analysis and prescription scarcely fit the contemporary need. Nevertheless, the procedure he followed in an attempt to fashion an effective evangelism for his time is profoundly suggestive for those who would undertake a similar endeavor in our time. It is possible that those who are seeking to relate the Christian gospel in powerful fashion to the hopes and fears of men who must live out their lives within the context

¹ This theme is developed in Chapter X, "A Lonely Prophet," W. S. Hudson, *The Great Tradition of the American Churches*, New York, 1953.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON, Ph.D., D.D., is Professor of the History of Christianity at Colgate Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, New York. This article is based upon papers which were read on November 22, 1957 at a Rauschenbusch Colloquium sponsored by the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City, and on September 24, 1960 at the "Academic Day" program held in conjunction with the dedication of the Divinity College of McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. The current year, 1961, is the centennial of Rauschenbusch's birth.

of the new world of atomic fission and space exploration may find a clue as to how the problem can best be approached in Walter Rauschenbusch's earlier recasting of the evangelistic motif.

I

Walter Rauschenbusch began his ministry in New York City on June 1, 1886, when he assumed his duties as pastor of the Second German Baptist Church. He was twenty-five years old, having just graduated from the Rochester Theological Seminary. For six generations his direct forebears had been Lutheran clergymen of a pietistic stamp. His father had come to the United States in 1846 as a Lutheran missionary, becoming a Baptist twelve years later and devoting the rest of his life to the training of a Baptist ministry for work among the German-speaking immigrants. This long pietist tradition, finding full expression in the home in which he was reared, was a decisive influence in shaping Walter Rauschenbusch's life. Toward the close of his high school years, he experienced his initial conversion. Later he recognized that there was much that was "foolish" in this adolescent awakening, but he also insisted that it was a "very true" religious experience. "It was of everlasting value to me. It turned me permanently, and I thank God with all my heart for it. It was a tender, mysterious experience. It influenced my soul down to its depths."²

The four years following his graduation from high school were spent in study in Germany. By this time Walter Rauschenbusch's mind was firmly fixed on the ministry, and he returned to Rochester in 1883 to complete his preparation. A summer spent as a supply pastor of a small German Baptist church in Louisville, Kentucky, deepened his sense of vocation. It was, he reported,

a small flock but a very neglected one. Sins of pastors and sins of members had created distrust and contempt among outsiders. Internal dissensions had banished the spirit of brotherly love. Everybody was sorely discouraged and very many were very hungry—which was the best thing about the church. . . . I worked a great deal from house to house . . . reconciled those who hated each other, and tried everywhere to awaken in their hearts the love of Christ as the only sure cure for their love of self and sin. Then I preached as well as I could and had the satisfaction of seeing the congregation almost double in three months. . . . When I left I was thin as a ghost, but I rejoiced in a number of conversions; I saw the members united by their common affection for their common Master; I saw them deeply affected when I said farewell. . . . I don't write this with a boastful spirit. . . . There is One behind me; I am but the instrument in his hand.

² Rauschenbusch, Walter, "The Kingdom of God," *Cleveland's Young Men*, January 9, 1913.

This experience of the summer left a marked impact upon his thinking. "It is," he said, "now no longer my fond hope to be a learned theologian and write big books; I want to be a pastor, powerful with men, preaching to them Christ as the man in whom their affections and energies can find the satisfaction for which mankind is groaning. And if ever I do become anything but a pastor, you may believe that I have sunk to a lower ideal or that there was a very unmistakable call to duty in that direction."³

The church in New York to which Rauschenbusch was called following his graduation from seminary had many similarities to the one in Louisville where he had served as a summer supply. Four weeks after his arrival in New York he reported his first impressions.

The church is not large, about 125 members. . . . The building is old-fashioned, inconvenient, and rather ugly, situated in a tough west side neighborhood. The church has had bad experiences with my predecessors who have left an unsavory reputation behind them. The consequence is that there are many little splits and much big discouragement.

There was much work to do, and he had not had time even to pick up a book. Later when he had things well in hand, he hoped that he would be able to "find some time for study and literary work," but he also hoped that he would "have grace enough to subordinate that to my work as pastor." His great desire was "to be useful to my fellow man" and his first weeks in New York, he reported, "have again taught me that I can do so best by bringing them into living and personal relations with our Lord Jesus Christ."⁴

If one immediate consequence of Rauschenbusch's New York pastorate was to reinforce his sense of vocation, a second consequence was to introduce him to the field of social problems. In the fall of 1886 Henry George was a candidate for mayor on a Single Tax platform, and Rauschenbusch was caught up in the excitement of the campaign. "I owe my own first awakening to the world of social problems," he later commented, "to the agitation of Henry George in 1886."⁵ An even more important influence in this awakening was his encounter with personal distress in the neighborhood of the church. "There, among the working people, my social education began."⁶ The impact of a growing acquaintance with the problems of the people, however, was at best a relatively slow process of education. A more

³ Sharpe, D. R., *Walter Rauschenbusch*, New York, 1942, pp. 53-54.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵ Rauschenbusch, Walter, *Christianizing the Social Order*, New York, 1912, p. 394.

⁶ *Rochester Theological Seminary Bulletin*, November, 1918, p. 51.

immediate influence which heightened his social sensitivity and helped him to see the connection between religious and social questions was exerted by a friendship that was established soon after his arrival in the city.

A few blocks away at the Amity Baptist Church, William R. Williams had just concluded a long and distinguished pastorate and had been succeeded by his son Leighton. The elder Williams, during his last years, had developed an increasing interest in social reform, and this in turn had led to the so-called "revolt of the millionaires" among the members which threatened the very existence of the church.⁷ The son, thereupon, decided to give up his legal career in order to continue his father's work. Leighton Williams and Walter Rauschenbusch immediately became fast friends, being very much alike in temperament, interests, and theological views. It was through Williams presumably that Rauschenbusch was introduced to the literature of social protest, and from this time forward Williams was to be Rauschenbusch's *alter ego*.

This developing interest in social reform found tangible expression in November, 1889, when Rauschenbusch and Williams launched a monthly periodical with the arresting title, *For the Right*. "This paper," they announced,

is published in the interests of the working people of New York. It proposes to discuss, from the standpoint of Christian socialism, such questions as engage their attention and affect their life. . . . Its aim is . . . to point out, if possible, not only the wrongs that men suffer, but the methods by which these wrongs may be removed. The editors freely give their time and labor to this undertaking, animated solely by the hope that their efforts may aid the advancement of that kingdom in which wrong shall have no place, but Right shall reign forever more.

An editorial in the same issue declared: "God helping us, we shall strive to speed the day when God's will shall be done on earth as well as in heaven."⁸ The editors seem to have entertained the hope that the periodical would serve as a rallying point around which a Christian Socialist Society would be formed among the workingmen. The April issue contained a Declaration of Principles of the Christian Socialist Society of New York City, but there is no evidence to indicate that the Society ever became much more than a hopeful proposal.⁹ The paper itself did not win a widespread response among those to whom it was addressed, and undoubtedly the payment of the printing bills became an increasing problem. The last issue

⁷ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁸ Bodein, V. P., *The Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch*, New Haven, 1944, pp. 9-10.

⁹ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

was published in March, 1891, a date which coincides with Rauschenbusch's departure for a ten-month period of study in Germany.

Neither the folding of the paper nor Rauschenbusch's departure for a period of study abroad represented any loss of interest in "the social question," for when he returned he immediately proposed the formation of a "Brotherhood of the Kingdom"—a small group of like-minded Baptist ministers dedicated to clarifying the theological and practical implications of the biblical concept of "the kingdom of God." In spite of its loose organization, the Brotherhood was in essence a tightly-knit and tightly-disciplined body, a sort of Protestant Third Order with a "rule" which required of its members a full commitment and a ready willingness to submit to the discipline of group discussion, group criticism, and group direction.¹⁰

It was within the matrix provided by the Brotherhood of the Kingdom that Rauschenbusch's thinking developed. It is difficult to say to what extent he shaped the thinking of the Brotherhood, and to what extent his thinking was shaped by the Brotherhood. This much is clear: the points of view articulated in tracts and articles by the various members of the group were largely indistinguishable. Furthermore, when *Christianity and the Social Crisis*—the book which rocketed Rauschenbusch to fame as a social reformer—was published in 1907, it was regarded by the members of the Brotherhood as a group product. Leighton Williams noted that "our contentions" have now been set forth "in a systematic way," and added that the book represented "a finished exposition of our opinions."¹¹ The book was, indeed, in large part a mere stitching together of papers which Rauschenbusch had presented at the annual conferences of the Brotherhood over a period of fourteen years—papers which had been written within the context of group discussion and revised in the light of group criticism.

II

One of the curious features of the reception accorded *Christianity and the Social Crisis* was the note of criticism voiced by the Baptist *Standard* of Chicago. This criticism came from an unexpected quarter, for the *Standard* faithfully reflected the point of view of another coterie of Baptist preachers at the University of Chicago who were among the most eminent exponents of a social gospel. The complaint voiced by the *Standard* was

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 121-22; Bodein, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; Williams, Leighton, *The Brotherhood of the Kingdom and Its Work*, Brotherhood Leaflet No. 10, p. 3; Rauschenbusch, Walter, *Suggestions for the Organization of Local Chapters of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom*, p. 3.

¹¹ Williams, Leighton, *The Reign of the New Humanity*, Amity Tract No. 11, p. 2.

that Rauschenbusch's approach was "rhetorical" rather than "scientific."¹²

The pre-eminent spokesman of the Chicago group was Shailer Mathews; and by a strange coincidence The Macmillan Company had published Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis* and Mathews' *The Church and the Changing Order* almost simultaneously, the first being released to the public in March and the second in April. The two books were remarkably similar in character and content. They both addressed themselves to the "social crisis" and to the task of the church in relationship to it. They both stressed the centrality of the Kingdom of God in the teachings of Jesus, emphasized the necessity for social reform, and spoke in terms of "social solidarity" and of the reciprocal relationship of "regenerate" men to a "regenerate" society. The casual reader could scarcely avoid the conclusion that the two books represented an almost identical point of view. There was, to be sure, a semantic quarrel, with Mathews rejecting the term "Christian Socialism" which Rauschenbusch used to describe his position and insisting that his own position could best be described by the term "Christian individualism." But, in many respects, Mathews' packet of "social legislation" did not differ greatly from the "practical measures" of Rauschenbusch's reformist socialism. Nevertheless, the Chicago group rightly recognized that Rauschenbusch represented a sharp challenge to their whole pattern of thinking.

There was, for one thing, a difference of mood and temperament. Mathews was cautious; Rauschenbusch was impetuous. Mathews spoke of the necessity for adjustments and appropriations; Rauschenbusch spoke of the urgency for decisions. Mathews could look to the future with equanimity; Rauschenbusch was frequently beset with forebodings. Mathews believed in doing something *for* people; Rauschenbusch believed in doing something *with* people. Mathews placed his trust in middle-class intelligence to effect social reform and thus remove the source of social discontent; Rauschenbusch believed in harnessing the discontent of the working classes to effect social reform. Mathews feared the word "socialism" because of its compulsive emotional power; Rauschenbusch cherished it for the same reason. Mathews believed that one of the most important functions of the church was to "keep social impulses law-abiding" and to "guarantee sanity in reform";¹³ Rauschenbusch believed that a primary role of the church was to create a revolutionary ferment in society.

¹² *The Standard*, May 18, 1907, p. 15. See also Charles R. Henderson's review in the *American Journal of Theology*, January, 1908, pp. 172-74.

¹³ Mathews, Shailer, *The Church and the Changing Order*, New York, 1907, pp. 158, 165.

The difference in mood and temperament may have been largely responsible in provoking the criticism of Rauschenbusch which stemmed from Chicago, but there was a deeper and more important divergence which was rooted in differing conceptions of the Christian faith. Perhaps "scientific" is the key word to identify the difference. Rauschenbusch, they said, was not "scientific." He was "rhetorical." He oversimplified issues, and presented them in terms of too sharp alternatives. If it had occurred to Rauschenbusch to respond to this criticism, he probably would have said that he was a preacher and not a sociologist. And to this response, Mathews would have replied that a preacher should be a sociologist who makes it his business to "bring things to pass."¹⁴ In this connection, it is significant that, whereas Mathews believed in an "institutional" ministry and in the establishment of "settlement houses," Rauschenbusch regarded such activities as so expensive and time-consuming that they would be apt to divert the church from its main task.¹⁵ For both men, the main task of the church was spelled out by the word "regeneration," but Mathews thought of regeneration in terms of "good" men and a "good" society, while Rauschenbusch thought in terms of "new" men and a "transformed" or "transfigured" society. This difference, in turn, was related to their differing conception of God. Mathews thought of God, in large part at least, as a fact which "must be treated seriously," a necessary "corollary," a "universal will" or a kind of "Natural Law" to be studied and defined and heeded.¹⁶ For Rauschenbusch, God was always a living presence to be experienced—demanding repentance, promising forgiveness, and through a miracle of grace enabling one to walk in newness of life.

Leighton Williams made it clear that neither Rauschenbusch nor the other members of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom were thinking in terms of any mere moralism.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁵ "The increasing social distress . . . has led to the establishment of so-called institutional churches. . . . Scarcely any churches have entirely escaped the influence of this tendency. . . . This is greatly to the credit of the churches. . . . But that does not do away with the fact that a fearful burden has been imposed on the churches. . . . In one way, this philanthropic work has given a wholesome bent to modern church life. But there is always the danger that the distinctive spiritual work will be crowded to one side. Those who object to the institutional church as a perversion of the church are not altogether wrong. It was an early experience of the apostles that they could not 'continue steadfastly in prayer and in the ministry of the word' if they had to 'serve tables.' . . . The people ought to be able to provide for themselves what the churches are trying to provide for them. . . . Make social life healthy and you can simplify church work." Walter Rauschenbusch, "The Stake of the Church in the Social Movement," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1897, pp. 25-26.

¹⁶ Mathews, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12. Mathews' conception of the religious life is revealed most starkly in his discussion of the average man who is to be assured that "it is best to live as though such love and reason [God] were real." *Ibid.*, pp. 215-18.

We may rejoice that many are now uniting with us in urging the need of a high ethical standard, not only of individual but of social righteousness also. . . . But when it is asserted that this ethical element constitutes the whole of the essential content of Christianity, we must part company with these new allies. When they affirm righteousness to be the great word of the New Testament, we demur. . . . We believe that morals are the florescence of true religion and its fruitage, but let us never confound the fruits with the roots. . . . My father used to say: "Morals apart from the religion are like cut flowers. They may retain their form and fragrance for a time after they are severed from the parent stem, but their life is gone and they must soon wither and decay." And with reference to Christian morals, it is most clearly evident that they are the outgrowth of the faith of the believer, and of his experience of the grace of Christ. . . .

A large portion of the Christian people at the present time seem disposed to ignore or minimize these supernatural elements . . . and to treat the Christian cult merely as a wholesome moral discipline or a lofty philosophy of life. They aim thus to make it a thoroughly reasonable system that a man of the world can accept. The effort must fail. The man of the world will never accept it, for Christ has wrought into its whole fibre the principle of the cross, and that he will accept only as he becomes a changed man. . . . Christianity is the power that it is in the world . . . not in spite of its supernatural elements, but because of them.¹⁷

On the other hand, it was equally clear that this emphasis upon the necessity for a transforming religious experience did not lead to sentimentalism. Mathews, actually, was much more of a sentimentalist than Rauschenbusch. Mathews could conceive of God as operating through men who were honest, chaste, kindly, and intelligent; but Rauschenbusch had no difficulty in describing the Czar Nicholas as "God's gift to humanity," even though he acknowledged that one could search the earth and not find one less likely than the "autocrat of Russia" to serve as "God's instrument."¹⁸

Indispensable, then, to an understanding of Walter Rauschenbusch is the recognition that he never allowed his interest in social Christianity to obscure the centrality of personal religion. "Spiritual regeneration," he said,

is the most important fact of any life history. A living experience of God is the crowning knowledge attainable to a human mind. Each one of us needs the redemptive power of religion for his own sake, for on the tiny stage of the human soul all the vast world tragedy of good and evil is re-enacted. . . . No material comfort and plenty can satisfy the restless soul in us and give us peace with ourselves. All who have made the test of it agree that religion alone holds the key to the ultimate meaning of life, and each of us must find his way into the inner mysteries alone.¹⁹

¹⁷ Williams, *The Reign of the New Humanity*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁸ *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, February 12, 1899.

¹⁹ *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 104.

Rauschenbusch knew that God speaks to men one by one, redeeming them and transforming them, giving them a new mind and a new heart. It is with the "individual soul," he insisted, that the Kingdom of God "begins," and it is there that "the powers of the Kingdom" are "born."²⁰ It is in the "inward transfiguration" of the individual, said Williams, that "the powers of the Kingdom first manifest themselves."

The illumination of the intellect, the cleansing and sanctifying of the affections, the subjection and strengthening of the will, the development of a high and forceful type of Christian character, these are the first works of the Spirit. It is through men and women thus sanctified and transfigured and energized that the social manifestations of the Kingdom appear.

Through the operation of the Spirit, he continued, there comes into existence "a new type of Christian manhood and womanhood; and the New Humanity thus formed slowly, silently, but inevitably crystallizes into a new order to which is given the name of the Kingdom of God."²¹

"In the best social order that is conceivable," Rauschenbusch asserted in 1912, "men will still smoulder with lust and ambition, and be lashed by hate and jealousy as with the whip of a slave driver."²² Twenty years earlier this point had been stated even more vividly and powerfully in *For the Right*.

One of the peculiarities which distinguish *For the Right* from many other papers akin to it, is that it stands for a combination of personal regeneration and social reform. Most of the social reformers claim that if only poverty and the fear of poverty could be abolished, men would cease to be grasping, selfish, over-bearing, and sensual. We do not see it so. We acknowledge that evil surroundings tempt to evil actions and strengthen evil character. . . . But we can conceive of a state of society in which plenty would reign, but where universal opulence would only breed universal pride and wantonness.²³

"The Kingdom of God includes the economic life," said Rauschenbusch, but "no outward economic revolution will answer our needs. It is not this thing or that thing our nation needs, but a new mind and heart. . . . We want a revolution both inside and outside." "The social order cannot be saved without regenerate men." Only "converted men" are the sure ground of hope.²⁴

²⁰ *Cleveland's Young Men*, January 9, 1913.

²¹ Williams, Leighton, *The Powers of the Kingdom of God*, Amity Tract No. 8, pp. 10, 12.

²² *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 104.

²³ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

²⁴ *Christianizing the Social Order*, pp. 458-62; *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, New York, 1917, p. 194.

III

Given his understanding of the human situation, it was inevitable that Rauschenbusch should regard evangelism as the primary task of the church. It was for this reason, as we have noted, that he could not give his wholehearted support to the so-called "institutional church."²⁵ He had made the same point five years earlier in discussing current conceptions of missions, when he insisted that interest in educational and philanthropic work must not be allowed to obscure the central aim which is "the extension of faith in the crucified and risen Christ, who imparts his spirit to those who believe in him and thereby redeems them from the dominion of the flesh and the world and their corruption, and transforms them into spiritual beings, conformed to his likeness and partaking of his life." It is this inward spiritual experience that provides "the only solid and trustworthy basis" for anything else that may be attempted.²⁶

In this address, published in 1892, he almost intuitively seems to anticipate the charges of superficial optimism, moralism, altruism, and mere humanitarianism that were to be brought against the advocates of the social gospel in the 1930's and refutes them in advance. He admits that men are inclined to forget that an inward spiritual experience is the indispensable prerequisite to the transformation of the social order, and then in a most revealing and perceptive statement he explains why this is so.

One reason why we forget it is because many of us, through ease of life and the exceeding pleasantness of this present world, are prone to sag down from evangelical religion to humanitarian morality, from spiritual fervor to altruistic earnestness.

Another reason is that the spread of the idea of evolution has created an optimism among us which is not warranted by the facts. We have heard so much about the progress of civilization that a serene faith has come over us that the cart is slowly but surely rolling up the hill, and that all that is necessary is to clear away the obstacles by education and reform, and leave play to the inherent upward forces of humanity. I was myself once of this opinion and found it comforting. Observation and the study of history have compelled me to part with it sadly. However evolution may work in the rest of creation, a new element enters in when it reaches the ethical nature of man. Ethically man sags downward by nature. It is ever easy to follow temptation and hard to resist it. The way that leads to destruction is always broad and its asphalt pavement is kept in perfect order, with toboggan slides at either side for those who prefer a steeper grade. . . . Moral gravitation is downward. It is accelerated in us by years of sin and by the whirling rush of centuries of wrong which pushes us from behind. Let us not be beguiled by that seductive devil who tells us that man will walk into the millennium, if

²⁵ See note 15.

²⁶ *The Watchman*, November 24, 1892.

only you will point out to him where the millennium is and clear away the worst obstacles for him. Man was never built that way. If he is to get in, he will have to be lifted in. There will have to be a force from above strong enough to overcome all the downward gravitation of flesh and world, and to conquer the devil in addition.

Valuable as all secondary concerns may be, the inward spiritual experience comes first, for without it "education will turn into a striving after wind, culture into lasciviousness, social reformation into social unrest, philanthropy into a sprinkling of rose-water over the carcass."²⁷ Later Rauschenbusch was to insist: "If the new interest in social questions crowds out the old interest in evangelistic work, it is a reaction from an old one-sidedness into a new one-sidedness."²⁸

Rauschenbusch was frequently contemptuous of the professional evangelists among his contemporaries, but he was never contemptuous of the older evangelism which had nourished his own spiritual life. In his earliest scrapbook, which covers the years 1886 to 1890 when his social views were taking shape, there are copies of sixteen sermons by Dwight L. Moody.²⁹ In 1889, the year in which *For the Right* was first published, Rauschenbusch edited and published *Neue Lieder*, a translation into German of Ira Sankey's *Gospel Hymns*, No. 5. The following year, he published a translation of *Gospel Hymns*, No. 1; and in 1894, he published a translation of *Gospel Hymns*, No. 2. In 1897, the latter two were combined and reissued under the title *Evangeliums-Lieder, 1 und 2*, and a new edition was published in 1910. More than a quarter of the hymns were Rauschenbusch's own translations, including eighteen hymns by Fanny J. Crosby. Years later he wrote: "A man's eyes must be hazy with prejudice, if he does not love and prize the great expressions [in the hymns of the church] of personal salvation and religious experience."³⁰

The older evangelism, Rauschenbusch readily acknowledged, was one-sided, but it was not superficial. What dismayed him and aroused his contempt was what so many of the contemporary professional revivalists were doing to it—stripping it of all profound emotion and rendering it devoid of significant content. In his last book, he commented: "To one whose memories run back to Moody's time, the methods now used by some evangelists seem calculated to produce skin-deep changes. Things have simmered down to signing a card, shaking hands, or being introduced

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

²⁹ Bodein, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁰ *Rochester Theological Seminary Bulletin*, November, 1918, p. 12.

to the evangelist."³¹ The nub of the problem was what he called the substitution of "proselyting" for "discipling." The difference, he said, is this: "Discipling produces a real change for the better in the inward character, while proselyting leaves the man as it found him."³²

There was a deeper difficulty, however, than mere superficiality. Even Moody had recognized that the older evangelism was becoming increasingly ineffective, and in his last years he had cast about for a more promising alternative.³³ In 1904, Rauschenbusch reported that the "waning power" of the old evangelism was "generally conceded," but that "there is as yet no new evangelism before us which we might adopt; we are only wishing that there might be." In an article in *The Independent*, in that year, Rauschenbusch sought to diagnose the malady and by so doing to indicate the lines along which the new evangelism must be developed.³⁴

The basic assumption of Rauschenbusch's analysis was that, while "the gospel of Christ is one and immutable," the "comprehension and expression" of the gospel in history has been of "infinite variety."

No individual, no church, no age of history has ever comprehended the full scope of God's saving purpose in Jesus Christ. Neither has any proclaimed it without foreign admixtures that clogged and thwarted it. A fuller and purer expression of the evangel has therefore always been possible and desirable. It is on the face of it unlikely that the gospel as commonly understood by us is the whole gospel or a completely pure gospel. It is a lack of Christian humility to assume that our gospel and *the gospel* are identical.

Consequently our understanding of the gospel must be subject to constant reconstruction, and this becomes an urgent task in a transitional age when all categories of life and thought are silently changing.

The gospel, to have power over an age, must be the highest expression of the moral and religious truths held by that age. If it lags behind and presents outgrown conceptions of life and duty, it is no longer in the full sense the gospel. Christianity itself lifts the minds of men to demand a better expression of Christianity. If the official wardens of the gospel from selfish motives or from conservative veneration for old statements refuse to let the spirit of Christ flow into the larger vessels of thought and feeling which God himself has prepared for it, they are warned by finding men turn from their message as sapless and powerless.

Since we are "passing through an historical transition as thorough and important as any in history," it would scarcely be surprising to discover

³¹ *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, pp. 96-97.

³² "Discipling versus Proselyting," a leaflet reprinted from a report of the Amity Missionary Conference.

³³ Hudson, *The Great Tradition of the American Churches*, pp. 145, 150.

³⁴ "The New Evangelism," *The Independent*, May 12, 1904. (Quotations in the three pages following are taken from this article.)

that "the message of the church has failed to keep pace with a movement so rapid," nor should it be regarded as strange that "humanity, amid the pressure of . . . new problems, fails to be stirred by statements of truth that were adequate to obsolete conditions."

The implications of this analysis for the evangelistic outreach of the church are self-evident. Evangelism, to be effective, must do two things. It "must appeal to motives which powerfully seize men," and it "must hold up a moral standard so high above their actual lives that it will smite them with conviction of sin." If it fails at either of these two points, "if the motives urged seem untrue or remote or if the standard of life to which they are summoned is practically that on which they are living, the evangelistic call will have little power." The two questions, therefore, which must be investigated are these: "Are the traditional motives still effective? And is the moral standard held up by the church such as to induce repentance?" Rauschenbusch was convinced that both questions must be answered in the negative.

Generalizations are always hazardous, and Rauschenbusch recognized that this is particularly true with regard to motives. "The motives urged at any time will vary with the preacher and the audience, and there will always be a large measure of truth and power even in the most defective preaching that touches human nature at all." Nevertheless, there are changes of emphasis from age to age, and the motives which sway men in one age may be much less powerful in another. "Within our own memory," he continued, "the fear of hell and the desire for bliss in heaven have strangely weakened, even with men who have no doubt of the reality of hell and heaven." On the other hand, other motives have become much stronger. "Past Christianity has developed in us a love for our fellows and a sense of solidarity so strong that they demand to be considered in every religious appeal." While men "give less thought to their personal salvation than our fathers, . . . their sympathy for the sorrows of others is more poignant." Furthermore, in a transitional age, there is an anticipation of "great coming changes" and an awareness of "the plastic possibilities" of the future. Men are motivated by "a hope for humanity such as has long existed only where the millennial hope was a vital thing." Thus, while some motives are dropping away, "larger and more truly Christlike motives are offering themselves," but they are motives to which the church has been making no adequate appeal.

"The moral standard held up by the church in its teaching and in its collective life," Rauschenbusch contended, has proved itself to be equally

inadequate. The moral teaching of the church has been largely individualistic in its ethic, dealing primarily with private and family life.

It has boldly condemned drunkenness, sexual impurity, profanity; it has fostered gentleness and pity; and it has been largely successful in this teaching. It has also drawn the line against Sabbath breaking, dancing, card-playing, and theater-going; but it has not been successful in maintaining that line. In general, the community has risen toward the level of the church in private and domestic virtue, and the church has drifted toward the level of the respectable community in regard to amusements.

As a result of this twofold movement, the gap between the church and the community has been narrowed. "The morality of the church is not much more than what prudence, respectability, and good breeding also demand." When the church says, "Repent and become like me," there is little either in her teaching or example that is sufficient to convict men of sin and summon them to repentance. The plain fact, said Rauschenbusch, is that we are emerging from an era of individualism and the most pressing problems of our time have to do with our corporate relationships. It is here that guidance is most needed, and it is here that "the moral guide of humanity is silent." In terms of the most critical issues of life, the church "lacks an ethical imperative which can induce repentance."

The alienation of the industrial wage-earners, Rauschenbusch noted, presented a special evangelistic problem for the churches. "It is an untrue and cruel charge to say that the church workers have not done their best to reach the people. The efforts of the churches in the great cities for the last generation have perhaps never been paralleled. And yet they are futile. This is one of the most stunning and heart-rending facts in all our life." The lack of success is partly due to the inadequate motives and standards at the heart of the old evangelism, but the difficulty is compounded by the essentially middle-class character of the churches.

A compelling evangel for the working class will be wrought out only by men who love that class, share its life, understand the ideals for which it is groping, penetrate those ideals with the religious spirit of Christianity, and then proclaim a message in which the working people will find their highest self. They will never be reached by a middle-class gospel preached down at them with the consciousness of superiority.

A new evangelism which shall "again exert the full power of the gospel," Rauschenbusch confessed, "cannot be made to order nor devised by a single man," but if we are to have a part in shaping it, we must be "open to two influences and allow them to form a vital union in our personalities."

We must open our minds to the Spirit of Jesus in its primitive, uncorrupted, and still unexhausted power. That Spirit is the fountain of youth for the church. As a human organization it grows old and decrepit like every other human organism. But again and again it has been rejuvenated by a new baptism in that Spirit.

We must also keep our vision clear to the life of our own time. Our age is as sublime as any in the past. It has a right to its own appropriation and understanding of the gospel. By the decay of the old, God himself is forcing us on to seek the new and higher.

The forging of a new evangel, Rauschenbusch acknowledged, would be a slow process, but he had "full faith" that it would be accomplished. "A new season of power will come upon us. . . . Our bitter need will drive us to repentance. The prophetic spirit will awaken among us. The tongue of fire will descend on twentieth-century men and give them great faith, joy, and boldness, and then we shall hear the new evangel, and it will be the Old Gospel."

IV

By the time Walter Rauschenbusch wrote this article on the need for a "new evangelism," he had already spent eighteen years seeking to identify the "stronger motives" and to work out the "wiser methods" which he regarded as necessary components of the new evangelism. When he had arrived in New York City to take up his pastoral work, he had been convinced that he could be most useful to his fellow men by "bringing them into living and personal relations with our Lord Jesus Christ,"³⁵ and this remained his central conviction. What he discovered, however, was that the old evangelistic appeal did not work. Those who stood within the church, to be sure, did "respond joyfully to the ideas in which their Christian life was nurtured and in which their holiest memories" were "enshrined," but he quickly learned that, as soon as the "evangelistic efforts" were extended beyond the young people of the church family, the "evangelistic call strikes an invisible wall and comes back in hollow echoes." There were some who could be persuaded to attend a service once, but they did not return because they heard nothing to which they could respond.³⁶ How was he to reach these working people in whose midst his little church was set?

Rauschenbusch soon realized that the problem he was confronting was of larger significance than the peculiarities of his own situation. As the middle class had claimed a place of power and influence in society in preceding centuries, so now the laboring classes were emerging to claim for themselves a similar responsible and decisive role in the shaping of the

³⁵ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

³⁶ "The New Evangelism," *The Independent*, May 12, 1904.

future. In a very real sense, he was convinced, the future belonged partly to the "young and thoughtful minds in the colleges," and to an even greater degree to the working people. The ironic twist in this situation, so far as the Christian faith was concerned, was that the old evangelistic motives "have least effect on those classes who most distinctly represent the new age, the industrial working classes and the college men and women." This fact posed a searching question. "If the gospel has no effect on those classes who will dominate the future, what will become of the gospel?"³⁷

One obvious answer to Rauschenbusch's own immediate problem was in line with his own natural inclinations and Christian sympathies. It was to identify himself with the struggles and aspirations of the working classes. The publication of *For the Right* was a major initial effort in this direction, but this alone was not sufficient. While it may have gained him a more sympathetic hearing among the wage-earners, it did not result in any conversions. The gospel had to be so presented that it would touch the emotions, for only as the emotions were profoundly stirred was there the possibility of leading people to a "new birth."

Rauschenbusch was emphatic in his insistence upon the importance of emotion. Speaking before the Baptist Congress in 1893, he declared: "Being saved without emotion is unthinkable. Imagine a man being born again without being stirred to the bottom of his nature." "If I had to choose," he continued, "between intellect and emotion in religious work, I would rather have genuine emotion with little intellect than the reverse," for a religion without emotion is "valueless" and "has no saving power."³⁸ The emotional impact is the decisive element which distinguishes truth from religious truth, he was to insist in 1910.

This is really the test, whether a truth is a religious truth to you. If it stirs and shakes you, if it unsettles you with divine dissatisfaction and impels you with a longing for holiness and God, if it lifts you beyond the fear of men and gives you a taste of the joy and peace of eternity; then the miraculous power of real religion is at work in you. Religious truth always has a direct sanctifying effect. If it has not, it may be truth; but it has not yet become religious truth to you.³⁹

This is not to say that Rauschenbusch was advocating any contrived emotionalism. "Emotion is good," he affirmed, "only when it is spontaneous, only when it rises naturally in the soul in response to a great thought or

³⁷ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, 396.

³⁸ *Proceedings of the Baptist Congress*, 1893, p. 33. See also a similar stress on the importance of emotion in his account of the Welsh revival in *The Examiner*, June 15, 1905.

³⁹ *The Freedom of Spiritual Religion*, a sermon delivered at the Northern Baptist Convention, May 8, 1910.

in view of some entrancing object." If it is merely contrived, it cannot be either "genuine or lasting."⁴⁰

Rauschenbusch's problem was to identify those facets of the gospel that would speak to man in his contemporary situation and stir his deepest emotions. He seems early to have discovered that, as a result of the Christian penetration of the total society, "every normal man has a sense of affection and responsibility for his fellows and that we can awaken his sense of sin by making him realize the harm his evil doings have done them, and can intensify his desire for a new life by showing him that his righteousness will help all." He illustrated the effectiveness of this approach by his own experience in an evangelistic address in Pittsburgh. He had been requested to speak to the men on social purity.

I spoke in the usual way about the abuse of the sex functions and the dangers of contamination. But in the last part of the address I pointed out that sex life is a much more important part of a woman's life; that her happiness, reputation, and welfare are identified with it; that in almost every case the lawless pleasures of men have to be paid for by the sufferings of women; and I asked the men if we are willing to take our pleasures at that price. I realized at that moment and found afterward that the appeal to their self-interest and self-protection had left them cold; the appeal to protect the women stirred them.⁴¹

Rauschenbusch also seems early to have discovered the emotional power resident in an emphasis upon the "plastic possibilities" of the future for either good or evil. Speaking at a Thanksgiving Service in 1898, with the Spanish-American War being brought to a successful conclusion, he reminded his hearers that they stood on a watershed of history. "So far as we can now judge, there has been no year since the close of the Civil War that has been so momentous, so epoch-making. It is probable that . . . to the historian of a hundred years hence, this year 1898 will be one of the mountain ranges in the geography of times, a great watershed from which the rivers begin to flow toward new and distant oceans."⁴²

In 1885 Josiah Strong had described, in his little book *Our Country*, the decisive role that the United States was to play in the new age, and Rauschenbusch capitalized upon the sentiment implicit in this theme.

Now, when the war . . . is definitely over and we survey its effects on our future, there is in the heart of our people a deep sense of destiny, of a mission laid upon us by the Ruler of history. . . . God thinks in acts. He speaks in events. He has made clear his will for us by the irrepressible force of events. We shall have to accept and obey. We may well view this new task with bated breath. If we

⁴⁰ *Proceedings of the Baptist Congress*, 1893, p. 33.

⁴¹ Sharpe, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

⁴² *Rochester Post-Express*, November 25, 1898.

rejoice at all in our new imperial domain, we rejoice in fear and trembling. . . . By a higher guidance than our own we now stand charged with duties the scope of which we hardly surmise. . . . God calls us forward. . . . The lifework of manhood lies before us. The pillar of fire has lifted and moved. We must break camp and follow, though none of us have traveled the trackless future to tell us whither we are going.

If we propose to be, as God is calling us to be, "missionaries" and "exemplars of humanity" in foreign parts, Rauschenbusch was careful to point out, then we must be careful to "mend our own faults."⁴³ Less than three months later, he drew a second lesson from the signs of the times: "The sooner we learn that this earth is a very small planet and getting smaller every year, and that our welfare is bound up with all the other passengers, the better it is for us."⁴⁴

Socialism, however, was Rauschenbusch's most momentous discovery. He refused to regard it "as a red-hot lava eruption from the crater of hell," insisting that it was "a river flowing from the throne of God, sent by the Ruler of history for the purification of the nations."⁴⁵ It was a judgment on the churches and their unsocial Christianity, and there was much of Christ in its deepest concerns. But one of its most important features to Rauschenbusch was that it represented a point of contact with the working classes, symbolizing their aspirations and the word itself possessing powerful emotional connotations. Thus, while Rauschenbusch was never a Socialist in the accepted doctrinaire sense of the term,⁴⁶ he was quick to claim the name for himself, for the word "socialism" spoke to contemporary man in a way few other words could speak. It conveyed a sense of social sin, a feeling of complicity in and responsibility for the sins of society in which all have shared. Thus it served as "short-hand" for a moral standard which extended beyond a purely individualistic ethic and it could be utilized as a clear-cut summons to repentance. But the use of the word "socialism" did more than this. It appealed to the motive of compassion for the downtrodden. It emphasized the necessity for fraternal association in common tasks. It quickened the feeling of kinship between nations and races. It bespoke a new age pregnant with promise. It was, in brief, a word that could be captured and utilized for a more powerful

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, February 13, 1899.

⁴⁵ "The Ideals of the Social Reformers," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1896, p. 202.

⁴⁶ For the points of "conscious antagonism" to the prevailing tendencies of Socialism, see Rauschenbusch's article, "Christian Socialism," *A Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, ed. Shailer Mathews and G. B. Smith, New York, 1921. See also "The Ideals of the Social Reformers," *op cit.*; "Practical Measures of Socialism," *The Treasury*, January, 1901; and especially his address before the Labor Lyceum in Rochester, *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, February 25, 1901.

presentation of the gospel.⁴⁷ It was at least partially with this thought in mind that Rauschenbusch began calling himself a Christian Socialist and thought in terms of organizing a Christian Socialist society.

While Rauschenbusch continued to utilize the word "socialism" as a means of conveying those implications of the gospel which spoke most directly to the new age in which the church found itself, his visit to Germany in 1891 was the occasion for the discovery of a biblical concept that was more inclusive and, properly interpreted, even more powerful. This was the concept of the Kingdom of God, and in all of Rauschenbusch's future activity, the Kingdom of God was to be "the enduring motive" of what he called his "evangelistic work," the great "object" to which men should be asked to surrender their lives.⁴⁸

Christianity and the Social Crisis can best be understood as Rauschenbusch's attempt, in consultation with the members of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom, to state in some systematic fashion the message of the "new evangelism." What pleased him most about the reception the book received were the comments of those who told him that the book "gave them a new experience of religion and a new feeling about Christ," for this was evidence that his attempt to state the gospel in a compelling form that would touch the hearts of men was not entirely unsuccessful.⁴⁹

Ten years earlier, Walter Rauschenbusch had left his pastorate in New York City to accept a position on the faculty of the Rochester Theological Seminary. After the publication of *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, he was to embark on a new phase of his career. "Demands for lectures" poured in from every side. "I found myself," he said, "launched into a new activity in which I had no experience."⁵⁰ His teaching schedule was rearranged so that he could be away from the Seminary four days each week, and he became something of an evangelist-at-large for the remaining ten years of his life. As he reviewed these final years toward the close of his life, he said that he found his "deepest satisfaction" in the evidence that had come to him "now and then" that through this "public work" he had been able "to help men to a new spiritual birth."⁵¹ This had been his vocation in the beginning and it remained his vocation to the end.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 203-10. See also "Contributions Socialism Has Made to Social Feeling," *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, December 13, 1909.

⁴⁸ Bodein, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19; *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 93; *Cleveland's Young Men*, January 9, 1913.

⁴⁹ *Rochester Theological Seminary Bulletin*, November, 1918, p. 53.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

The Ministries and the Ministry of the Whole Church

FRANKLIN H. LITTELL

I

TO SPEAK OF the understanding of the ministry in the great confessional traditions raises immediately and inevitably the question of the understanding of the church. More than that, in recent years it raises immediately the question of the understanding of the laity. An Anglican bishop has recently said, in criticism of Professor Kraemer's *A Theology of the Laity*, that a proper doctrine of the laity will remain impossible without a sound understanding of the priestly office. I should like to suggest that, just as in the New Testament every office and function is tested by reference back to the whole body of the faithful, so in fact in church history a proper understanding of the various ministries is impossible without a sound grasp of the role of the whole people of God, the *laos tou theou*. And while in the reversing mood, I would like to call to your attention the statement in Congar's *Lay People in the Church*: "At bottom there can be only one sound and sufficient theology of the laity, and that is a 'total ecclesiology.'"¹

The converse is also true, though much neglected. There can be no sound doctrine of the church which limits itself to popes, Christian princes and presidents, and the ideas of professional theologians. Even in the colloquial use of the terms "clergy" and "laity," all of us were laymen before we were called to minister. In the more profound use of the term "laity," we still belong—as the delightfully ironical French Dominican phrase puts it—to "the other laity": i.e., those of the *laos* who have been set aside to perform certain functions. The understanding of the doctrine of ministry is impossible, then, without reference to the doctrine of the

¹ London: Bloomsbury Publishing Co., 1957, p. xxviii.

FRANKLIN H. LITTELL, B.D., Ph.D., is Professor of Church History at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. He has been active in the Evangelical Lay Academies and related movements in Germany. This article was presented as an address at the Conference of Professors in the Practical Fields, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia, on June 11, 1960.

laity; moreover, both are intelligible only in terms of the doctrine of the church.

The difficulty in speaking of these things, indeed of relating the concerns of church history at all to the so-called Practical Fields, is enormous. All of us are more or less securely embedded in "the world" and its assumptions about institutional life. In the eyes of the world—and here we must not forget that "the world" of New Testament parlance is better translated "the spirit of the times"—"the church" is an institution founded to effect spiritual purposes, whose chief claim to distinction lies in the originality of its founder and a certain timelessness and aloofness in its posture toward merely human problems. As a "religious" institution, "the church" is commonly discussed in special terms and with a special language like that of diplomacy. The thing we frequently forget is that the language of diplomacy, the polite phraseology of the courts, is usually little better than the mask of insolence and hostility. We need less kissing of the hand toward the church and the sacred things, and more acceptance of direct involvement.

Truth is better understood by those involved in the struggle for it than it is by those who claim aloofness from the issue. General historians and New Testament theologians have perceived this truth, along with some of the so-called "practical" practitioners, much more fully than church historians to date. As long ago as 1911 James Harvey Robinson published his great book reinterpreting the nature of the historical discipline, *The New History*. In this brilliant writing Professor Robinson, then of Columbia University, demolished the false style of much earlier historical writing. The old style of history had suffered from several serious faults. First, it was episodic and melodramatic, being chiefly the chronicle of dramatic events in the lives of great men. Second, it was romantic, exaggerating the importance of individual personalities, single decisions and critical moments. By dissecting such traditionally traumatic events as the Fall of Rome and the French Revolution, Professor Robinson claimed to demonstrate a principle of continuity in history: history knows no sudden changes or abrupt reversals. Lacking a Christian interpretation of the course of history, Professor Robinson fell into the trap of nineteenth-century positivism. But he did drive home with powerful insight and language that history cannot ignore the experience of the common folk of the different periods—the way in which the ordinary subject lived, ate, believed, was housed, died.

If this be true of the common course of human history—and it may be disputed whether this is history at all in the biblical sense—how much more

certain it is that church history can only be the history of the whole people of God. But how much of the writing of church history still perpetrates the old errors—being the romantic chronicle of dramatic moments in the lives of popes, Christian princes, theologians (the latter not because of their decisive significance so much as because they write the books!). And how much of church history is still the painfully positivistic portrayal of denominational emergence and triumph!—defective in method and provincial in perspective.

Moreover, Professor Robinson sensed something else which our New Testament theologians express and observe, to date, better than church historians: the degree to which all teachings and interpretations interact with given social/economic/political/institutional forces, and to which they are only intelligible by review of the *Sitz im Leben*. How can, for example, the doctrine of the church be abstracted from the actual view the Christians have of their own mission? How shall the doctrines of ministry be discussed apart from the self-consciousness of those called to minister? How can a doctrine of the laity be elaborated without regard to the actual stance of the members at a given time—docile or reactionary, passive or participative?

Most important of all, perhaps, is the willingness of the church to accept the proposition that such doctrinal matters are open to discussion—and that by the whole laity as well as professional theologians. A church which functions thus creatively is different in kind from a religious institution which restricts the definition of terms to an absolute monarch or ruling class. Nevertheless, no branch of the Christian church has totally forgotten that originally Truth was revealed in brotherhood, and that brotherhood-love is the oldest of all the Christian theological and ethical disciplines. Once we were all brethren, sharing a common ministry, whatever life's slow spreading stain may have done to us.

II

In the various great traditions there are different ways of expressing the need of the involvement of the whole people in the decision-making process. In the Eastern Orthodox communion this dimension is best symbolized by the word "pleroma." Christian truth is that which has been confessed by all those who have borne the Name, in all places and all times. Only a genuinely universal council can define positions which are binding upon the Church.

In Latin Christianity the imperative participation of all the faithful is represented by that immensely rich word "consensus." The precursors

of the Conciliar movement stressed the *consensus fidelium*: that which was confessed gained its authority in good part by its universality, by the degree to which it had been appropriated by all of the believers. Participation in the making of decisions is also implied, although at that time the ordinary member was more docile and obedient than vocal. Consensus is not to be confused with unanimity or majority rule; the truth which is declared to be the consensus of the Church rests not on parliamentarianism but on the initiative of the Holy Spirit. Even today, when the Pope no longer issues pastoral letters or encyclicals in the name of his fellow bishops as well as his own see, when a new doctrinal proclamation such as the Assumption of the Virgin is made, it is significant that the form of words used announces only that that which is proclaimed has been for long the belief of the faithful.

In Protestantism, the ministry of all the faithful has recently been stated in terms of the ordination which we have in our baptism. Among the great Reformers of the sixteenth century baptism was stressed and, after the hassle with the Anabaptists, confirmation was introduced in the territorial churches; although they would not follow the advice of the radical Protestants and do away with wholesale baptism of the unwitting, the Reformers did adopt Schwenckfeld's proposal at Strassburg that when those baptized should reach the age of understanding some ceremony should be used to emphasize their direct and conscious participation in the Christian life. And whereas in the north German principalities such participation came to be defined in terms of obedience to the prince in things religious as well as in political affairs, in the Swiss cantons and in the Rhine valley some lay initiative among the membership was allowed. The insistence of Calvin and Butzer upon Church Order and Discipline as the "third mark" of the True Church, a position not accepted by orthodox Lutherans to this day, was in effect to guarantee certain structures within which the laity could function and even lead. In the first generations of the Reformed establishments, the laity with any part in decision-making tended to be of the ruling families and town councils. But where Calvinism was persecuted, and where it came to flower in radical Puritanism, even the ordinary member came to exercise the ordination of his baptism—strengthened by the doctrine of the Covenant—in a vigorous fashion. It was in radical Puritanism that the "priesthood of all believers" became an operative principle as well as a profession of intent.

The statement of such a principle is, after all, of little significance unless there are provisions made for the exercise of such universal priesthood. In the high period of the Latin Church the liturgy and the sacramental life

were stressed. And in spite of the theoretical emphasis upon "consensus," in fact decision and initiative rested largely with those trained to lead in the rituals. Except for those who took the vows and joined orders with special functions to perform, the stance of the layman was that of spectator. In the sixteenth century a new note was added: preaching from the Bible. A substantial number of Christians were no longer willing to obey and adore uncritically; some explanation of truth and its application became necessary. Power and decision still resided largely with the secular ruler, and the theologians and church lawyers who advised him, but the spreading of the vernacular and the flood of printed tracts carried some meaning to those who would listen and could read. With radical Puritanism another element was added to the Sacramental life and the hearing of the preached Word: discussion. Today that dimension of Christian life has become so important that the leader of Bad Boll Evangelical Academy, a German Lutheran, declared last summer in the annual meeting of the Directors of Evangelical Academies and Lay Institutes (an association now listing over sixty centers in twelve countries) that contemporary ecclesiology must add Discussion to the Word and the Sacraments as a pillar of the church.

Such an event can only be understood historically or, perhaps better said, eschatologically. It has come about in the fullness of time that the members who are practicing, and not merely nominal, are no longer content to watch with adoration and obey with alacrity: they want to participate in the making of the decisions. Such participation was out of the question when decisions in Christendom were divided between emperor and bishops, or later when decisions were fought out between metropolitans and crowned heads. It was even meaningless when kings and secular princes were the *summi episcopoi* and the civil and clerical bureaucracies vied with each other to control the realm. Discussion came to be again a basic element in the life of the church when, in an effort to recapture the genius of the Early Church, congregations in the left wing of the Reformation took seriously the ordination of the laity. It has sometimes been said that the Anabaptists or the Mennonites or the Quakers have no clergy. It would be more accurate to say that they have, in the traditional docile sense, no laity.

In the Anabaptist movement of the sixteenth century, so brutally and speedily suppressed, the discipline of apostolic decision-making was followed. In the meetings the Bible was read and discussed, common prayer was used, discussion followed; a consensus of the membership was declared when "it seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us . . ." (Acts 15:28). In the radical Puritanism which came to the fore in the English Commonwealth, the

emphasis on responsible participation by all concerned was even carried over into the body politic. When Colonel Rainboro addressed the assembly in the New Model Army, he declared that he verily did "believe that even the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the richest he." And the "poorest he" had a right to discuss and help make the decisions which governed his life. This is but the secularization of the priesthood of all believers. And in political life as well as in the congregation it is mistaken to suppose that such universal priesthood means "every man his own priest"; rather it points toward what the fine Quaker phrase terms "the unlimited liability" of one for the other. Colonel Rainboro's fellow Puritans, the Separatists of Plymouth, united in both civil and religious covenants before touching land; but the precedures of self-government which they followed were the same in both settings.

Hence Peter Taylor Forsyth's tribute to these forerunners of religious liberty, of the voluntary principle in religious and civic life.

Independency erased the distinction between the theologian and the layman more completely than any other. No church was so little a church of its ministers, influential as these were. It was influence they had, and not power. The priesthood of all believers here first became practical and effective for church life. . . . The voluntary principle became the whole principle of English Nonconformity.²

The time was at hand when some men perceived that that service only is pleasing to God which is voluntary and uncoerced. And the perception of this truth directly affected the doctrine of God as well as the view of the role of the ordinary member.

In this concept we perceive the significance of the "hat service" of the Quakers and the questionings which different radical Puritans injected into the Church of England service. The early Friends moved in a society in which excessively flowery language, bowings, curtsies, and frequent repetition of titles barely disguised the crudeness and insolence of human relations. These relations commonly obtained in the church as well as in court, where those of position and prestige took it for granted that their pleasure would govern religious act and pronouncement. But the Quakers read their Bibles and left their hats on because they had perceived a very important truth previously neglected: God is no respecter of persons.

(Incidentally, this issue of patronage versus gospel freedom is very much at stake now in my section of the country. Our seminarians, two-thirds of whom are already serving churches, are constantly confronted by "the leader from the outside"—the person whose status in politics or economics

² *Faith, Freedom, and the Future*, London: Independent Press, 1955, p. 324.

is such that he presumes the right to tell the preacher and the public that of course "our" church will uphold "the Southern way of life." But most of the time he does not himself attend regularly and accept the burdens of active membership. And certainly he has not accepted the openness of God's promise to the church, of the potential of a situation in which those who come after him may perform miracles greater than his, in which the Spirit of Truth works among those who believe according to the measure of their faith and not according to the prestige scales of the Democratic Party or Continental Can.)

In the questionings which disturbed the services for some years of the seventeenth century, the same sense of a ministry shared by all believers was at stake. Just as a commoner had risen in a public assembly in Zurich in 1526 to demand that Zwingli should follow the policy of church reform which had been discussed and decided upon in meeting—rather than refer it to the Town Council for decision—so in public services from time to time in seventeenth-century England, various radical Puritans would stand up to question the pulpit. Pointing to or quoting an apt text, they would take another position from that represented by the actions or words of the civil servant who was conducting the Church of England service. Now it is commonly said that they were carrying their case in a dramatic or impolite way. But this is to miss the heart of the matter. Part of their case was that matters of Christian belief and witness should be settled not by professionals but under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the meeting of believers. Therefore their standing up in the midst of the sermon or service was not to disturb or challenge as such, but to demand that an open discussion should take place. It was no longer enough for the word to be interpreted and made intelligible to a listening audience: it had now to be discussed, applied, related to real people facing real decisions.

Some of the defenses given by these early champions of the discussion method—who were not infrequently jailed and tried for their peculiar opinion that nonprofessionals should discuss theology!—are revealing. They accuse those in power of keeping the Book sealed and high on a shelf away from the hungry flock of God, and letting it out only to those who have been schooled to treat it as philosophy. But the Book of Life has been opened by the Spirit to all who believe, and the word must be made flesh if it is the word which concerns Christians. In other words they were affirming the doctrine of the Incarnation and asserting that their persecutors had made of Christianity an arid scholasticism. But the real point was, of course, that the Anglican priest had run things for generations without

anybody but king or prince or patron interfering. And now came this strange fellow, of known rebellious opinions, to demand that such matters as worship and doctrine and morals be discussed by all believers!

III

We can see the line of development by asking another question: *Who carried the faith* in different generations? With a small margin for error, the picture comes into focus.

While the church functioned in the Mediterranean matrix, the faith was carried by anonymous Christians—traders, craftsmen, perhaps soldiers. There were only a few professional leaders, like Peter, Timothy, and Paul, and the latter preferred to be known as one who worked with his hands, i.e., as a nonprofessional. The faith spread by the conviction of its membership.³

With the development of Byzantine administrative procedures for collecting taxes and tribute, and the centralization of political and religious power according to Roman law, the Christian Church too became centralized and hierarchical. After Constantine, Justinian and Theodosius, all initiative and decision on matters Christian rested with the Emperor. Christianity spread, and this procedure continued for more than a thousand years, by military conquest and the baptizing of subject peoples. Only monasticism, initially a protest movement, remained as a recognized channel for laymen with more than passive interest in things religious.

In the high Middle Ages there was some diversification, but the main issue lay between Emperor and kings, Pope and metropolitans. Lay initiative at membership level was forced into the posture of "heresy."

The state-church Reformation brought, if anything, a tightening of controls. In a definition of lay priesthood to which Roman Catholics and Emperor also assented—at Augsburg, 1555, and Westphalia, 1648—effective power and decision in all matters religious was placed in the hands of the secular government (kings, princes and town councils). The carrier of the faith in the sixteenth century was the Christian prince, or perhaps the prince half Christian and half heathen. It was not until after the French Revolution that Catholicism began to recover its universality and disengage itself from such ties to the secular nobility. In many parts of Europe Protestantism is still particularistic and provincial, and in most lands it remained so until the religious and political earthquake of World War I. Obedience and docility are still the priority virtues among Continental

³ See Williams, George H., "The Role of the Layman in the Ancient Church," *Greek and Byzantine Studies*, July, 1958, pp. 9-42.

church members. The whole burden of the *Kirchentag* and Evangelical Academies—the lay movements which sprang up after the Church Struggle had made appallingly clear the perils of an unconverted and unlettered laity—has been to try to break through this style of life of the *Pastorenkirche*.

At the first international conference of the new laymen's movements, at Bossey, 1948, those present said quite frankly that their needs in a broken and disjointed age could no longer be met by liturgy or preaching alone. Only full and free and informed discussion among laymen could serve to relate the Christian message to life where they lived it. As Reinhold von Thadden, founder and President of the greatest laymen's movement in the world, the *Kirchentag*, has said: The professionals' traditional way of handling the layman's questions has been to take them, restate them in terms of answers which the church has had for a long time, and then give back to the layman answers to questions which he never asked. Hans Hoekendijk, formerly with the World's Student Christian Federation and now professor at Utrecht, has put the problem another way, saying the trouble with the church is that she tells the blind that the lame walk, the captives that the blind receive their sight, and those in chains that the deaf hear. The alert laymen have come to feel, also in the European establishments, that the Word doesn't mean much until it carries concrete significance, until it is transmuted into social structures and living tissue. He feels he is rightfully involved in the discussion which formulates as well as in the listening role, and that his participation prevents the formulations from being irrelevant.

The men of the Church Struggle insist that a church with a highly pyramided power structure and no trained laity is vulnerable to totalitarian attack. The Nazis or their fellow travelers, the German Christians, simply captured the key positions: the communicants as a whole knew nothing but to follow instructions. On the other hand, those congregations, chiefly of the Calvinist and United Churches, which had some tradition of lay responsibility, and also atrophied but residual structures for expressing lay decision, proved far more effective in mustering spiritual resistance.

IV

Our situation in the American churches is different. Our problem is that we are still securely lodged in the intact society, the continuum of Christ and culture, which characterized the European churches of the Victorian era and the *Wilhelminischen Zeitalter*. The ministry of the Christian folk is still predominantly understood and interpreted—or rather,

misunderstood, and *misinterpreted*—in terms of blessing “the American way of life” or perhaps “the Southern way of life,” which are, speaking Christianly, the same thing.

Nevertheless, we have a heritage of Christian ministry which is still unique in one important respect, and which places us closer to the New Testament churches and the Younger Churches of Asia, Africa and the islands of the sea, than to fifteen hundred years of West European “Christendom.” That is the heritage of modern missionary endeavor, of the ministry of the whole church in proclaiming the gospel to the uttermost parts of the earth. This we have to remind us that at our best we are “pilgrim church” and not culture-religion. Whereas European state-church Protestantism condemned missions officially as late as 1650 and tolerated them only for small societies of enthusiasts even in the nineteenth century, American Protestantism has taken its basic forms from a century and a half of foreign and home missions. The *Kirchentag* of 1872 rejected the plea that missions should be the concern of the whole church, and not until 1952 (for example) did the territorial Church of Hannover accept the proposition that it is the responsibility of every believer to proclaim the gospel to all peoples or at least support those who do.

Among the Free Churches of Britain and America however, the carrier of the church faith became again in the nineteenth century the ordinary member, as Professor Latourette has demonstrated and stressed. In the missions work supported by ordinary members in average congregations, the spread of the faith became for the first time since the apostolic age the concern of the prayers, study and giving of the whole people. By 1928, two-thirds of all the missions work around the world was being carried by these churches. Today, as we enter a period of history in which the layman working overseas for nonchurch agencies is replacing the professional missionary as the type of effective missionary, the center of Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish religious support and organization has shifted to the American scene. The question is whether the principle of voluntarism will be defined in secularized terms as the “right” to be negligent, or defined in biblical terms through the disciplines of discipleship. After all, the only freedom of a Christian man is perfect obedience to the Lord of the Church. And this defines the ministry of the whole church, lay or clerical.

The substance of the matter would seem to be this: the doctrine of the ministry of the whole church—of the “apostolate of the laity,” to use the current expression—remains but an empty phrase unless and until specific

structures are provided to give it outlet. Luther, to be sure, spoke of the general priesthood in clear language.

Injustice is done those words, "priest," "cleric," "spiritual," "ecclesiastic," when they are transferred from all other Christians to those few who are now by mischievous usage called "ecclesiastics"!

... there is really no difference between laymen and priests, princes and bishops, "spirituals" and "temporals," as they call them, except that of office and work, but not of "estate"; for they are all of the same estate,—true priests, bishops and popes,—though they are not all engaged in the same work, just as all priests and monks have not the same work.⁴

But in Luther's time and situation the lay priesthood became confined in fact to the political rulers, in the *landesherrlichen Kirchenregiment* which persisted in Germany until the Revolution of 1919 and in Scandinavia and Great Britain to this day. Throughout most of church history, including the state-church Protestant Reformation, the "priesthood of all believers" has remained a pious wish.

In fullness of time, however, there have now appeared movements of mission, evangelization, social action which are in fact the church in action. Those of us commonly called "ministers" are rather chaplains to the laity in this greater ministry. It is, along with the more commonly accepted function of providing liturgical and sacramental leadership and helping to fulfill the promise of the open Bible, our particular responsibility today to lift up the dimension of *discussion* and *group participation* in the life of the church. Our sociologists of learning have made amply clear to us in recent years that it is by such identification with group process that people actually come to accept new truths, motivations, value judgments. But more important than the acceptance or appropriation of certain understandings is the providing of structures within which new light can break forth in Israel. Decision once made by a single member or professional class, and accepted by a docile people, is no longer a satisfactory way of operating among many Christians. We do wrong to talk about the "group process" in static terms, historically, and put it on a scale over against "authoritarianism": they belong rather to two different periods of church history!

It is not our calling to judge Paul or Charlemagne or John Calvin (all laymen!) in the style of ministry they developed appropriate to their times. Rather our calling is to understand and articulate what the Lord of the Church intends its ministry to be in 1960. The burden of my concern is that those who are properly speaking *chaplains* to the whole people in their

⁴ "An open letter to the Christian Nobility," in *Works*, Muhlenberg Press, 1943, II, 325-26.

ministry shall not interpose an outmoded concept of leadership, and thereby stand between those called to be disciples and Jesus the Christ. Neither preaching nor discussing, baptism nor the Lord's Supper, are ends in themselves: but all exist for the edifying and building up of the whole church in her ministry. In this, if we are true to our calling, we live in the mood which Professor Kraemer describes in the New Testament Church, where ". . . all the stress was on the *diakonia*, the ministry of the whole membership, because the Church as a whole stood under the same token as its Lord, i.e., 'servantship.'"⁵

When we come clear as to what this implies, we shall comprehend more fully the glories and miseries of the doctrine of ministry in the great confessional traditions. We shall also see how in our role as clergy today, we are here "to minister, not to be ministered unto."

⁵ Kraemer, Hendrik, *A Theology of the Laity*, The Westminster Press, 1957, p. 140.

Common Sense Looks at Man-Made Men

J. DAVID TOWNSEND

SINCE MAN HAS BEEN able to talk, he has been finding fault with the Creator's works and activities. Few of our kind have ever been fully satisfied. Some find life too short, others too long. Some complain of the cold, others of the heat; and all unite in railing against sorrow, pestilence, and toil.

The constant refrain of mankind has been that of the Persian poet:

Ah love! Could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry scheme of things entire,
Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
Re-mould it nearer to the heart's desire?

This complaint has, however, been largely of a rhetorical nature. Religions and philosophies aiding, the masses have pretty generally acknowledged the futility of revolt; and most men—however harshly they have been treated by Nature—have agreed that it is better that the universe should be governed by a changeless, impartial power than by even the best and wisest of their own species.

But of late years the fault-finding has assumed a more serious tone. It is no longer only the disappointed lover or bereaved parent who expresses discontent with the ways of Providence. The voice of Science has joined the chorus. Out of the laboratories and lecture-halls are issuing sober denunciations of the bungling, haphazard ways of evolution, the awful waste involved in natural selection, and the amateurish quality of the laws of heredity. The voice of Science does not stop at criticising, but goes on to promise relief from most of the ills resulting from Nature's mistakes; and mankind listens in delight as a new heaven and a new earth open up their untarnished splendors.

Science can well boast of her past accomplishments. Her flying machines cleave the air at a speed faster than sound. Rivers have been harnessed and deserts made to bear fruit. The split atom is providing an immeasurable quantity of energy. Harmful insects and bacteria are being

J. DAVID TOWNSEND, retired minister living in Bel Air, Maryland, is author of *The Divine Art*, Abingdon Press, 1931; *The Cats Stand Accused*, Houghton Mifflin, 1961; translator of De Ségur, *Napoleon's Russian Campaign*, Houghton Mifflin, 1958.

destroyed, and man's life span has been considerably lengthened. There is evidence that tomorrow the winds and clouds will be brought under human control, and hurricanes, floods, and droughts will be things of the past. Tomorrow our venturesome youth, straining at the narrow limits of the earth, will be colonizing, perhaps improving, the planets and stars.

But these achievements are insignificant compared with what is promised in the realm of biology and psychology. The boast is heard that it now lies within man's power to manipulate elemental materials in the laboratory so as to create life. The enlarged understanding of genetics which he now has will enable him to remake himself. He will soon be able to predetermine the physique and mentality of unborn children, and, with a little experience, to produce geniuses.

When this boast first falls on our ears, we thrill with pride over the vastness of the human intellect; and our delighted imagination shows us a race of gods striding purposefully over a world from which pain, sorrow, disease, and strife have been eradicated. Soon, now, we shall indeed be remoulding this sorry scheme of things to our heart's desire!

But after the first flush of egotistical satisfaction has cooled, we begin to ask certain sobering questions. Heart's desire—whose heart's desire? Mine, yours, who want only good things for mankind? Or that of the political or scientific megalomaniac? Immediately the picture takes on a darker color. The scientists are not without apprehension concerning the application of their findings, since they generally qualify their statements with an *if*, saying "If society uses our discoveries wisely, well and good. If unwisely, the result will probably be the destruction of the human race."

Common sense suggests that two conditions are requisite to the wise use of these discoveries in the realm of genetics. The first is, *that there be a definitely established type, a constant man-model toward which to strive*. The second, *that the power to work any permanent change in the human organism be vested in men of godlike vision and unimpeachable integrity*. These conditions being granted, the whole matter becomes more complicated. We are faced with the same dilemma that faced the mice who knew that in order to render the cat harmless, they had only to tie a bell to her tail.

As regards the first of these conditions, the adoption of a perfect model, there seems little likelihood that that requirement will ever be met. Man welcomes physical change, and taxes his wits to alter as frequently and radically as possible everything about him. He tires even of his own form. The child yearns for adolescent size; the adolescent, for adult strength;

the old man, for youthful roundness. There is no end to the shapes or colors we might assume, if we had the least say in the matter. There would be short-lived fashions in human morphology, as in clothing and furniture. One year everybody would be fair, the next, dark. Long legs would be the rage, then short legs; and breasts and buttocks would fluctuate from Lilliputian to Gargantuan.

What would be the perfect type, we wonder? In garrison states an overwhelming number of males would be produced, equipped with such physical parts and mental powers as the prevalent type of warfare might require. In nations dedicated to peaceful pursuits the intellect and the pleasure-giving organs would be highly developed. In an age of excursions into outer space, a creature adapted to existence on other planets would be produced. In periods of an abundance of food (as we now know it) the digestive tract would be enlarged, while in an era of nourishment by basic chemicals, the gut would almost disappear. In an advanced automotive age the legs would shrink to insignificance, unless it were found desirable to retain the female leg as a sex symbol.

Now, the second problem, that of determining what power shall design this constant human type, is even more thorny. The all-important question is, what man or group of men will be vested with the authority to cause mutations in the human genes? What group will control the innate capacities of unborn generations? Who shall decide what are the most desirable physical, mental, and moral traits? One thing is clear: in all the record of man's doings on this planet, he has given little evidence of possessing anything like the wisdom required for such a stupendous task. In all history can there be found one man who did not make a single mistake or miscalculation? What, then, encourages us to believe that suddenly the man of superhuman wisdom and unimpeachable integrity will appear among us? Is it not inevitable that the work of a supreme body composed of the best of men should bear the imprint of personal prejudices?

A military authority, as has already been pointed out, would work for an abundance of warriors, males endowed with fine bodies and inferior minds. A group of intellectuals would favor a type with a debile body and hypertrophied brain. Sea lovers would produce men with gills; mountain lovers, men with double-sized lungs. The great industries would toil to create a diversity of types capable of consuming their various products, would fashion the race's external and internal organs with a view to facilitating the eating, drinking, smoking, and wearing of their wares. (The advertising agencies have shown us what can be done in the line of influencing human

tastes.) So a little reflection convinces us that it would require a wisdom above earthly wisdom to create the perfect man.

Science further promises a world in which suffering shall be minimized, if not abolished. In the same breath it boasts that one day it will create geniuses as they may be needed. From what, then, would its geniuses be fashioned? No one can say what unlikely ingredients go into the making of a genius—what part pain, what part joy. Certainly we look in vain among the geniuses for one whose life was all sunshine and laughter. The very elements which Science would banish have been the most active ingredients in the composition of genius. Bereavement, deformity, poverty, frustration, blindness, deafness, disease (in particular syphilis, tuberculosis, epilepsy) have all in some unaccountable way fired the soul to produce immortal works of art.

It is conceivable that human knowledge might succeed in creating a new kind of genius, a mathematical or mechanical genius, a man who could acquire and manipulate all demonstrable facts and figures and lay bare all the secrets of matter. But out of what combination of facts shall we create that indefinable something which sings the deathless song, throws up the aerial vaulting of a temple, sets a crude stone wall ablaze with heavenly shapes and colors, transforms the beating of the pulse into the enduring rhythm of poetry? It is certain that we should be a healthier, handsomer race, if all misshapen bodies, hearts, and minds were corrected. But should we then have any geniuses?

Men have already learned that the delicate balance of Nature cannot be disturbed with impunity. They have seen this in the losing fight against insect pests; in the field of bacteriology, when helpful bacteria are destroyed along with the harmful; in the realm of psychology, when the disturbing of age-old conditions results in the impairing of mental health.

It is a solemn truth that all is for the best in the best possible of worlds. Given the existing natural conditions—gravitation, climate, the composition of the earth's crust and the atmosphere, the influence of other planets—life could have evolved only as it has. There has been nothing haphazard about the growth of the different species. Every grouping of living cells is the inevitable consequence of millions of years of rejection and adaptation. Such marvelous organs as the eye and human hand could not have come into being in any other environment. Even the sudden mutations were not so blind as they might appear, since only adaptable types persisted. As Santayana puts it, "Each sort of life is a proof that circumstances made that sort of life inevitable."

Those, therefore, who find fault with Nature's bungling ways, denouncing as cruel and wasteful the laws of natural selection, are criticising perfection. Man will surely destroy himself when he pits his fallibility against the deep driving forces of creation. There is not one chance in a thousand that a mutation deliberately provoked by radioactive emanations should not prove deleterious.

Yet a great deal is being said about Science's ability to replace natural selection with *more humane alternatives*. Nothing could be more ridiculous than this proposal, since Nature herself would have adopted the alternatives, had there been any. All attempts to redress Nature must end in chaos. A striking example of this can be found in the degree of success we are enjoying in the matter of prolonging human life. People do live longer; but the solving of the problem of early death has created a new problem, what to do with the ever-increasing number of old people. How shall we employ them? How keep them well and happy? And the spectre of overpopulation dogs our steps. To cope with this new problem new skills are being imagined, new branches of science developed, and the possibility of colonizing the neighboring planets is being explored.

Thus the greater part of the ingenuity of Science is constantly being employed, not in combating Nature, as many suppose, but in combating ills produced by her own cleverness. Had man's intelligence not split the atom, for instance, he would not now be wrestling with the lethal horror of nuclear fallout and radioactive wastes. Had he not invented the internal-combustion engine, he would not be desperately looking for an antidote to gas-poisoned atmosphere.

Scientists by their own admission are not primarily concerned with the application of their findings. They turn their precious discoveries over to the people with doubt in their minds: "If they be used wisely." Yet, being familiar with the ideals which prevail in the world, they must know that they will *not* be used wisely. An adult who puts an open razor in the hands of a baby has no doubt about the use the child will make of it. Such knowledge will direct the behavior of a normal person. Why not that of the scientist, then? Perhaps the rulers of *Erewhon* were not altogether wrong in prohibiting their inventors and men of science from making their discoveries known to the public.

Religion and the Arts

Painting as the Communication of Spirit

ROBERT P. ROTH

ART IS A MYSTERY which probes heights and depths beyond and deeper than the human venture itself.¹ For this reason Malraux called art man's protest against his fate, a brave, defiant attempt to say something that will live after he is gone. Certainly artistic creativity demonstrates one aspect of man's capacity to transcend himself, and therefore it exhibits at the same time the perils of a prideful *hybris* and the possibilities of a faithful service. There is a mysterious connection with Spirit that makes various definitions of art in terms of human enterprise inadequate, whether the definitions are formulated in psychological, sociological, or philosophical categories.

Art cannot be understood simply as the playful imitation of nature, nor the voluntaristic sublimation of basic biological urges, nor the esthetic sensitization of intellectual pleasure. Although all of these factors and more may be present in the motivation of any artist, ultimately they must be seen as instruments in the hands of whatever Spirit happens to be ruling over the age in question. If Aristotle could say that art is the therapeutic catharsis of the emotions of pity and fear, it was only because healing, in the sense of reconciliation, is a proper concern of the Spirit. Any statement of the meaning of art will therefore require an examination of the *cultures* in which the various art forms are produced as well as the *styles* which vie for ascendancy in any given culture, and both culture and style will have to be studied in terms of the religious Spirit which motivates them.

I. ART AND CULTURE

Long recognized as a fruitful index to the meaning of a culture, art is more basic than language itself to our understanding of ourselves, other

¹ The concern of this essay is primarily the visual art of painting, but the general principles set forth apply equally to all arts.

ROBERT PAUL ROTH, B.D., Ph.D., is Professor of New Testament Disciplines and Dean of the Graduate School at Lutheran Theological Southern Seminary, Columbia, South Carolina.

peoples and other ages. We have no extant literature nor any knowledge of the language used by the inhabitants of France and Spain 25,000 years ago, but the drawings they left in their caves reveal more clearly than books the hopes and fears, the matters of ultimate concern, of those ancient people.

Christianity, however, is concerned with art not only because both religion and art are aspects and indices of culture. Christianity affects the whole man as well as the totality of society. Hence the problem of Christianity and art is more than cultural relationship. Christianity is both a culture and the critic of culture, both the product of a cultural legacy and the judge of all cultures, not the least its own. We shall see that this peculiar eschatological thrust of the Christian gospel is the key to our understanding of the relationship between Christianity and art.

Cultures may be analyzed in terms of their reaction to Nature and the Spirit. Under the friendly Aegean skies the ancient Greeks sought a balance between the material substance of sensory experience and the spiritual stirrings within their souls. The word which best characterizes the height of Hellenic creativity is moderation (*sophrosune*), the proper equipoise between the Dionysian and the Apollonian phases of the Greek genius. Youthful ebullience is counterbalanced with the ideal of *mens sana in corpore sano*. The result is the search for perfect form. The idealization of natural forms arose concomitantly with the idolization of religious values. Indeed the idol of religious devotion was none other than the superman of esthetic pursuit. Greek statues and paintings had expressionless faces because they were not simple imitations of nature nor even representations. They were idealized types. The same is true in both architecture and drama. The temples were not copies of anything in nature, but they exhibit the balance, symmetry, and proportion which the Greek mind abstracted from nature. The masks and artificial devices used to augment the voices of the characters on stage rendered the actors utterly expressionless and made impossible the subtle nuances of voice inflection which are so important for modern drama. The Greek approached his art with a preconceived idea which he attempted to represent to the limit of perfection in his chosen medium. The idea of perfection stood at the apex of an architectonic hierarchy of rational values, making Greek esthetic achievement predominantly intellectual. Art became the material formation of an idea.

The affinity of Chinese and Japanese culture with classical Greece is remarkable. Here, too, worship of Nature with facile acceptance of the

benignity of the Father of Heaven produced the same placid serenity in art forms as did the nature gods of Mount Olympus. The principle of *Yang* and *Yin* with its balance of opposites (male and female, wet and dry, heaven and earth) served for the Orient as did the golden mean in the West. The demure Kwan Yin is simply the oriental version of Aphrodite. The formalized figures of a Japanese print, cool and tranquil under the ideal of *shibusu*, are as typical as the painted ceramics found in the ruins of a Minoan temple. Even the symbolic gestures and grotesque masks of a *Noh* drama are reminiscent of the stereotyped strophes and the grimacing faces of the Athenian amphitheatre.

When we turn to ancient Semitic culture, particularly that of the Hebrews, we find a marked contrast to the Nature worship and naturalism in art of Greeks and Orientals. The Hebrews viewed Nature as the creature of God. Instead of exalting the forces of Nature and divinizing them, the Hebrews extolled heaven and earth as the handiwork of the Creator Spirit. So fearful, however, were they of an idolatrous attachment to any created thing that they permitted themselves only symbolic, never representational, expression. When the Hebrew spoke esthetically of "dragons and all deeps, fire and hail, snow and frost" (Psalms 148:7-8), he did so only to declare his faith that all creatures fulfill the command of the Lord.

The difference between the Hebrew and the Hellenic spirit is illustrated by their contrasting use of language. For the Greeks, words defined and circumscribed ideas. In the same way the artist's medium could contain and formulate an idealized concept. For the Hebrew, words were windows which opened to reality and pierced the veil between one spirit and another. No surer grasp upon reality was available to the Hebrew than the glimpses afforded by fleeting words said or sung in a moment of faithful obedience. Any materialization through artistic media might falsely attempt to possess and control the hidden and unnamable God. This was not because matter was considered evil, but because as a created good it must not be identified with the Creator of all goods. The Hindu culture also exhibits an esthetic indigence because of a preoccupation with Spirit as over against Nature, but the Hindu subservience to Spirit was accompanied by a world-negating denial of the flesh, while the Hebrew release was sought in the apocalyptic longing for the courts of the Lord.

When Christianity entered upon the stage of history the glory that was Greece had already degenerated into the grandeur that was Rome. Gnostic fatigue with the frustrations of this world sought escape in mystic

excursions to the ineffable world of the empyrean. Christianity at first did not foster artistic endeavor but rather "fasted from art." Christian reluctance, however, was not because of ascetic or spiritual odium for the things of this world. The central message of the Christians, after all, was that the Word had become flesh in Jesus! Yet for several centuries no serious attempt at artistic creation was made.

Was this because art is concerned with the beautiful while the Christian message proclaimed the ugly cross? Contrast the graceful beauty of the humanized god of Phidias with the formless, uncomely, rejected, bruised, defeated figure prophesied in Isaiah and fulfilled on Golgotha! Yet of the few Greek paintings known to us the most famous is Timanthes' depiction of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, a copy of which remains sketched on the wall of a house in Pompeii. Certainly Greek painting was not incapable of seeing the beauty in sorrow and tragedy, but here the tragic face of Agamemnon is covered with his robe, not due to the inability of the artist or the medium to express tragic emotion, but because such horror would destroy the Greek sense of noble restraint. Perhaps a more profound interpretation of this restraint is that the Greek was ultimately unable to face the horror of human tragedy, a horror which is not avoided but accentuated in the figure of the cross. It is significant that the greatest Greek painting and the greatest among Christian paintings should both be concerned with the subject of sacrifice. Yet it is plain that Agamemnon's sacrifice is man's futile offering to God while the crucifixion is God's sorrow for man.

From the beginning, though their painting was halting, the Christians placarded before the world the ugly picture of the crucified Savior. From the scratches on the catacomb walls to the Isenheim altarpiece of Grünewald there has never been hesitation concerning the primary subject of Christian art. The reason for the Christian fast from art, however, must be found in the nature of the subject. The crucified Lord brings both judgment and mercy, death to the old world and life in the new. It was the eschatological judgment on the old that accounts for the slow development of a specifically Christian expression. The slaying of the old Adam in the classical world had to be done, the burial made, and the clearing of the debris completed before the new life could rise and produce the fruits of a fresh culture. And since Christian culture still remains in the flesh while at the same time being born anew in the Spirit, the process of judging and slaying the past must continue and be repeated in each moment of the present.

II. STYLES

Today it is not the subject that makes the difference in painting but variation in styles. Beginning with the emphasis upon background in the Italian Renaissance but especially with the humane affirmation of Brueghel, the choice of subjects for painters in the modern world became infinitely various. Landscapes, portraiture, genre painting, still life—everything from guitars to guillotines became objects of the painter's interest. But the shift from ostensibly religious subjects to the infinite variety of the secular world was not so profound a religious shift as the innovation of different styles. Turning from Da Vinci's *Last Supper* to Bonnard's *Breakfast Room* involves a religious difference in subject, but it is only a movement from consideration of the second article of the creed to the first. One is not less religious when he thanks God for his daily bread than when he proclaims the Lord's death in the Eucharist, and indeed both are as ineluctably related as the petals of a rose. But mere choice of subject will not reveal whether the artist's concern is reverence for the creature represented or for the Creator whose grace makes possible not only the creature but the artist and viewer as well. Here style becomes the revelatory factor.

The humanist return to classical forms, departing from medieval distortions, has often been described as an improvement in technique. Certainly improvements were made in the skills of painting until finally photography rendered nugatory such endeavors at realistic representation. But why was the attempt made in the first place? The shift from the stilted, twisted figures of the medieval painters to the realistic, anatomically perfect forms of the Renaissance was a change in ultimate religious concern from otherworldliness to this-worldliness.

Since this major transfer of religious concern with its consequent change in style, another shift has been made which is equally significant. Here the great watershed is Cézanne, who stopped representing reality and started radically to reconstruct it. The result has been more stylistic innovations until at present the world of painting has become so complex that it almost defies analysis. Classical, romantic, impressionistic, futuristic, cubistic, surrealist, particularistic, abstract, organic, inorganic, idyllic, monumental, prophetic, propagandistic—these are some of the adjectives given to the many styles that have evolved.

Examination of styles and schools of painting may fruitfully reveal their relation to the existing philosophical theories of epistemology, assuming

that art is basically communication. According to such analysis the various styles may be classified as realism, impressionism, surrealism, and expressionism. It should not be assumed that the epistemological analysis will provide a complete understanding of the meaning of art. It offers only a key to the differing styles, and, as we shall see later, only a superficial one. For example, Picasso has used his medium for prophetic purposes of moral protest and propaganda with styles ranging from realism to surrealism, impressionism to expressionism.

Coupled with the classical revival the realistic style recovered the simple Aristotelian correspondence theory of knowledge. Ideas are true to the degree that they correspond to their sensory images. Reality is thus a substance of this world and painting is true to the degree that it corresponds realistically to it. When the rules of the Academies became so fixed that painting became dull, the spirit of judgment and renewal acted against realism and modified it into impressionism. Basically impressionism is not different from realism except that it seeks to capture a moment and a mood of reality rather than some timeless and formal truth. Monet, Pissarro, and Renoir thus freely experimented with light and color in a way which contrasted sharply with the tonal banalities of the Academies. The epistemology of the impressionists is empiricism. Each impact of the manifold world of the senses is a bit of reality which deserves to be recorded in both its pristine purity and in its provocative relation with its immediate neighbors.

Both realism and impressionism are this-worldly and life-affirming. Although the former is more concerned with universals and the latter with particulars, both are fundamentally humanistic. Surrealism and expressionism, however, are otherworldly and life-denying. Mysticism is the way of knowing for the surrealists. Immediate insight into the subconscious is claimed as the source of all that is valuable in art. The limp watches of Dali are "irrational, impossible, fantastic, paradoxical, disquieting, baffling, alarming, hypnogogic, nonsensical, and mad—but to the surrealist these adjectives are the highest praise."² Another characteristic of the mystical style is symbolism. From Ryder and Rousseau to Dali and Miro familiar objects are used only as suggestive symbols to lead the viewer into the world of fantasy, mystery, and magic. The expressionists, on the other hand, while just as gingerly with the things of this world, are far more comprehensible in their irrationalism. Existentialist theory

² Barr, Alfred H., Jr., *What Is Modern Painting?* New York, 1943, p. 32

of knowledge explains the style of the expressionists. No attempt is made to copy a preconceived form. Unlike the Greeks who sought to communicate a system of rational truth, the expressionists, whether they be cubists, futurists, Fauvists, or the earlier experimenters like Van Gogh and Gauguin, have simply tried to convey on canvas in color and shape what is in their inmost souls.

The acids of modernity have eaten deeply into the souls of these disillusioned sophisticates, and weary with this world they have set out to construct a new world of their own. Some, like Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning, have constructed an antinomian world of drips and blobs. Others, like Piet Mondrian and Mark Rothko, have shown their revulsion against the disorder of the given world by designing a world of pure and simple geometric forms. Both exhibit a recrudescence of ancient gnosticism, antinomian and legalistic, a fevered and faithless attempt to escape fear and frustration in this world.⁸ Yet all these wild expressions proclaim, more eloquently than realism ever could, the basic Christian truth that the world is shattered and shorn of the image in which it was made. Not willing to accept the world that is given to them, yet too honest to claim an essential verity behind all existence, these painters "let the canvas speak to them." The result is the shocking positivism of the human spirit that wrestles not against flesh and blood but against principalities and powers!

III. TOWARD A CHRISTIAN CRITIQUE OF PAINTING

How is it possible to choose between various styles? Can one be said to be better or truer than another? A work of art may be judged in terms of its integrity: has the artist honestly accomplished what he intended to do? or in terms of skill in execution: has he successfully handled his medium in the pursuit of his purpose? But these are questions which may be asked only within a given style. It appears no more possible to choose between styles than to choose between philosophies. Ultimately each rests upon a metaphysical root metaphor. Some prefer to look upon the world as an idea, and therefore everything in it is reduced to a formalized concept with art as its faithful representation. Clarity and adequacy then become the chief criteria of judgment. Others see reality in terms of the sense image. Purity and relationship become the critical concern. The mystics exult in their beatific vision because they find reality in the obscure. The expressionists thrash and wrestle with existence because they cannot accept what they

⁸ Cf. Roth, Robert P., "Christ and the Muses," *Christianity Today*, vol. 2, 11 (1958), p. 9.

see but are unable to create an adequate reality for themselves. But when we are asked to choose between metaphysical metaphors, all we can say is *chacun à son goût*. Indeed we may well wonder why it should be necessary to choose between Giotto and Van Gogh, Botticelli and Rouault, Gauguin and Klee. Each in his own way pierces the veil of truth and awakens in the viewer new life.

Regardless of philosophical orientation, a painting may be said descriptively to be a vehicle of communication. Whether the artist sets out to say something or not, his product serves to speak to people in such a way as to move them. Christianly speaking we may ask if a painting communicates not just God, but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and consequently does it move us by the Spirit to say, "Abba, Father!" We can ask this question as Christians because everything we have in the world is given by God and hence everything must serve to glorify Him. Peter Blume's *The Eternal City*, which was at first received with critical disgust, conveys in stark realism the strident cadences of an Old Testament prophet as it blatantly shouts the judgment of God upon a city of sin. Who can say that the Spirit did not speak through this prophet? The tragic, bewildered face of Van Gogh with its mysterious bandage around his tortured ear earnestly but pungently asks the meaning of existence and leads us on our first step to repentance. And more clearly and profoundly Rouault says all these things—judgment, repentance, and the infinite plus of mercy—in his *Christ Mocked by Soldiers*.

The criterion is the relevance of the work of art to the Christian message in all its eschatological and redemptive force. The sentimental shepherds of Hoffmann, the calendar art of Coleman, and the many "beauty parlor Christs" that are pushed by the publishing houses of the churches must not even be taken seriously as either art or Gospel, except that they are so popular and powerful in shaping the faith of undiscerning people. These romantic projections of maudlin sentimentality with all their attention to religious subject and all their pious persuasiveness can no more move us to the God of the Gospel than Maxfield Parrish's *September Morn*.

The Christian message concerns creation, the image of God, the fall, redemption, and the coming new life. These will be the categories of criticism. The nature of the God of this message is both hidden and revealed. This will make a difference in the way the artist handles his medium. His aim will not be obvious imitation nor even careful and detailed representation, but rather the suggestiveness and symbolism of revelation. His art will never directly communicate any more than the flesh of Jesus directly

communicated the fact of his Messiahship. Painting, like the Word itself, will be mediated immediacy, always pointing to the reality and leading to the faithful breakthrough but never robbing the viewer of the responsibility of his own contribution to the revelation.⁴

The creature is understood to be the glorious handiwork of God. None of this original goodness is lost, yet the whole image is turned upside down and no relic of purity remains. The whole creature is corrupted so that the world itself groans as in travail. Hence the artist must portray the pride, the lust, the greed which torment this world, and this will exhibit the quality of God's judgment. There must be restraint in the art work just as the law restrains and keeps order, but there must also be prophetic protest and exposure as the law leads us to a knowledge of our sin.

There will be the paradox of the perfection of imperfection, the restraint of the unfinished statement, and this will be true both because of the terrible turbulence of sin in the world and because of the yet-to-be-fulfilled wonder of salvation.

The great mystery the artist can and must proclaim is not that man and earth can reach to God and heaven by the manipulation of a material medium, but rather that God has come down to earth, that the divine can be declared through the colors of clay! This will be difficult—for both artist and viewer. But why should art be easy? A painting too easy to understand wears thin. It must have the mystery of new surprises each time it is viewed. Van Gogh sharply retorted to Gauguin when Gauguin charged him with painting too fast, "You look too fast!"

The artistic statement will furthermore exhibit the quality of grace in all its splendor of freedom and renewal. The grace of redemption and new life will find expression in art insofar as the piece shows surprise and risk and newness and even humor. Forgiveness is the gift of the ability to laugh at oneself. The comic relief of the grotesque gargoyles on the roof gutters of the Gothic cathedrals marvelously serves this function of holy humor as they laughingly proclaim that even the demons of hell must serve Christ. And what is so healing, what is so refreshing, as laughter over the incongruous, especially when it is the merriment of Michael and all angels rejoicing over a sinner that has been saved? Grace requires risk and surprise because it is free. This insures a future in art which will be constantly changing, bringing into play ever new and fresh experiments.

Painting must therefore be exciting without being bizarre, and also

⁴ "A picture lives its life like a living creature, undergoing the changes that daily life imposes upon us. That is natural, since a picture lives only through him who looks at it."—Pablo Picasso.

relevant without being banal. It must have all the adventure, the reach, the penetration of romance with none of the egoism and sentimentality. It must have all the protest and introspection of existentialism with none of the cynical despair and acceptance. It must have all the mystery and suggestiveness which points beyond the obvious but none of the obscurantism and mystical identity of the surrealists. Christianity will demand of art, as it does of culture and its own self, the judgment and grace of the Spirit, for it is truly a fruit of Spirit as it is used to communicate salvation.

Commentary

Readers will recall that the Summer Issue, 1960, of *RELIGION IN LIFE* was devoted to Edinburgh, 1910. In that issue Dr. J. H. Oldham pointed out (p. 334) that at that Conference, Bishop Charles E. Brent first indicated in a public statement his intention to take steps to organize what in fact shortly afterwards became The Faith and Order Movement. In the same issue, Dr. W. R. Hogg presented (p. 349, esp. note 10) some of the difficulties inherent in accepting this frequently made assertion. The response of Dr. Oldham to Dr. Hogg on this question is printed here, with the permission of both, to serve the needs and interests of present and future historians of the ecumenical movement.

MY DEAR RICHEY HOGG:

You are quite right about the lack of correspondence between my recollection and the record. But there is probably a fairly simple explanation.

The Edinburgh Conference was very well organized, since I had at my disposal the most competent help. I had as my assistant Kenneth MacLennan, whose efficiency as an organizer is guaranteed by the fact that six years later, during the first world war, his services were requisitioned by the Ministry of Munitions, in which he became head of the guns contract department, i.e., was responsible for the supply of all the guns required by the British armies. Also at the Conference itself we had as ushers some of the most brilliant of the younger generation, as you note in your article.

But we were not equipped even to begin to cope with the task of making verbatim shorthand records of the hundreds of seven-minute speeches. The results were both meagre and unequal. In regard to any particular speech the notes depended on who happened to be on the job at the time. Also, as you know, even a first-rate stenographer—so far as I recollect we had only one who would come into that category—can be a good deal at sea in regard to theological and technical matters that lie outside the range of his or her own experience.

Moreover, although I was responsible for editing the Reports and laid down the general lines, the strain of the Conference proved to be too much for me and I had to take a fortnight's rest. The work had to be put through in a great rush and most of the editing was done by assistants in my absence. Even if I had been on the spot and noticed the omission, it might have been difficult to remedy it, if no notes, or only inadequate notes, were available.

I know the extraordinary tricks which memory can play on people in these matters, and also that my own memory is less retentive and reliable

than that of many people. But I reply not only on a fairly clear recollection of Bishop Brent making the same point as Wardlaw Thompson (whom you quote), only more fully and forcibly, but still more on the fact that in the months that followed Edinburgh I was certainly aware of his intentions. During those months my central concern was to think out what sort of organization the Continuation Committee was, on what lines it should develop and how it fitted into the total context. I found myself continually asking the question: What is Brent going to do and how? and I recall my mind being set at rest when the news came. I was certainly fully aware of his intentions. Conceivably he may have communicated these to me in private conversation or in a small informal group. But I have no recollection of such an occasion, and am fairly confident that his intention was announced in a speech in the conference.

It so happens that my interest in this small incident has been further stimulated by an illustration of the difficulty of establishing matters of fact even within the period of living memory given in the recent *Life of Lord Haldane of Cloan* which I have just (only yesterday) finished reading. Haldane, whom I used to hear a great deal about in my younger days, was Secretary of State for War in the Liberal Government from 1905-12. He carried through the most fundamental reforms in the British Army that have ever been effected. This included plans for sending an expeditionary force to the Continent and the creation of a Territorial Army for home defense. It is widely recognized that but for these reforms and the quality of the preparations made Paris would probably have fallen in 1914 and an early victory might have been achieved by Germany. Yet when war broke out such was the hysteria that Haldane was hounded from office as a pro-German, simply because he knew Germany well and had worked hard for peace simultaneously with putting his country in a greater state of readiness for war than she had ever been, if the efforts for peace should prove unsuccessful.

In Duff Cooper's two volume *Life of Lord Haig*, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, which I read some years ago, there is recorded an incident which appears to me one of singular beauty and which I have often related to my friends. On the day of the Victory Parade in London in July, 1918, Haig was ill with a high temperature and could hardly sit on a horse. But Foch, Pershing and other allied Commanders were there, and Haig felt that for him to be absent would be to let down the British Army, so he determined to go through with things. The end of the Parade came, but Haig, before going home to bed, had one other duty yet to perform.

Haldane, though he had laid the foundations of victory, as the leading soldiers knew—Haig in particular had worked with him at the War Office when he was carrying through his reforms—had been given no place or recognition. Haig, before ending his day, paid a call on Haldane. He said he could not stay, but that he wanted to leave a book with him—a copy of his war dispatches. It was only after he had gone that Haldane found that the volume bore the inscription “To the greatest Secretary for War England has ever had.”

I find this a most moving story of considerateness and loyalty. But it now appears that the thing could not have happened precisely in the way that Haig’s official biographer describes. That the volume was presented to Haldane is certain, since it is now in the Scottish National Library bearing the inscription in Haig’s writing. But there is apparently conclusive evidence that it could not have been presented in July since the book was not printed till some months later. Also the inscription is signed by Haig as a peer, and he did not receive his peerage till *after* the Victory Parade.

On the question of whether Haig paid a visit to Haldane on the night of the Victory Parade, there is on *both* sides what, if it stood alone, would be accepted as unimpeachable and decisive evidence, i.e., that he *did* and that he did *not* make such a visit.

It seems to me a conceivable possibility—though Haldane’s biographer, who has explored every possible source of information, does not mention it, and there may be something that rules it out—that Haig presented to Haldane in July a typescript and replaced it later with a printed copy bearing the same inscription. We shall probably never know precisely what took place.

Similarly, there will probably never be certainty about what Bishop Brent said at Edinburgh. I think that I know and that there is an adequate explanation of the absence of supporting evidence. But from the historian’s point of view allowance has to be made for the unreliability of individual memory. . . .

Ever yours,

J. H. OLDHAM

Guestling, Sussex, England

Book Reviews and Notices

Science, Technology and the Christian. By C. A. COULSON. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 111 pp. \$2.50.

Dr. C. A. Coulson, the author of this challenging little book, is a well-known physicist, mathematician and professor at Oxford. Though he addresses a British audience (the book first appeared in England), Professor Coulson's statements speak directly to the issues which are being discussed inside and outside the church in America. After having heard the elaborations of so many theologians on the subjects of "science and faith," "the demonic dangers of technology," "the implications of automation," "the population explosion" and "the peaceful use of atomic power" the reader will find it refreshing to follow the unsentimental and logical presentation of a scientist who, as a Christian, is at least as concerned about these questions as the theologian. The dust jacket of the book states that the book is helpful "for the Christian who wants to know just how science and technology affect him" and speaks to him "who seeks to apply Christian principles to world problems." Fortunately, this is not what the book does. The strength of the book is that it does not speak only to Christians and that it is not based on the application of "Christian principles" to world problems.

After a helpful distinction between science and technology, the author develops his basic thesis dealing with the rapid changes caused by the "second industrial revolution." This is done in comparison with the first industrial revolution. Interesting historical observations and statistical data clarify the points. We live in a time when technology can no longer be treated with suspicion. The industrial developments of the last decades are not only irreversible, rather the Western man, particularly the Christian, must see in them a great task, even a "Christian vocation." "There could scarcely be a finer vocation than to see that as the second industrial revolution comes, it comes supported and interpreted by the best spiritual insights that we have. This is true missionary activity, whether or not it boasts that official title." (p. 104) "It may even be that the coming of the second industrial revolution to India in the next fifty years represents our last great opportunity, humanly speaking, for the evangelization of that huge country."

Without attempting to give easy answers to the problems of population expansion and food supply for the world, Professor Coulson does not neglect the discussion of these questions. The reader may sense a strong challenge to think more deeply and objectively about the enormous differences between the Western world and the young nations in Africa and Asia. We will find words of warning not to panic, for there is some hope in the unifying and international nature of science, already realized by the scientists themselves ("fraternity of scientists"). It is the new task of education to inform the "masses" about the strength, danger and beauty of science and technology. "Technology belongs to the masses: let us build on this" (p. 100). The scientist, in turn, must receive confidence from the nonscientist, particularly from the Christian, who must help him to place his concern "in its proper context—which is nothing other than the Kingdom of God" (p. 45).

One may ask precisely what the author has in mind when he repeatedly uses the phrase "the shaping of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth." Apparently it is used to indicate the task and destiny of the Christians and of man in general. The reviewer

takes it to be the outcome of what the author calls "the great Christian doctrine of creation." With this he expresses his basic theological belief that "the Atomic Age is part of God's world." This condemnation of the separation of faith and politics or economics is sound and should put many a theologian to shame. Two negative remarks about Nehru and Gandhi and some other remarks, however, seem to indicate that the author is ultimately of the opinion that God's work can only be carried out by Christians or those influenced by Christians. This does not seem quite consistent with the author's theological starting point, though it is admittedly a controversial issue. Finally, it could be asked why this highly qualified author has not dealt with the question of disarmament.

This book is highly to be recommended for Christians and non-Christians, ministers and students alike.

DIETRICH RITSCHL

Associate Professor of History of Dogma, The Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Austin, Texas.

Protestant Thought and Natural Science. By JOHN DILLENBERGER. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960. 310 pp. \$4.50.

This book was written in the hope that a knowledge of the historic movements between Protestant thought and the major scientific advances of the past may furnish a background for present-day theology.

There are two sections. The first (ca. 250 pages) is designed to be historical; i.e., to describe events of the past, as Protestant thinkers absorbed scientific ideas and scientists re-evaluated the faith as each new idea was presented. The second part (ca. 40 pages) "represents new directions in theology and science."

The disparity in length is understandable, for there is much to describe in the past and very little to point toward in the author's view of the present. The Introduction states that the real problem "underlying all the issues is the relative authority and interpretation of Nature and Scripture in theological matters." With so narrow an understanding of Protestantism, how far can one get in such a study as this? The range of the Protestant mind cannot be set down to these limits, although the men chosen by the author to represent modern Protestantism are bound to an unique sense of Scripture.

The book is seriously hampered as history because of this narrowness. But it was written when Professor Dillenberger was on leave from a theological faculty and on a grant from the American Association of Theological Schools. It is thus, in a sense, a "tract." The Protestant thinkers are shown defending the "faith" against the inroads of Copernican, Newtonian, Darwinian theories of causality and continuity in the world. It is a systematic survey within its limits and shows adequate knowledge of scientific evaluation as such, if not of the seriousness of the impact.

But this reviewer finds no new approach, nor any new touch on the already known. The real point of the book remains what the title states. Yet its character is historical in so large a measure that little is left for the final section. And in this it leads only to Barth, Bultmann and Tillich! Little or no mention is made of Maurice, Raven, Carlson, Cadoux, Bowne, Fiske, Brightman, Rufus Jones, Hocking, Inge and others in whom there has been some hope of coherence in the philosophy and experience of these great areas of life.

On pp. 766ff., in the discussion of Professor Bultmann, Dr. Dillenberger comes

closest to giving a clue for advance. In saying that Bultmann "has fully accepted the significance of the impact of modern science" (p. 266) he does not quite understand what is said, for on p. 267 he writes that (for Bultmann) "all conceptions of the world must be abandoned" and "Bultmann has clearly articulated that it is God who addresses man." Now clearly this is continued confusion, and not in this type of unresolved affirmations can advance be made. As with Bultmann, so with Tillich and Barth, the end is not in sight. We must labor longer for the healing formulae which will make our world one again.

The book is like a vestibule to a church or conference hall. It lets you know you are in the right place but not in the area of importance. There are echoes of distant voices and they seem important—but you only hear the little syllables of secretaries and ushers. The doors into the room of main enquiry never open.

The mighty cry for creativity in theological thought to answer the superb insights of science is but faintly heard, and the old theological clichés are all assumed to be true while the world view of science is only a matter of passing interest. This attitude cannot even be the launching pad for theology's new journeys.

EDWIN P. BOOTH

Professor of Historical Theology, Boston University School of Theology,
Boston 15, Massachusetts.

Christianity and the Scientist. By IAN G. BARBOUR. New York: Association Press, 1960. 128 pp. \$2.50.

After receiving his Ph.D. in physics, Ian Barbour graduated from the Divinity School at Yale University. He is a fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education and a member of the faculty at Carleton College where he teaches courses in both physics and religion. He is therefore exceptionally qualified to deal with the subject of his recent book, *Christianity and the Scientist*.

His book deals with a pertinent and timely subject since the relevance of religion and science to the sobering crisis of humanity is being rethought now with new earnestness by prominent thinkers and the fate of humanity is so vitally involved. But the book is directed not to mankind in general but to scientists who would also be Christian individuals.

The aim of the author is to suggest means by which such persons may achieve a synthesis of understanding, of feeling, of action out of what seems to many in these fields to be conflicting methods, principles and ideals. The aim of the book is to clear up confusion, strengthen faith and scientific competence, and enable benefited individuals to be of maximum value to themselves, their society and God.

In pursuing this purpose the author deals with six major topics: the vocation of the scientist, applied science and human welfare, scientific research and the pursuit of truth, the science teacher and the student, science and the social order, and the scientist as a person. His treatment reveals an understanding of science, of religious challenge and commitment, of the social and political context in which the tension and conflict express themselves in public life, of philosophical and scientific principles which on the surface seem to be in conflict but which careful reflective thought is able to resolve coherently and creatively. One of these, treated several times in different contexts in the book, is the error of imposing the categories of the natural sciences on all human behavior and human history.

The author's exposition is brief, clear, comprehensive, penetrating, highly

competent and interesting. It is a good presentation for those who have been initiated into these considerations and already possess mature understanding. It is especially valuable to those scientists who have not taken opportunity to reflect carefully on philosophy and religion. It will be helpful to those persons who are searching for a solution to their own conflicts as they seek, with understanding, to commit themselves to both science and the Christian life. I can think of no one who would not benefit from reading it—even though he himself is not a scientist; for science and religion today are powers affecting and shaping the life of all humanity.

WILLIAM E. KERSTETTER

President, Simpson College, Indianola, Iowa.

Radical Monotheism and Western Culture. By H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 144 pp. \$2.75.

Radical Monotheism and Western Culture is based upon the Montgomery Lectures on Contemporary Civilization which Professor H. Richard Niebuhr gave at the University of Nebraska in 1947. The three lectures in the original series have been expanded into six chapters, and to them have been added four supplementary essays which are closely related to the theme developed in the lectures.

Professor Niebuhr's purpose in this volume is to provide a theological analysis of contemporary culture by means of an examination of the conflict of faiths in which the whole of our culture is involved. Defining faith as "dependence on a value-center and as loyalty to a cause" (p. 24), he finds that the human necessity for faith is apparently universal and that gods, understood not as supernatural beings but as centers of value and as objects of devotion, are inescapable. Atheism in the sense of a life lived without confidence in some center of value and without loyalty to some cause is an impossibility. Ironically, despite the fact that Western culture has long been officially monotheistic, genuine monotheism—i.e., trust in the One beyond all the many as the one source of value and absolute loyalty to this One—is exceedingly rare. Indeed, such radical faith in the one God is found among men "as a hope and a goal more than as achievement" (p. 63). Wherever it is found, it is constantly in conflict with two other forms of faith which are always dominant in culture, viz., henotheism (in which society is made the value-center and object of loyalty) and polytheism (in which there are many centers of value and many gods). Yet such monotheism is not only a possibility and a hope; it is also an actuality, however partial and fleeting its realization may be, both in individuals and in society.

It is difficult to describe such radical monotheism formally or abstractly since it becomes incarnate only as it is "embodied and expressed in the concreteness of communal and personal, of religious and moral existence" (p. 32). However, one may say that such faith makes no distinction between the principle of value and the principle of being. Such faith depends absolutely for the worth of the self upon the same principle by which the self exists; and, since the latter is the same principle by which all things exist, radical monotheism ascribes value to all things. Moreover, the counterpart of faith in the value and essential goodness of all existent things is universal loyalty. In a word, the two great mottoes of radical monotheism are: "I am the Lord thy God; thou shalt have no other gods before me" and "Whatever is, is good."

The starting point of radical faith in God is, according to Niebuhr, the faith of the believing man, not some theory about being (ontology) which prepares the way for faith. Yet reason and faith are closely related. Reasoning is always present in

faith, and it is the task of theology to clarify and criticize this reasoning. But the faith that is given to believing man—not some creed or ontology or theology, however valuable these may be—provides the primary datum for the theologian.

Professor Niebuhr has selected three areas of Western culture for analysis—viz., Western religion, the political community (especially American democracy), and Western science. His discussions of these themes are incisive and extremely illuminating. The whole volume may be viewed as a further development of the theme with which Dr. Niebuhr was concerned in his earlier *Christ and Culture*. The latter has been widely hailed as "the one outstanding book in the field of basic Christian social ethics"; *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* is of the same high quality.

Since the supplementary essays which are included in this volume have for the most part appeared elsewhere, only their titles will be noted here: "Theology in the University" (formerly entitled "Theology—Not Queen But Servant"), "The Center of Value," "Faith in Gods and in God" (formerly entitled "The Nature and Existence of God"), and "Science in Conflict With Morality?" Readers who are familiar with any of these writings will readily recognize that they represent a rich addition to the original set of lectures, and they will likewise be grateful that these essays are made so readily available in this volume.

E. CLINTON GARDNER

Associate Professor of Christian Social Ethics,
Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta 22, Georgia.

Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann. By GIOVANNI MIEGGE.

Translated by Bishop Stephen Neill. Richmond: John Knox Press (London: Lutterworth Press), 1960. viii-152 pp. \$4.00.

The Professor of Church History (and formerly also of biblical exegesis) at the Waldensian Seminary in Rome, and his translator, have performed a welcome service to English-reading theologians by presenting here a comprehensive and mainly sympathetic treatment of the whole sweep of Bultmann's theological lifework. The title would lead one to expect that the book deals only or mainly with the demythologizing phase since 1941; the introduction, the culminating third chapter, the twelve pages of conclusion, and the appendix on Roman Catholic criticism of Bultmann do just that. But Chapters I and II, about two-thirds of the book, range out into his total theological production from 1921 to the present, and show that it is a consistent whole in which his dramatic demythologizing essay was a natural episode which should have surprised no one who knew his previous work. Even to those who know Bultmann well but have difficulty in relating the parts of his work to the whole, this book will be useful; and all the more so to those who need an introduction to his thought.

Not quite "everything that Professor Bultmann has ever written" (p. vii) is worked into these chapters, not even all his major works. His massive contributions to Kittel's *Wörterbuch* (around 200 folio pages) are not mentioned, nor are his many articles in journals (except those reprinted in the two volumes of *Essays*), nor is his extensive editorial work (*FRLANT*, *Theologische Rundschau*, etc.). Nevertheless this thoughtful and appreciative treatment of Bultmann's representative exegetical and systematic works is the outstanding contribution of this book.

The author, however, undoubtedly considered Chapter III to be his major contribution. While no one who had so sympathetically understood what Bultmann

is after, as Miegge had done in Chapters I and II, could flatly reject Bultmann's results, still this chapter is largely adverse criticism of his demythologizing. Miegge's greatest difficulty is to admit that there is anything *basically* mythological in the New Testament—mythological *elements*, yes, but mythology at the heart of any of its central formulations, no! This denial seems to rest upon two things.

(a) Miegge has not entirely succeeded in freeing himself of one of the popular connotations of myth—viz., "that which is untrue." Thus he says (p. 101), "... the kerygma is not mythological, because it is the proclamation of a divine action which really occurred." In the original Italian (p. 120), "... il kerygma" (which he later exemplifies with "The word became flesh") "non è *mitico*, perché è l'annuncio di un'azione divina *reale*." That is, the *mitico* and the *reale*, the mythical and the actual occurrence, exclude each other. But the mythical is often the believer's inner appropriation of an actual occurrence, the occurrence in its significance *to him*! So "Jesus of Nazareth was born" expresses an actual occurrence; but "the word (a hypostasis of a divine activity—*credendum*, *non videndum*) became flesh" expresses the same actual occurrence in mythological language as what really occurred to him, the believer: a divine event. Miegge's vestigial captivity to this same connotation turns up again (p. 120) when he insists that the biblical "myths" are not *puri miti* ("myths which are nothing but myths"). When is a myth purely mythical (to Miegge)? Presumably when it is completely untrue. Was there ever a *religious* myth that was "nothing but a myth," i.e., that did not point beyond itself? (By "religious" I mean to exclude the entertainment-myths which belong to the decay of a religion, the adulteries of Zeus for instance.)

(b) The other basis for Miegge's inability to discover genuine mythology in the New Testament is his too great dependence upon Stählin's article, *μῦθος*, in Kittel's *Wörterbuch*. One can share Miegge's echo of Brunner's high estimate of Kittel's *Wörterbuch*—"the most important (exegetical) enterprise undertaken in our generation" (p. 106)—and yet recognize that there are inevitably many glaring contradictions between pairs of articles in this vast collection of *signed* articles; they must always be critically weighed against each other. The main body of Stählin's article (Vol. IV, pp. 769-798) fulfills the task set him: to work out the implications of the word *μῦθος* in the New Testament. He rightly concludes that the conscious and, so to say, official attitude of the New Testament writers toward all myth is flatly to reject it. But Stählin adds an appendix (pp. 798-803) directed against Wrede-Bousset-Reitzenstein and especially Bultmann, in which he maintains that this rejection of consciously recognized myth also applies unconditionally to all the phenomena of the New Testament which its writers themselves did not label "myth" and did not recognize as myth; ergo, it is not myth. He fails to consider that "myth" used pejoratively always has in view the formulations of belief by those who believe otherwise than I, never my own belief and my formulations; yet I may myself be unwittingly deeply involved in myth.

Under these two impediments (a and b, above) Miegge comes to the rather surprising conclusion (p. 120) that Bultmann is not really demythologizing but only demonstrating that the so-called New Testament myths "are not really myths and basically never have been myths." So there is nothing to demythologize! After taking Bultmann so seriously in the first two chapters, he now ridicules his undertaking: "all this hullabaloo (*tutto questo rumore*) of academic controversy," he asks, "is it not a bit excessive?" The five volumes of *Kerygma und Mythos* are evidence enough that there is more than one answer to this rhetorical question.

Bishop Neill is a master translator so far as producing a smooth, readable English text is concerned, but the smoothness is purchased at the sacrifice of some of the forthrightness and subtlety of the original. The translator's favorite rendering for *Entmythologisieren* and cognates is "elimination of the mythological," while the Italian text either retains the German or respells it as Italian. This "elimination of the mythological" frustrates understanding from the outset, for it misinterprets Bultmann's intent: his intent, successful or not, is to unlock mythology from within, not to eliminate it. Miegge's ingenuity with the formidable terminology of existentialism is astonishing: he uses three different adjectives, (1) *esistenzialistico* (pertaining to the whole enterprise of the existentialists), (2) *esistenziale* (for German *existentieller*), and (3) *esistentivo* with adverb *esistentivamente* (both for German *existentiell*). The English translation uses only "existential" for both (1) and (2) and, for (3), only paraphrases that are not easily recognizable as a recurring technical term. The Italian even has an equivalent for *Dasein* (the despair of English translators): *esserci*. Heidegger's *das man* is represented less felicitously, by *Puomo qualunque*.

The translator does not hesitate to add linking sentences at transitions, often to great advantage. Since there seems to be no assignable reason for omitting eleven lines of main text from p. 48, that must be due to mere oversight or an accident to the manuscript, for there is no effort at condensation. Quite the contrary. It is common observation that between any two languages the translation, if adequate, will run longer than the original. Allowing for the different amount of type per page, this translation runs about 35 per cent longer than its original—commendably. We are in the translator's debt for having made available in English this significant book.

KENDRICK GROBEL

Professor of New Testament, Vanderbilt Divinity School,
Nashville, Tennessee.

Religions of the East. By JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960. 319 pp. \$4.50.

Modern Trends in World Religions. Edited by JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA and D. T. SUZUKI. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1959. xv-286 pp. \$3.50.

One of the most brilliant and energetic young scholars in the field of the study of religions is Professor Joseph M. Kitagawa of the University of Chicago. Already internationally known and respected for his scholarship, he is dedicated to reviving in colleges and universities in America instruction and research in the religions of mankind. Both volumes listed above are significant contributions toward this end.

Religions of the East is an innovation in textbooks on "comparative" religions. Its newness becomes apparent only after careful study of its contents and the rationale of its organization. A quick perusal of the table of contents and the subtitles of the chapters will suggest the data and organization of a typical textbook in this field. And the reader will find here an outline of the major beliefs and practices of each system of religion discussed and an account of the historical setting in which the religion arose with distinctive identity as a separate system. What is new is Professor Kitagawa's thesis that additional if not deeper insights into each system can be gained through a study of the sociology of that religion. It will be noted that, following his teacher, Joachim Wach, Kitagawa distinguishes sociology of religion as a discipline

of research from the sociology which a given religion manifests. Each of the religions of the East considered in this book is seen to have a specific, identifiable societal structure which may justifiably be called "the sacred community." Just as Christians speak of the Church in its corporate sense as "the body of believers" or as "the Body of Christ," so each of the religions of the East has its sacred "body" or "society." And the doctrine of or belief about this sacred community is another among the tenets of a system of beliefs which is interactive with the living community itself.

In the case of Chinese religion Professor Kitagawa finds the family to be the holy community; in Buddhism it is the Samgha (Sangha) which serves the function of a community of believers, not only for the believing monks but also for the believing laymen whose conscious and unconscious relation to the local and universal Samgha Kitagawa describes with extraordinary perception; in Islam, "the congregation of God" is the *Ummah*. For this reviewer, Kitagawa has succeeded, by means of his approach to these religions through their "sacred societies," in depicting the "wholeness" with which Eastern minds perceive and understand their experience and what we might call ultimate reality itself. Without question, he has demonstrated the insufficiency of those approaches which are concerned with merely the concepts of the religion and/or its rituals. Apart from the cult or folk element of a religion the concepts and rituals do not exist.

The book will commend itself to any college-level reader and will serve admirably as an introductory text in college and university courses in this area. It should also be found listed as collateral reading on the bibliographies for history and political science courses. Some local churches have already begun to use it in the "lay institute" courses.

Modern Trends in World Religions consists of the papers presented at the Paul Carus Memorial Symposium. Professor Kitagawa served indefatigably as the chairman of that exciting, oftentimes tense colloquy on the response of the religions to modernity. In addition to members of the Carus family there were some twenty formal participants representing the major religions in today's world and the several continents. Formal papers presented and included in this volume were prepared by Muhsin Mahdi, Charles Adams, Ellis Rivkin, Winston L. King, Karlfried Von Durckheim, Amiya Chakravarty, Wing-tsit Chan, Robert H. L. Slater, and Daisetz T. Suzuki. Out of the experience of this symposium grew the desire of the American scholars present to have a formal channel of communication for researches in the history of religions. Again, the scholarly and practical judgment of Professor Kitagawa served the concerns of the group and the interests of the discipline of the scholarly study of religions. Through his intercession with the Committee on History of Religions of the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Society for the Study of Religions was created. While he has only a preface as his formal contribution to *Modern Trends*, the selection of authors and the subjects to which they addressed themselves bear his identifying mark.

Because of the diversity of background and subject matter, the chapters of this book are not equally readable. But not a single chapter should have been left out. And each is a helpful tool to the student and teacher trying to keep up to date on the religions of living peoples.

EDMUND PERRY

Associate Professor of History and Literature of Religion,
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

Soul and Psyche. By VICTOR WHITE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 312 pp. \$5.00.

The late Father White was a Roman Catholic professor of theology at Oxford, a founder of the C. G. Jung Institute of Analytical Psychology at Zurich, author of *God and the Unconscious* and *God the Unknown*. His present work is "an enquiry into the relationship of psychotherapy and religion." He starts by asserting the identity of the "soul" of religion with the "psyche" of psychology, and supports this from the use of "soul" in the Bible, in classical antiquity, and in the Church. Some psychologists and some theologians have denied this identity and marked off convenient boundaries between their respective domains. But this denial encourages an artificial "split between religion and personal life."

Father White defends his special interest in the Jungian school, because of the religious relevance of the field of psychic factors they have explored, and the fact that they have also with unusual openness learned from other schools. In discussing the Jungian approach to religion, however, he becomes critical, as any disciplined Christian theologian must. Jung and his followers frequently use the term "God" as equivalent to or interchangeable with "an experience of the numinous," "an autonomous complex," "the God-*imago*," or "the archetype of Deity"—on the ground that the psychologist can discuss only these latter, not the existence or non-existence of a Transcendent Being. But by definition God is not identical with these phenomena; the "psychological fact" is that "by God we mean not the experience but the Transcendent who is experienced."

Jung has stated that creeds and dogmas are substitutes for, indeed protection against, immediate experience of God. That they can be used in that way, Father White admits; but they supply needed criteria of evaluation for religious experiences, the dogmatic formulas are *about* experiences, and together with the sacraments, prayer, Christian fellowship, etc., they serve to communicate these experiences. They "tend rather to expose the believer to immediate experience than to shield him from it" (p. 73). Jung himself in his later writings shows more appreciation of dogma.

Jung has found fault with the doctrine of the Trinity, as a symbol suggesting neurotic incompleteness. Dream symbols of human and cosmic wholeness are characteristically fourfold. The Three Persons are all masculine and all good; they stand for a one-sided moralistic perfectionism that ignores the feminine values, materiality, and evil, which are inseparable from man's—and even God's—growth into wholeness. The Trinity should be expanded to a Quaternity. Father White agrees to the abundant evidence that symbols of *human* wholeness are fourfold; but he finds, contrary to Jung, that the history of religion shows evidence of the dynamic Triad as an archetypal image in its own right, as a symbol not of man but of Deity.

Father White devotes several chapters to Jung's "missing fourth," both as the Feminine and as Evil. He finds that "archetypal and numinous feminine figures appear very early, and thereafter continuously, in the visions and devotions of Christians" and in their iconography (p. 127). Catholic Christianity has always given a place to the Church as Mother and Bride (prefigured by Israel), to the Divine Wisdom (Sophia), and to Mary. In recent years Mary has emerged as the most concrete and colorful symbol, but Jung is wrong that "the growth of veneration for a feminine figure was a comparatively late and gradual compensation for the alleged inadequacies of the all-masculine Trinity" (p. 131). The author suggests that a bridge between Catholic and Protestant should be built by "keener realization on

both sides of the psychological function of the figure of the Madonna as a created symbol both of the wisdom and hidden things of God, and of his saving activity in the community and in the soul" (p. 139).

In his chapter, "The Integration of Evil," he presents with sympathy Jung's doctrine that modern man has a crying need to become acquainted with and take account of his "shadow-side," those too-unconscious inclinations and motives which corrupt all our efforts to do good. The white man's unawareness of his shadow "has now brought the whole world to the brink of final destruction" (p. 147). Our author finds that Jung is right in urging the uncovering and integration of the energies of the shadow, since this contains, besides evil, repressed good which needs to be clarified and set free. But Jung is confused when he speaks of integrating *evil*, which is by definition disruptive and cannot be integrated either into God or into man. "Integration of the shadow cannot mean—as Jung too often seems to suggest—the addition of evil to good but the overcoming of evil by good" (p. 161). Not the inclusion of evil but the elimination of it is essential to wholeness; and Jung's attribution of evil to God is not an assertion but a denial of *his* wholeness.

Jung has delved deeply into the psychological meanings of Christian doctrine and history for Western man; and what he has to say deserves both the sympathetic understanding and the clear-sighted criticism which Father White has given.

ERMINIE LANTERO

Assistant Editor, RELIGION IN LIFE.

Jesus and the Trinity. By WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 160 pp. \$2.75.

Paul's Message and Mission. By WILLIAM BAIRD. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960. 176 pp. \$3.00.

1. Perhaps no Christian teaching has excited speculation and repelled explanation as much as the doctrine of the Trinity. Dr. Bowie's book gives the reader an excellent historical sketch of the various ways in which the doctrine's challenge has been handled from the earliest attempts down to the present time. The sketch is in fact one of the secondary treasures of the volume. The main treasure is Dr. Bowie's thesis that for the early Christians and the formulators of the creeds all teaching about the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit was meant to give expression to a religious experience which actually defies attempts at satisfactory explanations.

The author rightly asserts that Christian thinking about the one God revealing himself to men as Father, Son and Holy Spirit "began with a disclosure" from Jesus "and a discovery" on the part of the disciples. Some biblical scholars may feel, however, that in his tracing the embryonic origins of Christian trinitarian thinking, the author gives too little credit to the extent of stimulation from Jesus and consequently accredits too much to the religious genius of the disciples who responded to their Lord. In the light of some recent biblical research in quest of the historical Jesus, the particular emphasis given here on this issue is perhaps open to question. Furthermore, the accrediting of certain Pauline and Johannine expressions of trinitarian theology and experience to the religious genius of Paul and the Fourth Evangelist, thus removing them from any witness of Jesus to himself and to the Spirit, may in the minds of some be going further than is legitimate.

Nevertheless, even within the writer's debatable historical reconstruction at this point, the assertion is clear and well taken that the writers of the New Testament

documents strove to bear witness to a vital religious experience. It was an experience which was anchored in the theology and teaching of the Old Testament, which originated in a contact with the life and ministry of the Jesus of history, and which subsequently flourished in the church's own life and faith wherein the presence and work of the Holy Spirit were strongly felt.

Of real value to the student of Christian thought on the Trinity is Dr. Bowie's analysis of the second-century struggle to come to an understanding of the Trinity-faith which existed within a strict monotheism inherited from Judaism and the Old Testament. For Bowie what is vital about the Nicene debate and creedal formulation is not that trinitarian issues were thereby settled once for all (indeed they were not!), but that the assembled bishops agreed upon a statement of faith which recorded a deep conviction with respect to the reality of Christian experience with God. They were interested, Bowie tells us, in living truth which impinged upon Christian life rather than in dealing with "old preconceptions of philosophy."

A little more than the last third of the volume is devoted to a study of the theological consequences of the creed (in which Bowie criticizes the neo-orthodox position for obscuring "the points of contact at which God touches man in what the best in man still knows and feels"), of the emergence of the actual doctrine of the Trinity in post-Nicene theology, of the intellectual difficulties involved in making the teaching intelligible to the modern mind, and of the weaknesses of some modern attempts at interpreting the doctrine (Dorothy Sayers, Leonard Hodgson, and Henry P. Van Dusen). He concludes that "every would-be statement of the doctrine must be held, not as a dogma, but as a directive."

2. *Paul's Message and Mission*, by William Baird, presents a study of the nature of Paul's message and of his own concept of his mission in the Roman world of the first century. A valuable first chapter introduces the reader to the mental and spiritual climate, Jewish and Hellenistic, which Paul confronted. Baird calls it "an age of pessimism," which the Jew dealt with by underscoring his sense of belonging to the people of God and the Hellenist by his quest for immortality. Paul's recognition of the tragic condition of men in such an age, the fact that philosophers were also at work trying to solve its problems, Paul's observation of the effect of the church's witness upon her own people, and his conversion experience all combined, according to Baird, to drive Paul into his mission to that pessimistic world.

Paul's missionary instrument was the word of God, the proclamation in human language of God's redemptive acts. Principally this involved the announcement of what God had done in Jesus Christ and what this meant for the Christian. The discussion of this subject forms the most significant chapter (IV) in the book, a chapter which deals with Paul's Christological *kerygma*.

Baird distinguishes between the objective and traditional forms in which Paul presented his gospel and the nonobjective nature of its content. But at the same time he points out that Paul found both data and doctrine necessary tools for proclaiming his gospel, viz., "a personal revelation of God's redemptive action which is received only in committed personal encounter." Like the rest of the book, the chapter is richly suggestive to the modern church which witnesses to her Lord. A final chapter treats Paul's understanding of salvation, what faith meant to him, and his concept of the tensions of the Christian life.

ROBERT A. BARTELS

Associate Professor of New Testament, Northwestern Lutheran Theological Seminary, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

The Holy Spirit and Modern Thought. By LINDSAY DEWAR. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. xvi-224 pp. \$4.50.

As a survey of the biblical and historical materials on Holy Spirit, this book is most unsatisfactory. As an attempt to suggest new concepts for understanding the Holy Spirit's work, it is ludicrous.

The brief section on the Old Testament neglects the central question as to the content or the meaning of God's presence as Spirit with Israel; rather it seeks to argue the inadequate thesis that the Spirit's presence is predominantly subconscious and corporate. It states that the possession of the Spirit is the essential characteristic of the prophet, in the face of the clear evidence that the pre-exilic prophets disavowed such a claim over against the false ecstatic prophets. Their office was rooted in the Word, not in the clairvoyance of the ecstatic as claimed by Dewar (p. 163). In the treatment of the New Testament, the whole discussion is given an off-beat twist by concentrating on two peripheral questions: natural *vs.* supernatural operation of the Spirit, and the relation of Holy Spirit to baptism. With the first, Dewar belabors Calvin's (and Paul's) doctrine of original sin, with the second, Calvin's assumed lack of regard for the episcopacy and the sacraments. He makes no use of Eduard Schweizer's TWNT article on *pneuma*, perhaps because the latter makes clear that the presence of Holy Spirit in the New Testament is inseparable from the church's sense of mission, which emphasis Dewar completely ignores in preference for stressing the moral and illuminating aspects of the Spirit's work.

Dewar's competent summary of the patristic development of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, from Clement of Rome to Augustine, gives a handy guide to this complex literature. His summary has the important negative value of demonstrating what is all too obvious to those who have mulled through these writings, viz., "the restricted range of thought which marks nearly all patristic discussions of the doctrine of the Spirit" (p. 106). What is amazing about Dewar's historical treatment is that a man of his sentiments and theology skips from Augustine to Luther. One would have expected him to make much of the medieval conception of sacramental infused grace as the work of the Holy Spirit, or to explore Peter Lombard's identification of the Spirit's work with natural grace, or to analyze the speculative attempts of Joachim of Flora and Occam to overcome this antithesis of natural and supernatural. As for Dewar's tirades against Luther and Calvin, one might expect such in cheap Roman Catholic polemics but not in an attempt at objective history of dogma.

The last quarter of Dewar's book is entitled, "The Psychological Interpretation." This is the strangest mixture of the whole work. On the basis of "experiments" in extrasensory perception and psychokinesis, he accepts telepathy, clairvoyance, spells, blessings, cursings, and the mental control of physical objects as scientifically validated. And what is more, all this "science" now gives us a clue as to the mode of the operation of the Spirit and as to "how prayer works." He then attempts to use the views of Freud and Jung to suggest that all these strange powers have their root in the subconscious corporate mind of man, and that it is precisely at this level of human nature where the Holy Spirit works. The radical disagreements that the present reviewer has with this view of the Spirit have already filled a book (*Human Spirit and Holy Spirit*). Suffice it to say that Dewar's view requires him to depersonalize completely the relationship between Holy Spirit and man, this in the face of his constant assertion of the personal character of the Spirit. Here lies the danger in the doctrine of a social Trinity which he adopts (p. xiv), thus divorcing the work

of the Spirit of God from the conscious encounter man has with the Word of God in Jesus Christ.

ARNOLD B. COME

Professor of Systematic Theology, San Francisco Theological Seminary,
San Anselmo, California.

American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation With Representative Documents. Volume I: 1607-1820. By H. SHELTON SMITH, ROBERT T. HANDY, and LEFFERTS A. LOETSCHER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. xv-615 pp. \$10.00.

The appearance of the first volume of this historical interpretation of "American Christianity" with representative documents—with the promise that Volume II will be along soon—is a notable and welcome event. It is the first work of its kind and extent since Peter G. Mode published his 735-page *Source Book and Bibliographical Guide for American Church History* in 1921, a work now scarce, and of course with definitely dated bibliographies.

While these authors appear studiously to avoid calling their work a source book, about two-thirds of its bulk is "composed of documents." And this, plus the excellent summaries of pertinent "literature" at the end of each topical chapter, give it all the features and values of a source book. The documents are well chosen, and reproduced with a high degree of accuracy and in very readable type.

In the study of history there is no substitute for the reading of source materials, and teachers, students, and general readers will be grateful to these authors for making such a large collection conveniently available in the field of American Church History. It will provide an excellent reference or textbook either for undergraduate courses or for an introductory course on the graduate level; and perhaps the price of \$10.00 a volume does not place it beyond the reach of our present generation of affluent students. It also makes readily available fine supplementary reading for courses in American social and intellectual history.

About one-third of the text is taken up with the authors' "historical interpretation," which sets the over-all pattern of the book because the remainder was conceived as "illustrative documents"—that is, one might say, as footnotes to the text. Yet "footnotes" is not exactly the correct designation, since the authors do not claim a one-to-one relationship between the two parts, but only that their work "correlates" with the "interpretive narrative a body of representative primary documents."

The assumption underlying the mode of presentation seems to be the correct one, that documents do not speak for themselves. But the fact that the authors apparently felt constrained to devote one third of the text to interpretation leads one to wonder if they were not unduly anxious about what the unchaperoned documents might whisper to a reader—or if they do not exhibit less than the last full measure of respect for prospective readers who supposedly need to be told at this length what the documents are saying to them. One wonders, for example, how many readers after studying John Winthrop's rather clear account of Anne Hutchinson and the ruckus she stirred up (pp. 115-123), and having already noted John Davenport's definition of "justified" and "sanctified" (p. 111), would conclude that "The whole controversy is baffling . . ."—as the authors say it was?

The arrangement of the text is neatly, although not "rigidly" chronological, the whole (1607-1820) being divided into three periods: of transplanting, 1607-1690; of

"changing patterns, 1690-1765"; and of "Freedom and Renewal, 1765-1870." This plus the topical chapters plus an adequate index makes the work very usable.

SIDNEY E. MEAD

Professor of American Church History, Southern California School of Theology,
Claremont, California.

An Era in Anglican Theology: From Gore to Temple. By ARTHUR MICHAEL RAMSEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. x-192 pp. \$3.50.

The Archbishop of York—now of Canterbury—delivered the Hale Lectures at Seabury-Western Seminary in 1959; they are contained (with the addition of new chapters) in this attractively printed volume. Let it be said at once that they are eminently readable and that on the whole they cover the theological developments in Anglican thought from 1889 (the publication of the famous symposium *Lux Mundi*) to 1939 (the outbreak of the Second World War) with remarkable completeness, and with obvious concern to be as fair as possible to positions with which Dr. Ramsey is not himself in sympathy. If there is any omission, it is the developing of the newer "liberal" and "biblical" Evangelical School during this period; although one must concede that the real impact of that school was not seriously felt until a few years after the terminal date of the Archbishop's study. A brief mention of it may be found on p. 156.

The clue to the nature of Anglican Theology is correctly stated by Dr. Ramsey in his preface: Scripture, tradition, and reason (p. ix)—the three in continual interrelationship, although each theologian will have his own understanding of priority among the three. The thinkers discussed by the Archbishop include not only the late Tractarians, like Gore and his associates, but also the various kinds of Modernist, both "Catholic" and unlabeled, as well as Inge and others. The treatment closes with a long and appreciative chapter on the work of William Temple. I believe that Dr. Ramsey is entirely correct in taking Gore and Temple as more than beginning and end of the era, but also (and more important) the most significant theologians of the period under discussion.

At some points readers may differ from the author's analysis and evaluation. While he tries to be fair to the Modernist school, I believe that he is a little hard on some of its members. On the other hand, he recognizes the importance of that school's concern for a living theology even if he seems to dislike having any particular group called "liberal." His evaluation of the Liberal Catholic successors of Bishop Gore is on the whole just; evidently his Grace is not among those, so often found today, who can only sneer at the efforts which culminated in the publication of *Essays Catholic and Critical* and in the great Gifford Lectures of A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*.

A final chapter attempts a summary with a look to the years that followed 1939. Here Dr. Ramsey is very good indeed, especially in the closing pages where he once again picks up the "Scripture, tradition, and reason" triad and points the way toward a continued theological effort in which each of these, along with a renewed awareness of liturgical life, will have its contribution to make.

Anglicanism is sometimes very difficult for non-Anglicans to understand. It seems to be a divided house, yet there is a kind of unity which all Anglicans feel one with another. When the Catholic structures are emphasized, they are held at the same time with a reverence for Scripture and for reason. When the Reformed aspect of

the Anglican tradition is stressed, the Catholic structures can never be forgotten. And Anglican insistence on the place of reason in theology is never likely to be overweening, for the Scriptures and the historic structures are always present to restrain and channel it. This is what its past has made the Anglican communion to be; it may be said of the Anglican position, more perhaps than of any other, that it can be understood only in historical terms.

Anyone, therefore, who wishes to understand contemporary Anglican theology will find the Archbishop's book a great aid because of its successful placing of the present situation in the succession of theologians of the preceding period.

His Grace honors this reviewer by several citations from his published essays and books; in two of these instances he criticizes judgments expressed by the reviewer. Perhaps it may not be amiss to point out that, in the first matter, Professor Bethune-Baker's writings on the use of "evolutionary ideas" in theological reconstruction antedated by some years Lionel Thornton's *The Incarnate Lord*, cited by the Archbishop; hence the former was, in fact, "a pioneer" in this field so far as Anglican theologians are concerned. Further, I can see only a personal value-judgment on his Grace's part when he attributes the admitted overstatements (which he calls "recklessness") in this use, to Bethune-Baker's "confused" mind in metaphysics. A kinder, and I believe a more accurate judgment, is that a pioneer often if not always is likely to fall into this error (cf. p. 72 of *An Era*).

In the second matter, the citations from Bicknell and Hodgson on pp. 186-87 are not very important in determining whether or not Bishop Gore was (as I had said) "annihilated" by Hastings Rashdall in respect to the meaning of "person" in Augustine's and Aquinas' trinitarian discussion; what is important is a rereading of the *De Trinitate* and of the relevant portions of the *Summa Theologica*. I have no hesitation in still affirming that Rashdall did understand these doctors better and did show that Bishop Gore had misinterpreted them—and I refer any interested reader to Fr. Vincent McNab, O.P., the distinguished Roman theologian, who said precisely this as long ago as 1923 in an essay reprinted in *From a Friar's Cell*.

W. NORMAN PITTENDER

Professor of Christian Apologetics, General Theological Seminary,
Chelsea Square, New York City.

Miracles and Revelation. By JOHN S. LAWTON. New York: Association Press, 1960. 284 pp. \$6.50.

In this book Dr. Lawton attempts the formidable task of examining the treatment of miracles in English theology and philosophy of religion from the time of Deism to the present. He shows the changing approaches to the problem and the modifications in the understanding of miracle and its place in Christianity. In doing so he also points out how related terms such as nature, the supernatural, revelation and faith have undergone changes. The book serves also as a useful guide to the history of Christian Apologetics in England in the period since the Enlightenment.

The author carries out his objective with skill and verve. He surveys, analyzes, and succinctly summarizes hundreds of books, a process which could easily take on the aspect of an afternoon's reading in the card catalog of a library. But Dr. Lawton sketches the setting of the apologetic problem so effectively, and conveys the philosophical and scientific climate of the age so well, that the reader finds no difficulty in keeping his bearings or in sustaining interest. A great variety of viewpoints within

the church as well as many hostile to Christianity are presented with sympathy and fairness. At the same time the author's theological position is presented clearly, incisively and with humor.

The theologians of the Enlightenment approached miracles as the supernatural authentication of the message of Jesus, as divinely given proofs of the truth of revelation. The development of the natural sciences called into question the very possibility of the supernatural, and miracles became apologetic liabilities instead of guarantees of theological dependability. Nevertheless the evidential approach to miracle retained a strong following among theologians and underwent only gradual modifications during two and a half centuries of debate.

Dr. Lawton shows how the concept of nature has been enriched by the realization that the material order is the medium for the spiritual life of man, thus overcoming the Cartesian dualism which separated mind and matter. The understanding of the supernatural has also changed through the replacement of scholastic by inductive methodologies and a new stress on the personal elements in the encounter of God and man. Miracle is seen in intimate connection with the person and mission of Jesus as Messiah of Israel and a part of that which is revealed, and no longer from the evidential viewpoint as support for revealed truths. Stress upon the Incarnation as the revealing of God has modified the understanding of revelation, correcting the onesidedness of scholasticism and the Enlightenment. Faith, moreover, is seen as man's response to God, involving the believer in the totality of his person and not merely his intellectual assent to revealed propositions.

The discussion of the historicity of the miracles and the relation of the historical to revelation and faith is at once helpful and tantalizing. The recognition that miracles are a part of the revelation in Christ corrects the myopia of the evidentialist approach, and the stress on the analogy of the Incarnation opens fascinating vistas for theological exploration. But especially in the discussion of the Virgin Birth and the resurrection the reader's appetite is sharpened but not satisfied. Recognizing that the author takes English theology as his province, the reader may nevertheless wish that the occasional references to the European theological debate might lead to a direct confrontation of Bultmann and his followers.

WARREN A. QUANBECK

Professor of Systematic Theology, Luther Theological Seminary,
Como Avenue and Luther Place, St. Paul 8, Minnesota.

The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards. By DOUGLAS J. ELWOOD.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. xiii-220 pp. \$3.75.

Jonathan Edwards, it is apparent, is steadily coming into his own. The range of his mind and the power of his thought are generally conceded. The ill-informed caricature which for so long did service as an interpretation of his position has been thoroughly discredited, and Edwards is recognized as probably the profoundest mind that America has produced. Yet the exact nature of his contribution needs to be carefully assessed. He cannot simply be classified as a Calvinist. The Puritan position which he inherited was modified in various and subtle ways. To isolate the different strands in Edwards' thought is the purpose of this valuable book.

Dr. Elwood contends that Edwards occupied a position intermediate between orthodox Puritan theism and mystical pantheism. To defend Reformation theology was not enough. His great concern was "to discover a unifying concept that would

do justice both to the majesty of God and to the immediacy of His presence" (p. 9). Dr. Elwood describes this as a "third way" in theology, and he indicates that it drew upon a wide range of sources. Edwards used Locke's psychology and Newton's physics, the mediating position of the Cambridge Platonists and the work of Continental thinkers. There was clearly a strong strain of mysticism in Edwards' thought. The direct awareness of God plays an important role in his theology. When he speaks of God's majesty and immediacy he is not using abstract intellectual categories. The distinctiveness of Edwards' thought lies in the directness with which he grasps truth and the subtlety with which he elaborates its implications.

Having defined this characteristic and original position, Dr. Elwood examines various features of Edwards' thought. He shows how causality and necessity find their place in his metaphysics. He studies the way in which Edwards wrestles with the age-old problem of moral evil. He considers the divine self-communication as it affects the doctrine of revelation. He clarifies Edwards' relation to the various intellectual influences active in the thought of his age. He assesses Edwards' position in the ongoing Reformed tradition in which he takes his place.

This is a useful and valuable study of a great man. Because it is a first work, Dr. Elwood has not perfectly mastered his medium. At times his style falters. Occasionally he lapses into infelicities which would have troubled Edwards. In the early pages he quotes too frequently from modern writers; these comments do not always illuminate the exposition and they interrupt its flow. In the concluding chapter he examines the relevance of Edwards to modern life. It may be suggested that in a relatively brief book, an author must decide where he intends to concentrate his attention. Edwards' position in the history of thought is secure without establishing his immediate bearing on the problems of our day. He deserves sustained exposition. His contemporary relevance could profitably be studied at length. To combine both in a short book is to do less than justice to either.

These, however, are minor blemishes in a book which rewards the reader and promises better things for the future. Dr. Elwood has raised questions of interpretation which are of the utmost importance. These are too intricate for discussion in a review, but they will certainly demand the careful attention of all serious students of Edwards. Dr. Elwood has the great merit of having asked the right questions.

GERALD R. CRAGG

Professor of Historical Theology, Andover Newton Theological School,
Newton Centre, Massachusetts.

The German Phoenix: Men and Movements in the Church in Germany. By FRANKLIN HAMLIN LITTELL. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960. xv-226 pp. \$3.95.

As Professor Littell views the church in America today, he finds that faith is not threatened by intelligent unbelief but by emptiness of words, "words which mean nothing but easement to the speaker" and which "have lost all relationship to life and meaning." On the other hand he finds that "the European centers of renewal have passed beyond empty verbalization to disciplined witness." This book is an account of how the German churches' resistance to Hitler gave birth to the massive lay movements in Europe, the *Kirchentag*, and the Evangelical Academies.

It was the tough Christians who lived through the terrors of totalitarianism and war who led in forming the present-day lay movements in Europe. These movements

were spawned by the heroism and tenacity of faith under the Hitler regime. At Barmen in the heart of the Ruhr industrial district, for example, 140 Protestant leaders met in 1934 to adopt a six-point platform which became a fundamental confession of faith of the active Christian resistance to Hitler. The Barmen articles confess Jesus Christ as the one word of God whom Christians have to hear and obey in life and in death.

A little more than a decade later, on October 19, 1945, at Stuttgart, the surviving leaders of the Christian resistance spoke for their whole people in a declaration of guilt. The depths of soul-searching and reappraisal that went before the rebirth of Christian initiative are indicated, says Littell, by the fact that while these Christians were pleading guilty before God, the Nazi war criminals were pleading not guilty in the docket at Nuremberg.

Europe's Christians came to see that the struggle between the church and the world is not so much moralistic as it is eschatological, that their choice lay between the Christian hope and the spirit of the times. This point, says Dr. Littell, is one that is most difficult for American Christians to grasp. And I should say that this was brought out rather clearly in the discussions at Evanston during the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches.

If subjection to a totalitarian regime brings out the worst as well as the best in men, so does a persistent idealism such as that which characterized nineteenth-century Christendom on the Continent. In a review of the situation in the church there in that century, Littell shows its relationship to the rise of Marxism and indicates the responsibility of the churches. "But for the apostasy of the nineteenth-century churches which abandoned discipline, biblical ethics, eschatology and mission, and lost sight of history, the scandal of Marxism had never lain upon the 'post-Christian' world."

Dr. Littell says that it is only in the modern age that Christianity and its institutions have lost sufficient authority, and bureaucratic governments gained sufficient monolithic control, for totalitarianism in its proper sense to emerge. He characterizes it as hostile to other organization, independent centers of public opinion, representative forms of government, and as, in short, the "homogenization of all human relations." He argues that the alternative is not majority rule or the voice of the people. It is rather "the continuous and vigorous open discussion which makes policy decision . . . more or less adequate expression of the best wisdom available." It is this full, free, informed airing of issues that *Kirchentag* and the Evangelical Academies have been able to give to Europe since the Third Reich, and it is this that makes them of political significance in postwar Germany.

According to Dr. Littell the most significant lay movements are not in America but in Europe. The lay academy movement now numbers sixty centers in a dozen European countries. There, laymen are learning to see themselves as representatives of the faith, much like those laymen who spread the faith in the first centuries. They appreciate their professional competence as a vocation in the full Christian sense.

In the *Kirchentag* Dr. Littell sees "the magnetic pole of laymen's movements throughout the world." This rally of the churches, he says, takes seriously five dimensions of life: the time in which we have been born, the world in which we live, the human beings to whom we belong, the living God who is calling us, and the Christian community including the lay apostolate. Our author concludes: "In the lay movements of the Continent there are men who take the most thoroughgoing view of discipleship: no position should be verbalized until a Christian is prepared to make it a matter of disciplined witness."

Among the things that America might learn from all this, he suggests, are these.

The churches can develop programs aimed at conversation in specific vocational groups. There is a relationship between group structure and group function. There is more value than we have suspected in discussion in depth. We ought to welcome the recovery of lay initiative. The church must answer the questions that laymen are asking.

Dr. Littell's report is heartening and exciting. I believe there are lessons in this book that the churches and churchmen in America would do well to learn. The author's over-all view of the church in America, too, has an uncomfortable amount of truth in it. His report and observations on American Christianity are colored, however, by his own vantage-point and his apparent failure to observe some of the more hopeful factors. His appraisal of denominational programs in American churches has more truth than we like to admit. But there are some things going on quietly in local congregations, where after all the heart of the church is, that he fails to note. Keeping his eye on the university centers and seeing the need to relate them to the work of the church, he has failed to see some other centers of lay witness. Every year, for example, there are scores of summer retreats for laymen where their raw faith is making its impact. The lay apostolate here in America needs encouragement as well as critique.

NEWMAN S. CRYER, JR.

Editor, *The Methodist Layman*, 740 Rush Street, Chicago, Illinois.

God's Mission—and Ours. By EUGENE L. SMITH. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961. 169 pp. \$3.25.

History's Lessons for Tomorrow's Mission; Milestones in the History of Missionary Thinking. By PHILIPPE MAURY and others. Geneva: World's Student Christian Federation, 1960. 300 pp. No price.

Will Rogers in 1932 turned his humorous pen on the foreign missionaries: "They've got hearts as big as anybody's, but it's in the wrong country." Of the new churches overseas he declared, "Most of 'em are Christians just as long as the missionaries hand out the rice." And about the mission boards, "They send the wrong ones, the ones who couldn't make a living here."

Caricatures like this of the Christian world mission still prevail, both without and within the church. Among the many books being written to counteract such distortions and to present a fair and appealing image of the modern missionary and his task, the two here reviewed stand high.

Dr. Eugene L. Smith is the scholarly, dynamic General Secretary of the Division of World Missions of The Methodist Church, who speaks out of rich experience first in the pastoral ministry and for the past twelve years in a position of far-reaching missionary and ecumenical influence. His book consists of five animated chapters, each a unit in itself: "You can't export what you don't have; The Triune God and the Christian Mission; Death and life in the Christian Church; The universal Christ and our conflicting cultures; Why not tell the whole truth?" Dr. Smith—student, evangelist, missionary, administrator—grapples with some of the most critical issues that the church now faces on the world scene. His philosophy of missions is enlivened by many unforgettable illustrations and by exciting passages such as that on the emergence of the indigenous churches and their part in the universal Christian fellowship. The author's fine mind, deeply rooted faith, and profound missionary concern are reflected in all that he says.

History's Lessons for Tomorrow's Mission is a valuable symposium of thirty articles, related to the Federation's project of study and teaching on the Life and Mission of the Church. The writers, many of them world-famous theologians and missionary scholars, seek to interpret certain crucial events or personalities in church history in such a way as to help their readers, especially intellectual youth, see the Christian mission in historical perspective and understand better their own missionary obligation in the coming years. Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox missions are considered, the older and younger churches, and significant new trends and possibilities. English, German, and French annotated bibliographies add to the usefulness of the volume.

Both of the books under review are wholesomely honest in their appraisal of missions. They try to find the meaning of failures and mistakes in history and also to draw inspiration from past achievements. In the WSCF symposium Professor Laurence E. Browne, a specialist in early and medieval church history, analyzes the failure of Christianity under Muslim rule as largely a theological failure. Dr. Smith, in his penetrating third chapter, finds many parallels between the challenge of early Islam to the Christian communities of that time and the challenge of Communism to the world Christian community today. He believes that the greatest weakness of the church then was a lack of evangelistic and missionary passion. Is that our weakness today in the face of vigorous and competing religions and ideologies and also the widely prevalent secularism?

The successors of Will Rogers today might have second thoughts if they could read these two books. They are recommended to both ignorant and intelligent critics of missions as well as to all who support and participate in the great enterprise.

FRANK WILSON PRICE

Director of the Missionary Research Library and Adjunct Professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

The Coming Reformation, By GEDDES MACGREGOR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960. 160 pp. \$3.50.

Here is a vigorous protest against the superficiality and misdirected energy of the modern Protestant church. Dean MacGregor offers a remonstrance which deserves a hearing. The Coming Reformation, he tells us, is delayed by our smugness and pride. We need to recover inner discipline. We are guilty of two failures: we have no adequate doctrine of the church and we have lost the ideal of perfection. Protestants have held up an impossible ideal of perfection as though every man could attain it. At the same time we have failed to provide sufficient evidence of perfection, even in the lives of our most disciplined, so that others experience the "agonizing sense of imperfection that makes a Christian take refuge in grace" (p. 42).

He offers an excellent delineation of devotional literature, much of it in the Scottish tradition and little known to the average American reader. He sees the real indictment of books like Dr. Peale's *The Power of Positive Thinking* in the fact that "to millions of Protestants, no more profound literature on the spiritual life is any longer intelligible" (p. 102). If Dr. MacGregor's book saves some of our clergymen from becoming ecclesiastical organization men, this grim caricature of the Protestant church will have been worth drawing. However, this writer wonders whether the same purpose might not have been accomplished with less sarcasm and and without sacrificing needed balance.

With all its strengths, the book has serious limitations. Dean MacGregor is so apprehensive of the sentimental that the Reformation he prescribes lacks evangelical

warmth. He is too hard on inspiration. While warning against vague humanitarianism he offers nothing approximating the moral and social power and consequences of the earlier Reformation. And in repeated comparisons with the Roman Church, Protestantism always comes off second-best as "Rome's half-Christianized descendant" (p. 141). Perhaps it was needful for Dr. MacGregor to remove our Protestant veneer. However, the Coming Reformation will come only when a sounder, more health-giving prescription is offered to those who long to be instruments in God's hands for the renewing of our time.

K. MORGAN EDWARDS

Professor of Preaching, Southern California School of Theology,
Claremont, California.

The Art of Christian Doubt. By FRED DENBEAUX. New York: Association Press, 1960. x-181 pp. \$3.50.

Fred Denbeaux is chairman of the department of Biblical History, Literature and Interpretation at Wellesley College. In *The Art of Christian Doubt* he explores the relation between faith and skepticism, Christianity and culture, Dionysian poetry and Apollonian logic. The author's sympathy with and indebtedness to Tillich are obvious. The work is marked throughout by a Bergsonian interest in the individual Dionysian apprehension of the risks involved in existing in a pluralistic "multi-dimensional" universe. The Christian, argues Professor Denbeaux, lives in tension, accepting the "threefold onslaught of chaos" (146): contemporaneity, ambiguity, and particularity. The freezing of the ambiguous drama of the Bible into a logical, security-seeking orthodoxy is not the genuine alternative to Pyrrhonism. Faith must accept the abyss, the radical freedom, the indeterminacy of the human situation, and express itself in living art, not in rigid logic. Founded on paradox and "foolishness," Christianity must accept the questions raised by the contemporary theatre and art world, accept its union with culture, and dare to live in a creative universe, whose God is not bound by the past.

As a provocative essay on freedom, its temptations, its dangers, and its creativity, *The Art of Christian Doubt* is exciting and discomforting. The author's review of the history of the tensions of thought is sweeping in scope and sometimes penetrating in insight.

There are, however, serious defects in the argument. This is a little book, and little books are given to oversimplification. The criticism of logical positivism, for example, is inaccurate and trivial. Citing an oversimplified version of the verifiability criterion, Professor Denbeaux on succeeding pages (41, 42) accuses the positivist of confining meaningful discourse to empirical sentences and to logically true sentences. Similarly lighthearted is his attack on logic. He rejects the law of noncontradiction, which he thinks is held only by rationalists and monists. He then proposes that philosophy forego system. It would, in fact, have to forego thinking altogether. The author obviously does not intend to render Christianity nonsensical. Perhaps he has not adequately considered the results of the admission of contradiction into discourse of any kind.

DONALD R. DUNBAR

Ph.D. Candidate, Boston University, Boston 15, Massachusetts.

Fact, Fiction, and Faith. By JAMES ALFRED MARTIN, JR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. 186 pp. \$3.95.

One of the main tasks of Christian apologetics today is that of responding to the honest questions, doubts, and misunderstandings of Christianity on the part of our contemporaries. The new Danforth Professor of Religion in Higher Education at Union Theological Seminary, New York, has written an excellent book for those who believe that Christianity is obsolete, irrelevant, and makes little or no sense today. It is not intended as a contribution to theological scholarship but as an aid to the intelligent inquirer whether within or outside the church.

Professor Martin's method is first to articulate, as accurately as possible in the words of the modern inquirer, certain questions and doubts about Christianity and then to distinguish "fact, fiction, and faith" in the aspects of Christianity under question. After dealing in a first chapter with certain preliminary difficulties about our knowledge of the origins of Christianity and possible alternatives to Christian faith in reason and society, the author proceeds in the rest of the book to treat fundamental questions raised by the gospel story, the person and work of Christ, the Trinity, the development of creeds and church organization, the relation of faith and reason, the existence of evil, immortality, freedom and determinism. Along the way Professor Martin deals ably with the objection that religion breeds hypocrisy and escapism, with the view of Christianity as simply a higher morality, with the meaning of Christian love, and the significance of the traditional proofs of the existence of God. (The treatment of the proofs, as the author warns, is on a considerably higher level of difficulty than the rest of the book.)

Some of the high points of the book include the analysis of Jesus' teaching on the Kingdom of God (pp. 29ff), the treatment of Christology (pp. 72ff), and the recounting of the spiritual pilgrimage of Augustine as a case study in the relation of faith and reason (pp. 136ff).

This reviewer had the impression that the book suffered sometimes in not dealing directly and specifically with the questions raised. It might have been improved by an expansion of the formulation of the doubts and questions and by a more direct dialogue with the views and attitudes represented. The problems raised often supply simply occasions for exposition rather than for concentrated conversation. For example, there is no direct response to the question of science raised in the first chapter. Such a work as this is of necessity highly selective, but some important modern difficulties with Christianity have been omitted, e.g., its universal claim in relation to other religions and the psychological and sociological reduction of religion.

This book is not intended to be a highly original, profound, or moving presentation, but it is a straightforward, clear-cut treatment of modern doubts and questions. Professor Martin's stated aim is "not to convert, but to clarify"; but this is the kind of clarification which can be the first step toward conversion. I know of no better book on this subject.

OWEN C. THOMAS

Assistant Professor of Theology, Episcopal Theological School,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

One Body and One Spirit. By OSCAR J. F. SEITZ. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1960. 188 pp. \$4.25.

The title of this volume, though not inappropriate, hardly leads one to expect the admirably popular exposition of the Church in the New Testament that is found

in its pages. Combining sound scholarship with an excellent lucidity and simplicity of style, Dr. Seitz traces the origin of the Christian movement in the life and work of Jesus, its existence for a short time after the Resurrection and Pentecost as apparently a Jewish sect, and its emergence as a church with a world-wide mission that was beset with problems not altogether remote from those of the church today.

The story is told with a skillful interweaving of material from the New Testament with other Early Christian literature, particularly the Apostolic Fathers; there is a helpful discussion of the relation between the New Testament and the Old, and there are some interesting references to the Dead Sea Scrolls. On points of detail there may be room for debate here and there, as Dr. Seitz admits, but in general he gives a remarkably fair, balanced and illuminating picture of the Primitive Church as modern historical scholarship has taught us to understand it.

His purpose in doing so is not, of course, primarily historical. He writes out of a deep concern for Christian unity, and in the sound conviction that the surest way to it lies in a renewed and deepened grasp of the biblical understanding of the church. Here, in the Scriptures which all the churches cherish, they can find the One Church to which they all belong. In this connection he points out, quite rightly, that while a good deal has been accomplished "at the top," serious commitment to the ecumenical ideal is all too rare at the "lower" levels of the parish and the local congregation. His book is accordingly addressed, not to the pundits, but to the ministers and laity of the churches, among whom it deserves to find many readers and to be extensively used in study and discussion groups. It is pleasantly produced, and is furnished with an index and a short but useful bibliography.

PHILIP S. WATSON

Professor of Systematic Theology, Garrett Biblical Institute, Northwestern University Campus, Evanston, Illinois.

Varieties of Protestantism. By JOHN B. COBB, JR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960. 271 pp. \$4.50.

There may come a time, as you read this book, when you will feel like a chameleon on a piece of Scotch plaid. Probing within and across the denominational loyalties, the author finds a pattern of "basic orientations" within Protestantism. The effect of the first five chapters which contain these traditions is that the reader discovers himself in many places.

The author's conviction is: "Spiritual unity may often be found as much across denominational lines as within them. . . . What is still needed is an approach to Protestantism that recognizes its diversity but that does not identify its diversity with organized groups" (p. 14). His four main types of Protestantism are: Reformation, Churchly, Individualistic, Liberal. Subheadings include Lutheranism, Calvinism; authoritarian, liturgical; biblicism, experientialism; mystical, quest for abundant life, social gospel.

In describing each of these orientations the author gives us a sympathetic inward presentation. He does not begin with a norm, judge each denomination externally by the norm, and proceed accordingly. The last two chapters discuss the effect of science on these types and the "scandal of eschatology." These chapters, however, seem too compressed; they may be the kernel for another book. The final chapter, "The Unity Beyond," expresses the "spiritual diversity among us." This seems to me to be the weakest chapter in the book. "Three levels of our religious existence" are presented: our perspective, its expression, and its elaboration.

The first five chapters represent a fresh approach to understanding Protestantism in its diversity. They could profitably be required reading for every seminarian and key lay people in the church, possibly as a companion to *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism*, by Pelikan. Each chapter has as its conclusion, "Selective reading for further study." These are discriminating and representative. There is also a general bibliography on Protestantism and an index by topics. This makes it possible to compare by topics the teachings of the various traditions.

Dr. Cobb is now assistant professor of Systematic Theology at Southern California School of Theology. He has taught at Emory and at Young Harris College, and has received an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago Divinity School. This is no gab book or conversation stimulator, but rather a searching analysis of the diversity within Protestantism, an attempt to classify it and to describe each aspect of it in a sympathetic way. In this the author succeeds and has made a valuable contribution to ecumenical understanding.

BAYARD S. CLARK

Canon, Washington Cathedral, Mount Saint Alban, Washington, D. C.

Word and Sacrament. By DONALD MACLEOD. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1960. ix-176 pp. \$4.65.

The subtitle of this excellent little volume correctly indicates its scope and purpose. It is indeed "A Preface to Preaching and Worship" ("worship" being a wider, and therefore more adequate, description than "sacrament"), and a very useful one at that. Dr. Macleod, who is Professor of Homiletics at Princeton Seminary, stresses the importance of both preaching and worship, and refuses to set one against the other. As becomes one brought up in the Reformed Tradition he refuses to "downgrade" the sermon; and as one with a lively appreciation of the values in the contemporary Liturgical Revival (which owes much to the advocacy and influence of Pope Leo XIII and has spilt over into Protestantism), he essays the twofold task of setting preaching in the context of worship and of relating worship to the oral proclamation of the gospel. Both are integral and inseparable halves in the great work of Christian communication; and when they function together they not only "increase the dimensions of faith in the Christian message, but also demonstrate how life itself becomes in essence a prolonged act of worship."

Obviously Dr. Macleod is well versed in his subject; and he has read widely and thought deeply about the most important task of the Christian church. He has taken tribute of history, theology, and psychology, to make a real contribution to the ever-expanding list of books on the "finest of fine arts"—the art of communicating the gospel to this age of frustration, anxiety, and uncertainty, yet of wistful longing.

JOHN PITTS

Late Minister of St. Andrews Presbyterian Kirk, Nassau, Bahamas.

The Student Seeks an Answer: Ingraham Lectures in Philosophy and Religion at Colby College 1951-1959. Edited by JOHN A. CLARK. Waterville, Maine: Colby College Press, 1960. 346 pp. No price.

Those who are privileged to keep abreast of what is happening in higher education are well aware of the increasing concern for responsible religion—in the classroom and in the life of the campus. Another welcome item of evidence is this volume of lectures from Colby, and the promise of another to come. The topics discussed by

the fifteen lectures were selected by the students, and in these we have a clue to the context and categories in which the present student generation is asking the timeless questions. Beyond this the lectures themselves afford fresh insight in grappling with the questions, and from time to time break new ground or point new directions for inquiry. It is impossible to do justice to the content of the book in this brief notice; but to name just a few of the contributors—Allport, Bixler, Noss, Tillich—is enough to suggest the general high level maintained throughout.

P. S. ELLIS, JR.

Editor, College Texts, Abingdon Press,
Nashville, Tennessee.

Communism and the Churches. By RALPH LORD ROY. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960. 495 pp. \$7.50.

Three cheers! The earlier book of Mr. Roy, *Apostles of Discord*, brought this careful writer to the attention of honest students of sociology; but this definitive work will set a standard for any other writer who attempts to discuss subversive activities either inside or outside the churches. Not only has Mr. Roy given us an interesting account, but actually a kind of anthology of explanation on why anybody who has tried to apply religion to society has been "suspect."

He has arranged his work chronologically, yet associates all discussions with the secular identifications of the various national and international movements with which churchmen have been concerned. Of equal value in using the book as a reference is its comprehensive index of names and organizations. The section of notes gives a chapter-by-chapter documentation of source materials, editorials, articles, propaganda pamphlets, etc. The book is important because increasingly snap judgments flood the presses and objective consideration of the truth or falseness of charges and counter-charges is impossible. Our guess is that this book, with occasional updating, could remain a standard for many years to come.

E. S. B.

A twelve-page pamphlet, *A Christian Approach to Nuclear War*, has been issued by the Church Peace Mission, 475 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y. (15c; discount for bulk orders.) This study is sponsored by Pres. Herbert Gezork. Harold DeWolf, George Buttrick, Norman Gottwald, Otto Piper, etc. Most of the writers are not traditional pacifists, but they hold that the acceptance of war as a tragic necessity cannot from a Christian standpoint be extended to modern nuclear war. They conclude their theological analysis with concrete proposals, including a call to the nation's leaders for a disarmament program, unilateral if necessary.

Another book of Helmut Thielicke's sermons has been brought out by Harper: *Our Heavenly Father*—powerful sermons on the Lord's Prayer delivered to people in Stuttgart during the tragic closing days of World War II and the national collapse. "Preaching in the midst of those apocalyptic events, Dr. Thielicke drove directly to the central meaning of the Lord's Prayer." (Harper, \$3.00.) Also a book of Emil Brunner's sermons, a series on the Apostles' Creed, has been published under the title, *I Believe in the Living God* (Westminster, \$3.00). "The sermons are, in fact, Brunner's theology preached"; and they show, in eloquence and depth, that theology is "urgently the concern of every Christian in the pew."

Love is a Spendthrift is a book of day-by-day meditations for the Christian year, taken from the published and unpublished works of Paul E. Scherer (Harper, \$3.75). This volume was compiled by a group of his students and friends on occasion of Dr. Scherer's retirement from the Brown Chair of Homiletics at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, and it eloquently attests "that peculiar grace with which he clothes the biblical message in human language." Another prominent Lutheran has written *The Shape of Death* (Abingdon, \$2.25); Jaroslav Pelikan here deals readably with the teachings of five early fathers (Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Cyprian, Origen, Irenaeus) regarding life, death and immortality. They illustrate how "the core of the Christian faith is pessimism about life and optimism about God."

Can I Know God?, by W. E. Sangster, is an appealing book of his sermons selected and rewritten by this beloved preacher and author on the basis of the response he had received over the years from those who heard them. (Abingdon, \$2.75.) John O. Gross has written another Abingdon book, *The Beginnings of American Methodism*, "its spirit—its leaders—its institutions." This compact little history is lucid and authentic and will be appreciated by lay readers desiring information in this field. (\$2.50.) Abingdon Press has also brought out Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, as an Apex book (pap.) at \$1.75—a timely classic.

Glossolalia in the Apostolic Church, by Ira Jay Martin, 3rd, deals with "speaking in tongues" and is privately printed by the Berea College Press, Berea, Kentucky, where the author is professor of Bible and Religion. (Pap., \$1.95.) He has made a thorough study of this phenomenon in relation to its environment in the New Testament period, not only with an eye to psychologists and sociologists but for pastors, teachers, and Bible students. Genuine (as distinguished from synthetically induced) glossolalia he finds to be related "to the basic Christian experience as one of the fruits of the Spirit, as one of the cathartic demonstrations, symptomatic of a personality readjustment." Appendices on non-Christian instances of ecstatic speaking, historic interpretations, psychological explanations.

Kendig Brubaker Cully has edited a valuable anthology, *Basic Writings in Christian Education* (Westminster, \$4.95). It contains thirty-one writings from various periods of history showing the church's attitude toward education; they span Clement of Alexandria, Jerome, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, the Reformers, Milton, Locke, Mather, Pestalozzi, John Dewey, G. A. Coe. Dr. Cully has provided brief introductions to each author and period, also helpful bibliographies.

Frederick C. Grant has written *Translating the Bible* (Seabury Press, \$4.25) to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the King James Version. "A logical, accurate, and necessary volume for every student"; history of the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Bibles, and English Bibles from the fragmentary pre-Wycliffe attempts through the New English translation, and a final chapter on "Principles and Problems."

The Kossuth Foundation, 207 E. 37th Street, New York 16, has published *The Lean Years*, "a study of Hungarian Calvinism in Crisis" by Gyula Gombos (\$3.50). The author is a Hungarian essayist and editor, a former member of the congregation of Bishop Bereczky and witness to the events of 1956, now living in New York. He analyzes the techniques used by the Soviet occupation to maintain and extend its control over the Reformed Church in Hungary, "the largest Calvinist body behind the Iron Curtain."

E. H. L.



